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Against the backdrop of health research regulation, this work engages in an 
exploration of, and offers suggestions towards, how the decision maker can negotiate 
the complex path of the difficult decision. It is argued that whilst rules and principles 
are heavily relied upon in order to determine what to do, this reliance takes place 
without adequate reflection of the different ways in which we seek to rely upon these 
decision-making aids. What is most often the topic of analysis is the content which 
rules and principles carry rather than consideration of the different functions which 
each can fulfil or their (un)suitability in helping the decision maker. 
Before we consider which principles or rules should inform our decisions, we need to 
understand why we are using rules and principles. It follows that in order to 
understand why we might use rules and principles, we must understand how rules 
and principles can actually help us to reach decisions.  
Through the development and refinement of a conceptual tree, this thesis sheds light 
on the how and the why, in order to help decision makers determine the which. 
Through the metaphor of a continuum, additional insights are offered on the 
interrelationships that might co-exist between rules and principles.  
This thesis begins by offering an analysis of pre-existing understandings of rules and 
principles from legal theory and bioethics literatures. Additionally, I consider the 
implications of principle-centric and rule-centric approaches to decision-making. 
Through the overarching metaphor of a tree, a conceptualisation of best practice 
instantiations, which represent a helpful middle-ground between rules and principles 
is also offered. This can provide significant practical support to the decision maker in 







We are all faced with decisions in daily life, some of which are easy and others which 
are more difficult to make. In particular, difficult decisions must be made when 
considering how to carry out health research. Often, we base these decisions on rules 
and principles.  
This thesis takes a closer look at how we use rules and principles when making 
difficult decisions. By doing this, it offers a deeper understanding of just what rules 
and principles are. Before we decide whether to use a rule or principle (or both), we 
first need to think about the ways in which we use them, and the different jobs which 
we are asking them to do. This thesis identifies some of the different features of rules 
and principles, and the different functions which they can perform in order to help in 
the decision-making process. This work also seeks to uncover the nature of 
relationships and connections that might exist between rules and principles. 
Two literature reviews are carried out in order to understand what we already know 
about rules and principles.  Next, a tree metaphor reflecting the various findings is 
developed. A tree is made up of different parts (branches, a trunk, twigs, leaves, 
roots). This is likened to the different features and functions of rules and principles, 
and just as the leaves and branches and trunk are all connected, it is suggested that 
rules and principles are different, but connected decision-making tools. This tree 
metaphor is then tested and refined. First, it is considered in the context of typically 
principle-based decision-making. Next, and in contrast to the previous chapter, the 
tree metaphor is considered alongside a case study which focusses on decision-
making which is typically rule-based. 
This work is important because it moves current discussions forward by highlighting 
how both rules and principles (together) play important functions in the decision-
making process. Moreover, it considers how and why best practice (which represents 
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Chapter One: Introduction  
1.1 Introduction 
Decision-making is an inevitable aspect of life. Some of the decisions which we face 
are relatively simple and necessitate nothing more than a momentary thought before 
we reach our conclusion about ‘what to do’. Other decisions are altogether more 
complicated. They demand deeper reflection. The path towards discovering ‘what to 
do’ is often complex and paved with an array of considerations which must be 
factored-in along the way. It is this latter type of decision – the ‘difficult’ decision - 
which is of primary concern here.  
With a particular focus on the health research context, and through the conceptual 
metaphor of a tree, this work engages in an exploration of, and offers helpful 
suggestions towards, how one can negotiate the complex path of the ‘difficult’ 
decision. This thesis reveals different ways in which essential decision-making tools 
i.e. rules and principles can be used to support the decision maker. Through drawing 
analogies between these decision-making tools and the core features of trees, this 
thesis reveals valuable and novels insights into decision-making. It not only unpacks 
the different functions which rules and principles can perform, but also argues for the 
inclusion of best practice instantiations within decision-making armature. This thesis 
goes even further by unpacking the relationships that exist between these various 
tools, and considers their connections to the wider decision-making environment. The 
core features of the conceptual tree are summarised immediately below. 
First, from a regulatory perspective, principles and rules are key tools through which 
behaviour - the choices that we make around ‘what to do’ - can be regulated. It is 
argued in this thesis that the journey the decision maker must make from typically 
broad and abstract norms towards more prescriptive determinations of what to do is 





towards progressively narrowing twigs, and ultimately, towards different leaves. 
This is analogous to a continuum upon which principles and rules co-exist and where 
on one end, a broad abstract principle-like norm progressively narrows, becoming 
more specific, prescriptive and rule-like. The conceptual tree is fluid, and non-linear. 
That is to say that where progressive narrowing leads to a rule-like norm which is so 
rigid and prescriptive to a point that the essence of the principle which underpins it 
is lost, the decision maker is encouraged to change direction and to move back 
towards the more abstract principle-like starting norm and to travel down an 
alternative branch. In this way, the tree metaphor also accounts for the importance of 
fluidity and flexibility when dealing with difficult decisions.  
The conceptual tree also accounts for the complexity of this decision-making journey.  
A tree trunk forks into different limbs, and in turn, these limbs fork into different 
branches, multiple twigs and numerous leaves, presenting the decision maker with 
many options about which path to follow.  This space which spans across the entirety 
of a tree is analogous to the discretionary space which decision makers must self-
navigate in order to determine what to do. The ‘forking’ feature represents the 
different options which the decision maker is presented with regarding (a) potential 
principles/rules which are applicable to a given situation and (b) the diverse 
interpretations which can stem from each principle or rule.   
A tree possesses different features (roots, trunk, limbs, twigs, leaves) which all serve 
distinct and yet co-dependent functions. This thesis provides a novel exploration of 
the different functions which rules and principles (as well as best practice 
instantiations) can perform. This is important not only in terms of helping us to 
consider what we are asking of rules and principles, but also in determining the most 
appropriate regulatory approach. I argue that such an approach employs both rules 
and principles in a mutually supportive way and which should be bolstered by the 





The tree is a holistic organism. Whilst it relies heavily on its core structure (trunk, 
limbs, twigs, leaves), its health and potential to flourish are also influenced by the 
wider environment. For example, a tree is reliant upon a healthy root structure to 
deliver nutrients throughout the organism. This reliance on the surrounding 
environment is analogous to the need for something beyond rules and principles in 
order to engender a healthy decision-making environment, for example, training, 
culture and coherence.  
The conceptual tree is dynamic in nature, it requires and is amenable to on-going 
pruning. Its various features represent diverse facets of the tools and processes 
involved in decision-making and as demonstrated by virtue of this thesis, it 
represents a valuable conceptual device through which to explore, explain and 
support decision-making. 
1.2. Exploratory background and structure 
The health research context, which is the exploratory backdrop of this thesis, offers 
the perfect setting through which to explore principles and rules more fully; difficult 
decisions are plentiful1 and principles and rules are omnipresent. A plethora of 
legislative provisions and guiding principles are perpetually thrust upon us from 
legislators, professional bodies, and organisations. 
This field of enquiry represents a prime example of the challenges that come with 
regulating a complex and constantly evolving landscape; it is one which implicates a 
diverse range of stakeholders who must negotiate an extensive range of legislative 
and ethical considerations. Particular challenges emerge because of the rapid pace at 
                                                      
1 NHS Fife, ‘Making Difficult Decisions in NHS Boards in Scotland: Report of a Short Life 





which new health technologies continue to develop, the inability of the law to keep 
up,2 and the new ethical and legal dilemmas that consequently arise.  
A mere glance at the extensive legislation, professional guidance, and academic 
literatures around health research regulation uncovers a variety of principles, aimed 
at fulfilling different functions. Consider the principles included within the 
Nuremberg Code,3 reputed by some to be ‘the most important document in the 
history of the ethics of medical research’.4 The 10 principles within the Code remain 
core tenets of ethical research conduct over the 60+ years since their introduction. 
Similarly, the Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects 
of Research included within the Belmont Report5 in the United States serve to 
underpin the parameters within which biomedical and behavioural human research 
experimentation should be conducted. They offer a widely used set of ethical 
principles according to which both research applicants and Research Ethics 
Committees/Institutional Review Boards should assess the ethical robustness of 
research applications involving human participants.6  
In the United Kingdom, the major funding bodies such as the Medical Research 
Council and the Wellcome Trust and professional bodies like the General Medical 
Council and the British Medical Association offer numerous guidelines around 
research conduct.7 Relatedly, the four principles of respect for justice, autonomy, 
                                                      
2 See for example Bennett Moses, L., “Recurring Dilemmas: the Law’s Race to Keep Up with 
Technological Change”, 7 University of Illinois Journal of Law, Technology and Policy (2007), pp. 
239-285. Hereafter, ‘Bennett Moses, (2007)’. 
3 The Nuremberg Code (1947). 
4 Shuster, E., “Fifty Years Later: The Significance of the Nuremberg Code”, 337 New England 
Journal of Medicine (1997), pp. 1436-1440. 
5 Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of 
Research, Report of the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of 
Biomedical and Behavioral Research, (1979). Hereafter, ‘The Belmont Report, (1979)’. 
6 Beauchamp, T., “The Belmont Report”, Emanuel E., et al., (eds), The Oxford Textbook of Clinical 
Research Ethics, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
7 General Medical Council, ‘Good Practice in Research: Principles of Good Research Practice’ 
(2015); British Medical Association, ‘Confidentiality and Disclosure of Health Information 





beneficence and non-maleficence as advanced by Beauchamp and Childress8 feature 
extensively (and almost automatically) within Western bioethical discourse. 
Numerous further examples of the prevalence of principles can be observed by 
conducting a brief audit of key regulatory instruments not only within health, but 
also in other regulatory settings, such as the financial,9, 10 business,11 and 
environmental sectors.12 
The important point is that appeals are made to the notion of ‘principles’ and ‘rules’ 
on a daily basis and in a wide range of settings to govern a variety of activities that 
impact our lives. And yet, despite the integral spaces that they occupy, we fail to 
reflect adequately upon the different ways in which these appeals to principles and 
rules are being made. We might equally ask: what does it mean to use principles as 
opposed to rules, or vice versa? How do we know when one decision-making tool is 
being used as opposed to the other, and does it matter? A further consideration lies 
in unpacking what relationship(s) might exist between rules and principles. Put 
otherwise, we are ‘unconsciously’ relying on principles and rules.  
But why? Might it be that we are mis-using principles when, in fact, they are not the 
optimal regulatory mechanism to meet a desired end? Equally so, might it be that we 
are overly-reliant upon alternative regulatory mechanisms (such as rules) when in 
fact, a desired end could be met much more effectively through the (alternative or 
additional) deployment of principles? Even further, might it be that neither rules nor 
                                                      
8 Beauchamp T., and Childress, J., Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 7th Edition, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2013). Hereafter, ‘Beauchamp and Childress, (2013)’.  
9 Kern A., and Moloney, N., Law Reform and Financial Markets, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2011), p. 8. Hereafter, ‘Kern and Moloney, (2011)’.  
10 Black, J., “The Rise, Fall and Fate of Principles Based Regulation”, (LSE Law Society and 
Economy Working Papers 17/2010). Hereafter, ‘Black, (2010)’.  
11 See for example: HM Government, ‘Good Business: Implementing the UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights’, (2013). 
12 Kamminga, K., "Principles of International Environmental Law", 1 Environmental Policy in 





principles suffice on their own, in supporting decision makers, necessitating 
something beyond rules and principles? If so, what is this ‘something’? 
These questions are important when we consider the significant role which regulation 
must play in advancing and governing scientifically sound and ethically robust 
health research. Health research, by its very nature, engages a host of issues; legal, 
ethical and social. It appeals to questions on justice, trust, the public interest, 
solidarity, autonomy, privacy, consent, confidentiality, and commercialisation to 
name a few. It demands on-going reflection upon how to accommodate these interests 
and values, especially given that they can often conflict. The pressure is on to provide 
solutions which can relieve the current (and anticipated) healthcare demands which 
both national health systems and the international community must face. 13,14,15 
From a legislative perspective, and frequently incorporating these ethical 
considerations, health research touches upon several fundamental rights.16 Further, 
numerous international, European17 and domestic legislative instruments are 
engaged,18 accompanied of course by professional and organisational guidelines and 
standards. 
                                                      
13 See for example: Harmon, S., and Chen, K., “Medical Research Data-Sharing: The ‘Public 
Good’ and Vulnerable Groups”, 20 Medical Law Review (2012), pp. 516-539.  
14 Rynning, E., “The Ageing Populations of Europe: Implications for Health Systems and 
Patients’ Rights”, 15 European Journal of Health Law (2008), pp. 297-306. 
15 Beaglehole, R., and Yach, D., “Globalisation and the Prevention and Control of Non-
Communicable Disease: the Neglected Chronic Diseases of Adults”, 362 The Lancet (2003), pp. 
903-908. 
16 For example, the right to health is included within the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights 1948 and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966. 
Research participant rights are enshrined within instruments such as the Universal 
Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights 2005. 
17 For an interesting discussion on norms and standards of health law in Europe, see: Hoppe, 
N., “On the Europeanization of Health Law” (editorial), 17 European Journal of Health Law 
(2010), pp. 323-328. 
18 Such as the European Convention on Human Rights (Council of Europe, European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by 





It is important to remember too that health research not only furthers knowledge, 
leading to improvements in health, but additionally, it poses new risks. Such risks are 
often difficult to measure, depending upon the research in question. Risks can 
include: physical harm, psychological harm, privacy violations, distrust within 
doctor-patient and participant-researcher relationships, exploitation, and other 
harms, such as reputational damage to healthcare providers and institutions.19 Thus, 
numerous challenges appear. These challenges cannot be overcome by legislation 
(often in the form of rules) alone, which can be restrictive. In contrast, and of prime 
focus here, principles can be facilitative in regulatory terms.  
The problem is that when considering how to make difficult decisions with principles 
and rules, what is most often the topic of analysis is the content which principles and 
rules carry rather than consideration of the different jobs which we are asking them 
to perform. Before we consider which principles or rules should inform our decisions, 
we need to understand why we are using rules and principles. It follows that in order 
to understand why we might use rules and principles, we must understand how 
principles and rules can help us to reach decisions. This thesis strives to shed light on 
the how and the why, which might ultimately help decision makers determine the 
which.  
Some contributions have been made towards understanding the nature and utility of 
principles and rules, often emanating from legal jurisprudential literature where their 
respective merits and limitations have been laid out, most notably by influential 
                                                      
19 See for example Laurie, G., et al. for Nuffield Council on Bioethics, ‘A Review of Evidence 
Relating to Harm Resulting from Uses of Health and Biomedical Data’, (2015). Hereafter, 





authors such as Hart,20 Dworkin,21 Raz22 Alexy23 and Schauer.24 Other more recent 
contributions, specifically around ‘regulation’, are provided by authors such as Black, 
who has considered shifts from rule-based to principle-based-regulation (PBR).25,26 
And, while Black’s discussions take place within the context of the UK financial 
sector, PBR has also emerged in other contexts, including health research.27,28  
Within bioethics, principle-based decision-making often features as an approach 
towards determining what to do. Beauchamp and Childress’s Four Principles 29 
frequently provide the framework through which such considerations are articulated.  
Given the fact that both legal theory and bioethics literatures feature significant 
discussions on rules and principles, they represent the primary literature-bases which 
will be drawn upon in this thesis. At the same time, it should be noted from the outset 
that this body of work is not a legal theory thesis. Rather, for the reasons outlined 
above and which will appear throughout the thesis, legal theory literatures are 
employed as a valuable resource through which to conduct an important exploration. 
                                                      
20 Hart, H.L.A., The Concept of Law, 3rd Edition, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2012). Hereafter, 
‘Hart, (2012)’.  
21 Dworkin, R., “The Model of Rules”, 35 University of Chicago Law Review (1967), pp. 14-46. 
Hereafter, ‘Dworkin, (1967)’. 
22 Raz, J., “Legal Principles and the Limits of Law”, 81 Yale Law Journal (1972), pp. 823-854. 
Hereafter, ‘Raz, (1972)’. 
23 Alexy, R., "The Structure of Constitutional Rights Norms", Rivers, J., (trans), A Theory of 
Constitutional Rights, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 44–110. Hereafter, ‘Alexy, 
(2002)’.  
24 Schauer, F., Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based Decision-Making in 
Law and in Life, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991). Hereafter, ‘Schauer, (1991)’.  
25 Black, (2010).  
26 Black, J., Hopper, M., and Band, C., “Making a Success of Principles-based regulation”, 13 
Law and Financial Markets Review (2007), pp. 191-206. 
27 Devaney, S., “Regulate to Innovate: Principles-Based Regulation of Stem Cell Research”, 11 
Medical Law International (2011), pp. 53-68.   
28 Laurie, G., and Sethi, N., “Towards Principles-Based Approaches to Governance of Health-
Related Research Using Personal Data”, 1 European Journal of Risk Regulation (2013), pp. 43-57. 
Hereafter, ‘Laurie and Sethi, (2013)’.  





Indeed, despite these pre-existing contributions from the literature around how we 
conceptualise and use principles and rules, significant need for deeper analysis 
remains. For example, there has been a lack of adequate reflection upon the different 
and yet complementary functions which principles and rules might offer us as 
decision-making ‘companions’, and this thesis explores these functions. Further, 
analysis and comparison of the bioethics and legal theory literatures might usefully 
inform each other, if synthesised. 
Reflecting upon the contributions of principles and rules, away from the distractions 
of considering whether they are ‘better’ or ‘worse’ than each other, and instead, 
viewing them as complementary to one another can be of real value to contemporary 
governance.30 This thesis offers an exploration and subsequent reimagining of how 
principles and rules are conceptualised within health research regulation. 
Such a contribution moves pre-existing discussions forward in several ways. First, 
understanding the different functions (and limitations) of principles and rules might 
encourage regulators not only to design, but also to employ them in an efficient and 
appropriate manner. This can enable conscious use of principles and rules. 
Further, reflecting upon the relationship between principles and rules can aid 
regulators in proliferating regulatory approaches which make the most of both, as co-
existing within a complementary, symbiotic relationship whereby each can tend to 
the respective weaknesses of the other (laid out within this thesis). The metaphor of 
a continuum upon which rules and principles co-exist has already been invoked 
within the literature.31 This thesis develops this continuum even further, by exploring 
in more detail the grey and fluid area between rules and principles.  
                                                      
30 Black, J., “Forms and Paradoxes of Principles Based Regulation”, 3 Capital Markets Law 
Journal (2008), pp. 425-457. Hereafter, ‘Black, (2008)’. 
31 Goodin, R., Political Theory and Public Policy, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982),   






In turn, the continuum forms part of a broader conceptual device and the core 
contribution of this thesis, which is expressed through the metaphor of a conceptual 
tree and through which the findings of the thesis are articulated, developed, tested 
and refined. The conceptual tree not only accounts for the grey area between 
principles and rules, but additionally sheds light on specification (a methodology 
which purports to aid decision makers in applying principles), which remains 
underexplored in the literature. Special attention is also given to exploring and 
highlighting the value which instantiations of best practice can bring to decision 
makers. It is suggested that these can be conceptualised as a combination of 
specification and casuistry and can support the decision maker in determining what 
to do.  
Thus, the core contribution of this thesis lies in taking us beyond discussions which 
have preceded it, discussions which lack reflection of the full range of functions of 
principles and how they can be used alongside rules. Hitherto, we have tended to 
dichotomise rules and principles-based regulation, considering that either one or the 
other can be employed, rather than attempting to understand how we can make the 
most of both together, i.e. how we can use both rules and principles alongside each 
other, in a complementary and mutually supportive way. This thesis takes a step in 
transporting us away from dichotomy and towards harmony, advancing a more 
constructive, complementary approach of principles and rules within regulation in 
health research, whilst simultaneously revealing the helpful tools which exist ‘in 
between’ typical rule-like and principle-like norms.  The time has come to explore 
more deeply just how principles, rules and best practice can support the decision 
maker. 
This thesis consists of two parts. Part One (chapters two, three and four) explores 
what we can learn about principles and rules in decision-making from pre-existing 





A bespoke analytical template is developed in order to facilitate directed literature 
reviews. The template consists of six core themes which continually emerged during 
preliminary background research and which are pertinent to uncovering more about 
rules, principles and methodology associated in their application. The literature 
reviews and ensuing discussions are conducted around these themes, which are: 
form; function; application; dichotomisation; conflict and interrelationship. The 
findings from the literature reviews are compared and analysed. Comparing both 
bodies of literature is a novel undertaking. As a result, the metaphor of a tree provides 
a helpful conceptual tool with which to articulate the findings.  
Part Two of this thesis (chapters five, six and seven) begins with an analytical 
discussion on Principlism and specification, provided in chapter five. This builds 
upon the discussions and lines for further investigation raised in the literature 
reviews and introduces best practice instantiations as potential decision-making 
devices. The chapter also progresses existing discussions on specification – which 
remains a relatively underexplored topic of analysis which the literature, despite the 
significant claim that the methodology can help to extract action-guiding content 
from abstract norms.   Chapter six builds on the preceding chapter and offers a case 
study on the Scottish Health Informatics Programme (SHIP) which demonstrates the 
added value which best practice can bring in practical terms for decision-making. The 
approach taken in chapter six relies heavily on the methodology of analytical 
ethnography which enables me to incorporate the unique insights which I gained as 
a core member of SHIP. Additionally, both chapters five and six are used in order to 
test and further refine the conceptual tree and they respectively consider principle-
centric and rule-centric approaches to decision-making which provides a helpful 
frame of comparison. The final chapter draws together the contributions of this work 
and considers in more detail the originality and value of the contribution being made 
here.  
 Prior to beginning the first literature review, it is necessary to lay out definitions of 





provides such definitions whilst simultaneously highlighting the need for further 
clarity around the terms and how they relate to each other.  
1.3 Definitions 
Whilst it is relatively unproblematic to highlight the prevalence of principles and 
rules, actually defining and distinguishing between them are more complex and 
challenging tasks. Principles and rules can mean different things to different people32 
in different contexts. This is somewhat ironic, given that, as it transpires throughout 
this thesis, individual principles and rules are themselves subject to differing 
interpretations. It is even the case that rules and principles can be conflated, 
complicating matters further; 
The distinction between rules and principles is not new. But in spite 
of its age and frequent usage, it is still dogged by confusion and 
controversy. A confusing variety of distinguishing criteria are on 
offer, their relationship to other things, such as values, is obscure, 
and the terminology is inconsistent.33 
Preliminary consultation of the Oxford Online English dictionary aptly illustrates the 
confusion which can arise when attempting to distinguish between rules and 
principles: 
Rule: noun: 
1. One of a set of explicit or understood regulations or principles 
governing conduct or procedure within a particular area of 
activity: 
the rules of cricket, those who did break the 
rules would be dealt with swiftly 
                                                      
32 Wildes, K., “Principles, Rules, Duties and Babel: Bioethics in the Face of Postmodernity”, 17 
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy (1992), pp. 483-485, p. 484. Hereafter, ‘Wildes, (1992)’. 





 1.1        A principle that operates within a particular sphere of 
  knowledge, describing or prescribing what is  
  possible or allowable: 
  the rules of grammar 
1.2  A code of practice and discipline for a religious order 
or community: 
  The Rule of St Benedict.34 
Just as the definition of ‘rule’ includes the description of a ‘principle’, the converse is 
true under the definition of ‘principle’ below: 
 
 Principle: noun 
1. A fundamental truth or proposition that serves as the foundation for a 
system of belief or behaviour or for a chain of reasoning: 
   
the basic principles of justice 
 
 1.1 (usually principles) A rule or belief governing one’s behaviour: 
   
struggling to be true to their own principles 
 
 
[MASS NOUN]: she resigned over a matter of principle 
 
 1.2 [mass noun] Morally correct behaviour and attitudes: 
  
a man of principle 
2. A general scientific theorem or law that has numerous special                   
applications across a wide field.35 
                                                      
34 Oxford Dictionary (online, English, UK) definition of ‘rule’. Oxford University Press, (2015). 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/rule accessed 14th July 2015.  
35 Oxford Dictionary (online, English, UK) definition of ‘principle’. Oxford University Press, 
(2015). Accessed 14 July 2015:  





These definitions already illustrate at this early stage the ease with which the two 
terms can be conflated.  One of the central contributions of this thesis lies in the 
important task of unpacking the different understandings of rules and principles, and 
thus exposing the nuances within the varying understandings. In turn, this can 
contribute towards enriching our conceptualisations of what it means to call upon a 
rule or a principle.  
Given that varying definitions can be attached to rules and principles, laying out clear 
definitions of rules and principles from the outset is adventitious. What would be 
helpful, however, is to at least offer starting points of reference for each of the terms.  
1.3.1 Principle 
As I have laid out elsewhere:  
A principle can constitute an ethical value for consideration, such 
as the principle of beneficence, which, in the medical context, 
implies that actions taken by physicians should benefit their 
patients. Similarly, a principle can be conceptualised as a legal 
principle. For example, the precautionary principle commonly 
appears within discussions around research and risk: “At its most 
basic, the precautionary principle is a principle of public decision 
making that requires decision makers in cases where there are 
‘threats’ of environmental or health harm not to use ‘lack of full 
scientific uncertainty’ as a reason for not taking measures to prevent 
such harm”.  In yet other contexts, principles feature frequently 
within professional guidelines, akin to standards of practice, and 
often, such principles can appear, confusingly, to be just as 
prescriptive as rules The General Medical Council, for example, 
expects registered doctors in the UK to abide by its Principles of 
Good Research Practice. 36  
This indicates that various incarnations of principles exist within the health research 
context. For this reason, an intentionally broad and inclusive definition of principles 
                                                      
36 Sethi, N., "Reimagining Regulatory Approaches: On the Essential Role of Principles in 





is adopted from the outset of this thesis, and is based on the definitions offered by 
Alexy and Dworkin. Alexy claims that:  
principles are norms which require that something be realized to 
the greatest extent possible given the legal and factual possibilities. 
Principles are optimization requirements, characterized by the fact 
that they can be satisfied to varying degrees.37  
A further helpful feature of principles comes from Dworkin, who argues that 
they possess a ‘dimension of weight’38 which is lacking in rules:  
Even those [principles] which look most like rules do not set out 
legal consequences that follow automatically when the conditions 
provided are met....Principles have  a  dimension that rules do not - 
the dimension of weight or importance.  When principles intersect 
... one who must resolve the conflict has to take into account the 
relative weight of each [...] Rules do not have this dimension.39 
 
Principles, Dworkin argues, capture the more complex nuances of decision-making. 
He maintains that principles do not imply 'all or nothing' approaches to decision-
making but rather, as Alexy puts it, they imply that one carry something out the 
greatest degree possible ‘relative to what is legally and factually possible’.40Thus, 
principles are considered at this early point as norms which can be satisfied to varying 
degrees and which carry a dimension of weight. 
1.3.2 Rule 
In the same way that various forms of principles exist, different types of rules can also 
be identified. For example, Schauer highlights the distinction between descriptive 
                                                      
37 Alexy, (2002), pp. 47-48.  
38 Dworkin, (1967), p. 27. 
39 Ibid., p. 27.  





and prescriptive rules.41 The former, he notes, are used to ‘state an empirical 
regularity or generalization’.42 For example, ’as a rule, no-one sings before 8am’.  In 
contrast, prescriptive rules ‘ordinarily have normative semantic content, and are used 
to guide, control, or change the behavior of agents with decision-making capacities’.43 
For example, ‘we have a rule that no-one sings before 8am’. Additionally, authors 
have distinguished between constitutive and regulative rules44,45,46 but as Schauer 
explains, the distinction between different types of rules is not always clear.47 I am 
therefore choosing not to restrict the discussion to only one ‘type’ of rule, in order to 
keep the literature review as inclusive as possible.  
Akin to the preliminary definition of principles, capacious definitions of rules are also 
offered from Alexy and Dworkin. Alexy asserts that: 
rules are norms which are always either fulfilled or not. If a rule 
validly applies, then the requirement is to do exactly what it says, 
neither more nor less. In this way rules contain fixed points in the 
field of the factually and legally possible.48 
Dworkin builds upon this:  
Rules are applicable in an all-or-nothing fashion. If the facts a rule 
stipulates are given, then either the rule is valid, in which case the 
answer it supplies must be accepted, or it is not, in which case it 
contributes nothing to the decision.49 
 
                                                      
41 Schauer, (1991).  
42 Ibid., p. 1.  
43 Ibid., p. 2.  
44 Hart, (2012). 
45 Black, (2007), (2008), (2010). 
46 Searle, J., Speech Acts, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969).  
47 Schauer, (1991). 
48 Alexy, (2002), p. 47-48. 





The interpretations and the distinctions which Alexy and Dworkin propose based on 
applicability will be considered in more detail later. A starting definition of a rule is 
hence taken as ‘a norm which is applicable or not’.  
At this initial point all that is necessary is to note that as a springboard for the 
proceeding discussion, both rules and principles are considered broadly as norms 
which require action. Thus, principles are viewed as optimisation maxims whereas 
rules, subject to exceptions, are viewed as either applicable or not applicable. It will 
transpire that whilst this distinction appears straight-forward in theory, it is a crude 
representation of much more nuanced conceptualisations of rules and principles (and 
the interrelationships between them).  
Indeed, the practical reality of distinguishing between the two is a more challenging 
task and this thesis asks and seeks to answer whether a more valuable (yet still 
related) pursuit is one centred on understanding how both relate to each other.  This 
is one of the reasons why this thesis is not concerned with establishing categorical 
distinctions between rules and principles per se. Rather, in adopting the metaphor of 
a continuum with rules entering from one end and principles from the other end, the 
investigation here strives to reveal the nuances that exist on this continuum. As 
Wittgenstein has suggested, ‘the meaning of a word is its use in the language’.50  Thus, 
as mentioned above, a necessary component of this activity involves exploration of 
the relationships between rules and principles and centres on how these norms are 
used.  
This thesis borrows the Wittgensteinian analogy of ‘family resemblances’ where focus 
is not on establishing hard and fast definitions, but rather, in the context of rules and 
principles, this thesis strives to unpack ‘a complicated network of similarities 
overlapping and criss-crossing’.51 This highlights the value that lies in developing our 
                                                      
50 Wittgenstein, L., Philosophical Investigations, 2nd Edition Anscombe, G., (trans), (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1958), para 43. Hereafter ‘Wittgenstein, (1958)’.  





understanding of the different features that might render a norm ‘rule-like’ or 
‘principle-like’.  
This thesis also benefits from a pragmatic bespoke analytical template with which to 
explore key contributions from the relevant literature. The next section considers the 
template in more detail.  
1.4 Analytical Template with which to conduct literature reviews 
This thesis adopts a pragmatic, approach to conducting two literature reviews. The 
pragmatism lies in the construction and subsequent application of a bespoke 
analytical template which is applied to the relevant literatures. Comparing bioethics 
and legal theory literatures through the employment of a template is a novel approach 
and given the important space discussions on rules and principles has occupied in 
legal theory literatures, and the heavy reliance upon principles within bioethics 
literatures, it is valuable that such a comparison is undertaken. 
A literature review template is a valuable instrument through which to structure 
inquiry and discussion. Such an analytical lens has the advantage of facilitating 
comparison across the two literature bases. The template also provides a means for 
tracking how discussion and conceptualisation of rules, principles and their 
interrelationship develops throughout the course of the thesis. The key components 
of the template (referred to as ‘themes’) and the method of application are outlined 
below. 
The development of this template involves the identification of key themes which are 
of most interest to the line of inquiry here i.e. those which serve to uncover insights 
around purported characterisations of: rules and principles, their functions, and how 
they might relate to each other. Rather than adopting a broad and undirected 
approach to reviewing the literature, a template-based analysis facilitates a focussed 
review of literatures. This approach promotes exploration of contributions in the 





Neither literature review represents a complete and coherent historical analysis about 
each and every commentary relating to rules and principles.  Apart from the question 
of whether it is ever possible to provide a complete historical analysis about anything, 
attempting to do so would be distracting and unnecessary to the goals of this thesis.  
 
Rather, both literature reviews serve to highlight key areas of interest for this thesis 
in a coherent and well-structured fashion. Whilst analysis may subsequently appear 
incomplete and non-linear from a historical perspective, the adopted approach 
nonetheless offers a more effective and efficient means of conducting research than 
the alternative of a trite account of every single contribution which emerges, 
regardless of its (ir)relevance to this thesis.  
1.4.1 Template themes 
This section outlines the six key themes of which the analytical literature review 
template is comprised. Each theme corresponds to a different aspect of the nature of 
rules and principles. Additionally, some of the themes focus on the different 
interactions which might take place between rules and principles. During preliminary 
background research on this thesis topic, common themes of discussion continually 
re-emerged, indicating that shaping inquiries around these particular topics would 
be particularly fruitful in terms of uncovering how we can better understand rules 
and principles and the different dynamics which prevail between them. Thus, the 
following themes are included within the bespoke analytical template: form, function, 
application, dichotomisation, conflict and interrelationship. A definition of each 
theme is offered immediately below. 
1.4.1.1 Form 
Form is defined broadly as the way in which rules and principles are formulated or 
conveyed.  More specifically for the purposes of this thesis, form relates to purported 





form includes, for example, discussions around the language used in describing 
principles and rules. An important point for clarification from the outset is that when 
considering form, it is the implications of the form which rules and principles might 
take for decision-making that is of most significance to this thesis. For example, 
principle-like norms typically (but not always) correspond to abstract language rather 
than the (typically) ‘rigid’ or prescriptive language of rules.  
This thesis avoids discussions on which sources of the law (or external to the law) are 
valid, or whether for example, principles constitute ‘the law’. This clarification is 
necessary because there is a substantial body of literature, particularly within legal 
theory, which evaluates the validity of rules and principles as ‘law’, dependent upon 
the sources from which they emanate.52,53  In-depth engagement with such discussions 
is beyond the scope of this particular body of work54 because these are very specific 
questions about the nature of law and legal positivism and distracting to the task at 
hand. Hence, only those debates of direct relevance to this thesis are considered.  
1.4.1.2 Function 
Function relates to the purpose which the rule or principle is perceived to serve in the 
context of decision-making. For example, this would include discussions around 
whether and if so, how, principles and rules might be relied upon to guide decision-
making and determining ‘what to do’.  Identifying the different functions which rules 
and principles are perceived to perform is crucial for this thesis because this 
contributes towards developing a deeper understanding around the different uses 
that there might be for rules and principles and ultimately, their (un)suitability to 
performing different functions in practice. As will be demonstrated, occasionally the 
language of ‘rule’ or ‘principle’ is used, when in fact the expected function is more 
                                                      
52 Referred to as the ‘Rule of Recognition’ in Hart, Concept of Law, (2012).  
53 Green, L., ‘Legal Positivism’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Jurisprudence. Accessed 27 Jan 2014: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-positivism/. 
54 For more on ‘sources’ and ‘validity’, see: Hart, (2012) and MacCormick, N., Institutions of 





akin to its opposite number and vice versa, i.e. – there can be an appeal to principles 
when what is required are hard rules, or rules are laid down which operate in a way 
far more characteristic of principles.  
1.4.1.3 Application 
This theme relates to literatures that discuss how rules and principles might be 
applied to a particular decision or dilemma, i.e. the methodologies which might be 
adopted in using rules and principles. For example, this would include considerations 
around whether rules and principles are applied before or after a decision has been 
taken. Another example might be that of how conflict is addressed and resolved 
between principles via the use of specification (a methodology purported to add 
action-guiding content to abstract principles). It becomes apparent that while 
literatures allude to methodology of application, robust guidance for the decision 
maker on practical application is seriously lacking. Understanding how rules and 
principles are utilised is significant for determining the strengths and limitations of 
different processes of employing rules and principles to guide decisions. 
1.4.1.4 Dichotomisation 
This refers to discussions that set up rules and principles (and their strengths and 
limitations) against one another as opposed to treating them in a complementary 
fashion. Such literature would include, for example, comparing and contrasting 
discussions which favour rules over principles or vice versa (for example, debates on 
principle-based regulation and rule-based regulation are considered further below). 
Considering how rules and principles are dichotomised is important in order to 
understand pre-conceptions around any (antagonistic) relationships between them. 
This subsequently moves debate forward by considering whether these 
dichotomisations are substantiated, or whether a way can be found with which to 
optimise decision-making by using rules and principles in tandem with one another, 





have to offer and where one can compensate for the limitations that the other might 
have. 
1.4.1.5 Conflict 
Conflict refers to the way in which either conflict between rules and rules (inter-rule 
conflict), and principles and principles (inter-principle conflict) occurs, or conflict as 
it may arise between rules and principles. This also refers to the different methods 
advanced within the literature in order to resolve any such tensions.  For example, 
this might include discussions around how different rules or principles should be 
prioritised over competing rules or principles. Understanding how conflict is 
addressed within the literature is important for this thesis because this might provide 
helpful practical guidance on how such conflicts might be avoided or resolved in 
practice. 
1.4.1.6 Interrelationship 
This theme relates to discussions of how rules and principles might be connected to 
one another, and what the nature of this connection might be, albeit that it features 
some overlap with the themes of dichotomisation and conflict. This theme includes 
considerations around how principles might evolve to become rules or vice versa, 
and as to how principles and rules might be used in tandem with one another. 
Additionally, this theme encompasses discussions on confusion and conflation that 
can arise when relying on the terms ‘rule’ and ‘principle’, as illustrated from the 
dictionary definitions offered in chapter one.  
Further, the interrelationship theme not only provides a point of contrast with the 
‘dichotomisation’ theme outlined above, but it also helps to develop an 
understanding around any potential complementarity that might exist between rules 
and principles. It transpires that the metaphor of a tree which includes the co-
existence of rules and principles upon a continuum, provides a helpful 





the interrelationship(s) between principles and rules is integral for moving traditional 
debates forward and considering how decision makers might make the most out of 
rules and principles. 
1.4.2 Potential challenges to employing the template  
It is acknowledged that whilst the novel template-based approach has many 
advantages outlined above, it is also vulnerable to challenges in its implementation. 
This section discusses these potential challenges. 
A preliminary objection to the template is that different themes may be more or less 
relevant to each of the literatures under consultation. This is true. For example, it 
transpires that the ‘form’ theme is more apparent within legal theory than bioethics 
literature. This may be because of the differing objectives of each of the disciplines. 
The inherent objective of legal theory, it can be argued, is to seek to understand the 
nature of the law.55  In contrast, bioethics can be considered both a species of 
practical/applied ethics, concerned with the resolution of practical problems56 and of 
conceptual considerations.57  This is not to say that bioethics and legal theory have 
completely separate, unrelated goals, but it is important to understand and appreciate 
these differences.  Further, it is argued that this is not a weakness of the template per 
se. Even if alternative methodological approaches were taken, the occasionally 
diverging objectives of jurisprudence and bioethics are inescapable. The telos of these 
literature reviews is not simply to compare and contrast what the different literatures 
tell us about rules and principles. Rather, such a comparative analysis forms the basis 
for a valuable contribution towards both disciplines. By taking a holistic approach, 
                                                      
55 Granted, the different strands of legal theory will tend towards different goals, with 
normative and analytical jurisprudence, for example. 
56 Iltis, A., "Bioethics as Methodological Case Resolution: Specification, Specified Principlism 
and Casuistry", 25 Journal of Medicine and Philosophy (2000), pp. 271–84. Hereafter, ‘Iltis, (2000)’. 
57 A comprehensive discussion on the relationship between theory and bioethics can be found 
in: Arras, J., Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ‘Theory and Bioethics’, (2010), accessed 15 





this thesis enables exploration of what bioethics can learn from legal theory and vice 
versa with regards to the ways in which rules and principles are used. The aspiration 
of an holistic approach makes the deployment of a common template more justifiable 
in that it promotes ease of identification and comparison of diverse ways different 
communities think about and use principles and rules. 
Another anticipated challenge lies in determining under which theme different 
discussions are to be considered; discussions encountered in the literature may be 
‘multi-applicable’ in that they relate to more than one of the template themes outlined 
above. For example, the way in which rules and principles are applied could also 
relate to how they are applied when conflict arises between different rules or 
principles (thus eligible to be considered under both themes of ‘application’ and 
‘conflict’). Unfortunately, the task of categorising discussions under respective 
themes cannot be avoided; such an undertaking is a necessary step of adopting a 
template-based approach.  Thus, the same feature of rules and principles may be 
discussed more than once, but each time, only with relevance to how it corresponds 
to the particular theme under which it is being analysed. An additional weakness is 
that a thematic approach may risk the exclusion of important observations that do not 
fit under the template themes. The template themes are intentionally latitudinous in 
order to accommodate a broad spectrum of discussion.   
Further, although the likelihood that some important observations may still be 
overlooked remains, it is argued here that the template remains sufficiently robust 
and inclusive that the most relevant discussions for this thesis should be accessed.  
Again, the purpose of this thesis is not to recount every single observation about rules 
and principles which can be made, but to offer a more nuanced understanding about 
the nature of rules and principles and their interrelationship. It is argued that risks of 
missing out on secondary observations (i.e. those which are not of immediate concern 
here) are much outweighed by the benefits of taking a focussed, structured and 
methodical approach to reviewing the literature.  The analytical template is a novel, 





PART ONE: REMAINING ROOTED WHILST BRANCHING OUT: 
WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM THE LITERATURE? 
 
Having introduced the important work which this thesis sets out to do and the context 
within which the research is being conducted, we can now move on to Part One of 
this thesis, which asks:  what we can learn about principles and rules in decision-
making from pre-existing legal theory and bioethics literatures? 
Chapters two and three offer literature reviews and ensuing discussions are 
conducted around the key themes included within the bespoke analytical template 
laid out in chapter one. The findings from the literature reviews are compared and 
analysed in chapter four, the culmination of the findings results in the development 
of a conceptual tree metaphor. This metaphor provides a helpful conceptual tool not 
only with which to articulate the findings from the literature reviews, but to test them 








































Chapter Two: What can we learn from the Legal Theory 
Literature? 
2.1. Introduction  
Having outlined the themes of the analytical template and considered its utility and 
potential challenges, this chapter applies the template to the relevant legal theory 
literature. This chapter considers the decisive contributions which have emerged 
within legal theory literature and which discuss the roles of rules and principles, and 
the interrelationship between the two decision-making tools. This chapter concludes 
by discussing key findings from the application of the template. Particular focus is 
dedicated towards consideration of the relative strengths and weaknesses associated 
with principles and rules, and how the two might interact. As stated in chapter one, 
this preliminary literature review provides a novel platform against which to draw 
comparisons with and forge contrasts to the bioethical literature reviewed in chapter 
three. 
Discussions are structured around each of the template themes. A broad 
interpretation of ‘legal theory’ is adopted for the purposes of this literature review, 
which seeks to include discussions relating to the nature of law, notably the 
relationship between law’s normativity, coerciveness and the implications of its 
institutional and structural characteristics.58 
Consultation is not restricted to ‘classical’ legal theory literatures, but also includes 
literatures which may not typically fall within traditional conceptualisations of 
jurisprudential literatures but which remain valuable for the present discussion 
nonetheless. For example, as we see further below, Braithwaite’s considerations of 
rules and principles may typically be categorised as falling within the domains of 
                                                      






criminology and business regulation, but his work addresses questions of the 
relationships between rules and principles on a conceptual level.59 It would be short-
sighted to exclude such literature simply because it is not prima facie recognisable as 
jurisprudential literature, despite the fact that its inclusion could benefit the analysis 
here. Indeed, commentary on the nature of law and its operation is not the exclusive 
dominion of legal theorists.  
Application of the template to the legal theory (and related) literature provides 
several advantages for this thesis. The role of principles and rules in decision-making 
has occupied a vast and long-enduring space within the legal theory setting, and it is 
argued that this discussion remains pertinent today. The terms ‘rule’ ‘principle’ and 
‘norm’ carry with them considerable ‘jurisprudential baggage’.60 The literature review 
flags up key commentaries around the nature of principles and rules and how they 
might be used in decision-making. In turn, this not only lays out why this thesis topic 
merits consideration, but additionally, it serves in identifying gaps in the literature, 
some of which this thesis can contribute towards addressing by extending the enquiry 
on the core concepts – rules and principles – beyond the legal domain in subsequent 
chapters.  
It is worth reiterating that this is not a legal theory thesis. Accordingly, a core function 
of this chapter lies in providing a platform for comparison and contrast with how the 
key themes in the analytical template are considered between the legal theory 
literature and the bioethical literature which is reviewed in the following chapter. 
Again, this is a novel and valuable undertaking in and of itself. 
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2.2. Application of Template to Legal Theory Literature 
2.2.1 Form: the way in which rules and principles are formulated or conveyed
   
The form in which rules and principles are communicated has received considerable 
attention within the literature. In particular, form has been discussed in light of how 
principles and rules might be interpreted and how they can be differentiated from 
each other. 
Rules are typically described as hard and fast determinations which tell the decision 
maker what to do. They are characterised as specific prescriptions61 and contrasted 
with principles, typically defined as non-specific prescriptions.62,63 Specificity is a 
recurring theme within the literature and it is often employed as a term to refer to a 
level of prescriptiveness or particularity,64 most often (but not exclusively) associated 
with rules. There is a tendency to characterise a key point of distinction between rules 
and principles as one which lies between the specific (rules) and the general or vague 
(principles). 
2.2.1.1 Specificity and generality – meaningful distinctions?  
Schauer stresses that there is an important distinction to be made between general 
and vague prescriptions: specificity is a dimension of particularity, of precision, and 
this is to be contrasted with ‘vagueness’65 rather than generality.  He suggests that 
general prescriptions need not lack specificity, rather: 
                                                      
61 Braithwaite offers the example of ‘a rule preventing the dumping of chemical X’,  
Braithwaite, J., "Rules and Principles: A Theory of Legal Certainty", 27 Australian Journal of 
Legal Philosophy (2002), pp. 47-82, p. 51. Hereafter, ‘Brathwaite, (2002)’.  
62 Ibid., p. 47. 
63 Braithwaite uses the example of “a legal principle of environmental regulation like 
‘continuous improvement’”, ibid. 
64 A reminder that these descriptions are non-absolute. It is appreciated that both general and 
particular norms can be binding.  





The opposite of the specific is not so much the general as the vague. 
Not all general classes (or categories) are vague. The category 
‘insects’, for example, is very large, including literally trillions of 
particular insects, but it is still reasonably specific, in the sense of 
precise.66 
This distinction between the vague and the general is an important one because it 
suggests that rules, just like principles, can be general in nature. It suggests that 
vagueness around what to do, rather than generality, is a distinguishing feature 
between the two norms. This notion also suggests that rules and principles may be 
conceptualised as co-existing upon a continuum, where at one end, specific, precise 
prescriptions (typically rule-like norms) exist, and on the other end, vague 
prescriptions (typically principle-like norms) exist.  As considered later in this 
chapter, this continuum analogy/perspective has also been evoked by other 
authors67,68 and it is one that is further developed throughout this thesis. It is 
suggested that whilst the legal theory offers a solid foundation for the continuum, 
more nuanced relationships between rules and principles must be revealed and 
understood. 
Diver argues that tightly specified rules will increase specificity, so lack of precision 
leads to indeterminacy: ‘vagueness is a common affliction of regulatory standards, 
especially those that rely on such open-ended terms as ‘in the public interest’, 
‘feasible’, or ‘reasonable’”.69, 70  It is worth considering that vagueness/uncertainty 
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Hereafter, ‘Solum, (2009)’.  
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70 For an interesting project which strives to unpack the meaning of the term ‘public interest, 






might not necessarily be a disadvantage; for example, an overly prescriptive or 
narrow concept of ‘public interest’ or ‘reasonableness’ might be unhelpful.  
Already, we encounter another key difficulty: the emphasis/reliance that is placed 
upon specificity as a tool with which to distinguish between rules and principles.  
However, ‘there is no hard and fast line…consequently, there will be many cases 
where it will be impossible to say that we definitely have a rule or definitely a 
principle’.71 Why, then, one might ask, is it important to know whether we are dealing 
with a rule or a principle?  
Understanding whether we are dealing with a rule or a principle can help us to use 
the rule or principle in the most appropriate way (and to have realistic expectations 
about the relative strengths and limitations of each approach) or to reconsider 
whether the alternative (a rule rather than principle or vice versa) might be more 
constructive for fulfilling the purpose we are endeavouring towards.  At first blush, 
this may appear to contradict the idea of a continuum where conceptualisations and 
distinctions between rules and principles can overlap and become blurred. But, at 
each end of the continuum, a more easily discernible, typical rule-like or principle-
like norm is situated.  
Hard and soft rules are also distinguished – hard rules provide an ‘easy application’ 
of conditions for application and consequences, with rules becoming softer as the 
criteria for application and consequence become less clear. 72 It is noted, however, that 
vagueness may also feature around rules typically considered ‘hard’. Consider, for 
example, the ‘use of force’ in international law.73 Whilst this rule is thought of as 
‘hard’, there is much vagueness around what constitutes ‘use of force’.74 This once 
more highlights the challenges in distinguishing between different types of rule, let 
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alone rules and principles, again, in turn reinforcing the value of this thesis in fleshing 
out nuances rather than trying to categorically distinguish between the norms. The 
latter point around vagueness also raises the issue of open texture and indeterminacy, 
considered next.  
2.2.1.2 Open texture and indeterminacy  
A criticism of principle-based decision-making is that the language used in 
expressing principles is uncertain, giving rise to indeterminacy. Yet, in recognising 
the ‘open texture’ of the law in Concept of Law,75 Hart points out that even rules will 
always be open to interpretation. He illustrates the ambiguity which can arise using 
the example of the rule ‘no vehicles allowed in the park’. Two ‘open textured’ terms 
are contained within this rule: ‘vehicle’ and ‘in the park’. Hart questions whether ‘a 
toy motorcar electronically propelled’ would fit under the scope of the rule. He aptly 
problematises open texture as follows: 
There is a limit, inherent in the nature of language, to the guidance 
which general language can provide. There will indeed be plain 
cases constantly recurring in similar contexts to which general 
expressions are clearly applicable but there will also be cases where 
it is not clear whether they apply or not....Here something in the 
nature of a crisis in communication is precipitated:  there are 
reasons both for and against our use of a general term...If in such 
cases doubts are to be resolved, something in the nature of a choice 
between open alternatives must be made by whoever is to resolve 
them.76 
This bolsters the earlier supposition that rules may also be characterised as ‘general’, 
suggesting that relying upon specificity as a distinguishing feature of rules is not 
always appropriate. Moreover, Hart’s reference to the fact that a choice must be made 
regarding interpretation highlights the need for decision makers to exercise 
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discretion, even when equipped with a rule. Later in the thesis, the role of discretion 
is considered in more detail.  
Similarly, Rumble identifies the additional interpretative challenges faced by judges 
when confronted with rules, these include: 
• that fact that precedents in favour of either side of an argument could be 
found; 
• the broad scope of precedents; 
• the inherent difficulty in determining narrow or broad implications of rules; 
and  
• the fact that no two cases are identical thus giving rise to room for distinction 
and conversely, room for comparison where two initially separate cases 
appear more alike. 77   
 
This list further supports the inference that both rules and principles are open to 
challenges of interpretation. This also links to the overarching analytical theme of 
‘form’ in reiterating that form can be misleading and that we need to consider form 
in tandem with other themes in the analytical template, such as function. This in turn 
reinforces the utility of the analytical template in offering a more robust analysis of 
the literature.  
Challenges of interpretation also suggest that decision makers may need to avoid the 
temptation of prematurely assuming that a rule is a rule or that a principle is a 
principle. Rather, through deeper analysis, it may be necessary to discern and identify 
whether rules and principles are what they first appear to be, or whether they have 
been misnamed. This in turn might suggest that a more reliable means of identifying 
rules and principles is needed, or, equally, it may simply mean that we need to better 
understand how to use rules and principles in a way which is more accurately 
reflective of their functions, their nature, and thus, their appropriateness to a given 
context. The contribution made in this thesis can help us in this regard.  
                                                      






2.2.1.3 Identifying rules: pedigree or content? 
In The Model of Rules I, 78 Dworkin objects to positivism, with a particular focus on 
Hart’s conceptualisation of positivism, which is summarised as follows:   
The law of a community is a set of special rules used by the 
community directly or indirectly for the purpose of determining 
which behaviour will be punished or coerced by the public power. 
These special rules can be identified and distinguished by specific 
criteria, by tests having to do not with their content but with their 
pedigree or the manner in which they were adopted or 
developed.79,80  
Thus, for positivists, the form which rules take, in terms of how they are identified, is 
based on whether or not they meet criteria as opposed to the content included within 
the rules. For Austin, the test for identifying special rules is based on authority and 
upon who or what entity the rule has emanated from. He argues that rules are 
identified by considering what the sovereign has commanded81 (the ‘sovereign’ being 
the public power at that time). Austin’s work distinguishes legal/religious/moral 
rules according to who is the author of the command which the rule represents. This 
take on positivism has given rise to two key objections:  
(1) It is unrealistic to identify one determinate group or ‘sovereign’ 
given today’s pluralistic society and 
(2) This simplistic approach overlooks the ‘special authority’, which 
is attached to the law; Austin’s approach relies upon threat of force 
to ensure observation of rules and obligations, but does not 
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distinguish between the law as authority and other sources of threat 
for example, the Mafia. 
Whilst varying conceptualisations of positivism exist, Hart’s approach is arguably the 
best-known manifestation of the positivist theory in contemporary jurisprudence. It 
differs from Austin’s approach in several ways. First, it marks a distinction between 
being obligated (which means being bound by a rule) and being obliged (which renders 
conduct subject to inquiry, if certain conduct is not observed but lacks the 
commitment of non-derogation from a rule). Second, derogating from the stress that 
Austin places on the will of the sovereign, Hart locates the authority of a rule in two 
sources: 
(1) Where a rule is accepted as a standard for conduct and:  
(2) The rule is valid i.e. it is enacted ‘in conformity with some 
secondary rule that stipulates that rules so enacted shall be 
binding.’82 
In contrast, Dworkin stresses that the law as a system comprises of standards, policies 
and principles.  Principles, he claims, are legally binding due to their content or their 
appropriateness in satisfying justice. One interpretation of this claim is that principles 
and rules contrast in their goals or functions. A Dworkinian approach paints 
principles in a more virtuous light than rules, because they are assessed on their 
content as opposed to mere formal criteria which renders them (in)applicable.  
This raises an important point about the different types of principles discussed within 
the literature and one which Dworkin seeks to address. He refers to principles 
generically in reference to ‘standards other than rules’ whilst simultaneously 
delineating between principles and policies thusly: 
I call a “policy” that kind of standard that sets out a goal to be 
reached, generally an improvement in some economic, political or 
social feature of the community (though some goals are negative, 
in that they stipulate that some present feature is to be protected 
                                                      





from adverse change). I call a “principle” a standard that is to be 
observed, not because it will advance or secure an economic, 
political, or social situation deemed desirable, but because it is a 
requirement of justice or fairness or some other dimension of 
morality….The distinction can be collapsed by construing a 
principle as stating a social goal (i.e., the goal of a society in which 
no man profits by his own wrong), or by construing a policy as 
stating a principle (i.e., the principle that the goal the policy 
embraces is a worthy one) or by adopting the utilitarian thesis that 
principles of justice are disguised statements of goals (securing the 
greatest happiness of the greatest number). In some contexts the 
distinction has uses which are lost if it is thus collapsed. 83 
This reiterates that one of the key challenges when considering rules and principles 
is that the use of terminology and thus definitions and conceptualisations are varying. 
On one hand, Dworkin refers to ‘principles’ as anything other than ‘rules’. Yet, in 
other instances, he asserts that principles are to be differentiated from policies. As 
discussed in the next chapter, this occasional differentiation between principle and 
policy (whilst still using the terminology of ‘principle’ nonetheless) also arises within 
the bioethics context.  For example, Beauchamp and Childress, founding fathers of 
Principlism (the pre-dominant principle based decision-making model in Western 
bioethics) suggest that different methodologies (balancing and specification) are 
better suited to applying principles depending upon whether these are policy or 
principle-oriented.  
To return to the matter at hand, Dworkin has emphasised the importance of 
principles and yet, even more so than rules (it is often argued), principles are 
vulnerable to charges of indeterminacy of meaning or weight. Although flexibility is 
championed as one of the principle’s largest advantages,84 it can also be one of their 
most challenging features; principles can give rise to uncertainty, given their typically 
vague and abstract nature.  This potential lack of clarity also raises questions which 
                                                      
83 Dworkin, (1967), p. 23.  





are considered further below about how principles should be applied and how inter-
principle conflict should be resolved. 
Raz criticises Dworkin for ignoring the fact that some statements by courts that look 
like statements of legal principles are no more than abbreviated references to a 
number of legal rules.85 This raises the questions of whether principles are merely 
abbreviated rules and of the nature of the relationship between rules and principles, 
both of which are explored further in this thesis.  
Despite his insistence upon the importance of principles, even Dworkin admits they 
are not always recognizable from their form.86 Raz notes that in many legal systems 
legal rules and principles ‘can be made into law or lose their status as law through 
precedent’.87 But a new rule can be established in a single judgment. For principles, 
however, they:  ‘…evolve rather like a custom’ and are only binding if they have 
‘considerable authoritative support’.88 Raz’s claims suggest something about the 
ways in which rules and principles evolve. Rules can become law momentarily 
(through enactment in Parliament, in the UK for example). Principles, it appears, are 
established through a longer process which demands acceptance and support. Does 
this suggest an extra layer of complexity or significance of principles? This will be 
explored further particularly when functions of rules and principles are considered.  
2.2.1.4 Summary on form 
This section has revealed that articulations of rules are typically characterised within 
jurisprudential literatures as more concrete, specific, prescriptive and rigid than 
principles, which are considered vague and abstract in form. It has been suggested 
that both rules and principles can be general in nature, both generate interpretative 
challenges including indeterminacy but this is more characteristic of principles. 
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Discussion has also revealed that different types of principles and rules exist, 
including legal and normative principles, prescriptive, descriptive, primary and 
secondary rules. Different criteria have been advanced for identifying rules including 
the pedigree thesis, and sources of authority in advancing rules. It has been argued 
that legal principles evolve over time, in contrast, it has been suggested that legal 
rules can be created rapidly.  
At this juncture, it is important to note that many of the discussions have taken place 
within the context of conceptualizations of principles as developed in a (rigid) legal 
context. We might not expect to find the same features in ethics or elsewhere. 
Nonetheless, the discussion thus far will provide an interesting platform of 
comparison with the subsequent bioethics literature review and the 
conceptualizations of rules and principles that emerge therein. 
This section has also considered the action-guiding and interpretative function which 
rules and principles are purported to play. Of importance for future discussion are 
the typical assertions that rules trigger actions and in contrast, principles guide 
interpretation of rules, rather than offering specific prescriptions on what to do. 
2.2.2 Function: the purpose which the rule or principle is perceived to serve 
Unpacking the different functions which rules and principles can play in the decision-
making context is a central contribution of this thesis. The value of this pursuit lies in 
the fact that this is a relatively under-explored area of inquiry within the literatures. 
And yet, our reliance upon rules and principles for effective decision-making is 
contingent upon the different functions which we call upon principles and rules to 





Realists and Formalists on the matter of the Rule of Law are pertinent. These debates 
took place before the notorious debate between Hart and Dworkin89 emerged.90,91  
The Legal Formalists (Formalists) viewed the law as a system where judges were not 
charged with appealing beyond legal rules, or faced with interpretative choice when 
it came to decision-making. As Veitch explains:  
The more nearly we could come to constructing a legal system of 
perfectly clear and coherent rules, containing precise and 
‘scientifically’ analysed terms, elaborated out of perfectly analysed 
and synthesised concepts, the concepts being unvaryingly used in 
the same sense throughout the whole body of law, the more we may 
succeed in producing a highly formalised and thus properly 
rational system of law, capable of guaranteeing ‘the Rule of Law’.92 
 
Thus, the ideal of the time for the Formalists was of a legal system that pursued 
harmonious, homogenous application of law. In part, these rules could serve the 
function of safeguarding against judicial abuse, considered in more detail next. 
2.2.2.1 Protective function: predictability and safeguarding against abuse 
Rules have been considered as a means with which to safeguard against interference 
from courts. The Ancien Régime gave rise to mistrust of judges93 and Montesquieu 
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stressed that judges were only ‘the mouth that pronounces the words of the law.94 
Support for codified legal systems in accordance with such ideals spread across 
Europe, including the French Code Civil (1804), the BGB in Germany (1900)95 and 
Bentham’s strong support for UK codification of the law.96 According to the 
Formalists, the ideal legal system featured rules which were ‘fixed and announced 
beforehand’ and made it ‘possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will 
use its coercive powers in given circumstances’.97 At the same time, authoritative rules 
were criticised for overlooking important nuances.98 Simple rules could not cover all 
eventualities and it was argued that precedents were fairer. 
Thus, tension becomes apparent between those legal systems where codification 
featured and those where it was lacking, and the perceived utility or function of rules.  
Despite claims that rules provide predictability, rules were problematised because 
they failed to ensure the pursuit of important goals such as fairness (this resonates 
with Dworkin’s assertion that principles satisfy justice and fairness). Indeed, this 
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latter criticism was stressed by the American Legal Realists 99,100,101,102 who argued that 
the courts did not decide cases according to the rules within the law, but rather (upon 
empirical consideration), on the notion of what was fair: ‘Legal rules and reasons 
figure simply as post-hoc rationalizations for decisions reached on the basis of non-
legal considerations’.103 
In chapter three, similar allegations are made against principles; it is claimed that they 
are merely post-hoc rationalisations for decisions which have already been made, 
independently of those principles. Such considerations are of core significance to this 
thesis because understanding the nature and functions of rules and principles also 
necessitates an understanding of their limitations in the decision-making context.  
Might it be that we are relying upon rules and principles to serve particular functions 
that they are not adequately equipped to perform? For example, the claim that rules 
could provide certainty in decision-making has been called into question. Pioneer of 
the American Realists Movement, US Judge Jerome Frank104 differentiated Rule 
Scepticism with Fact Scepticism, whereby the former approach rejected the potential 
of rules to provide certainty within the law,105 the latter rejected even the possibility 
of achieving legal certainty due to the nature of facts.106 Indeed, even if we assumed 
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that a clear, coherent and complete legal system could be realised, whether such 
‘mechanical jurisprudence’107 would be desirable has been raised.108 This tension has 
been captured helpfully by Lord Reid as follows:  
People want two inconsistent things; that the law shall be certain, 
and that it shall be just and shall move with the times. It is our 
business to keep both objectives in view. Rigid adherence to 
precedent will not do. And paying lip service to precedent while 
admitting fine distinctions gives us the worse of both worlds. On 
the other hand too much flexibility leads to intolerable 
uncertainty.109 
Perhaps this was in relation to the post-Enlightenment attitude towards the law as a 
logical, rational system which would be more amenable to rules rather than principles 
which left room for discretion and abuse. Such an approach, it seems, places 
discretion under a negative light, relating discretion to abuse of powers and as 
something undesirable. It will become apparent later that one of the contributions of 
this thesis lies in highlighting the importance and desirability of the exercise of 
discretion (albeit not unfettered discretion) in the health research context. But, in 
order to understand why discretion is important, it is equally pressing to consider 
why discretion has been cast as an undesirable element of decision-making. 
The role of both rules and principles in safeguarding against abuse has also been 
discussed more recently in the regulatory context, with reference to creative 
compliance.110  Braithwaite observes that where the ‘phenomenon being regulated’ 
(interpreted here to mean the problem needing solved or the difficult decision which 
must be taken) becomes more complex and changing, then the penumbra of 
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uncertainty,111 of indeterminacy, becomes wider. He asserts that in the most difficult 
regulatory situations, many laws are swallowed up by the penumbra of 
uncertainty.112  
Clear tensions arose between Formalists and Realists regarding the attributes which 
legal systems should contain. These discussions raise a further challenge for rules and 
principles and one which is important to this thesis: if agreement cannot be reached 
on what the ideal legal system should look like, tensions will arise around the 
decision-making tools (rules and principles) which are relied upon within a system. 
This remains a challenge for regulation today. For example, within the health research 
context (the exploratory backdrop of this thesis), the European Data Protection 
Directive (one body of rules) must regulate a diverse and at times, conflicting range 
of activities around the use and reuse of personal data.  Clear tensions arise around 
the goals of protecting privacy whilst permitting data-sharing for, amongst other 
uses, health research. Thus, it is important to also consider that rules and principles 
can only take the decision maker so far, and external considerations, such as conflict/ 
(in)consistency in over-arching goals are also important.  This point is considered in 
more detail in chapter six. 
2.2.2.2 Satisfying justice 
The case of Riggs v Palmer113 is often cited within jurisprudence literature and 
illustrates the need to appeal beyond legal rules. The particulars of the case are as 
follows:  a grandson killed his grandfather in order to access his inheritance early, 
and to ensure that his grandfather did not change his will thus altering its terms. If 
the relevant legal rule was applied at the time, then despite having caused his 
grandfather’s death, Palmer would have benefited from his inheritance (albeit 
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alongside receiving punishment under criminal law for murder). Two of the 
grandfather’s daughters argued that the will should be invalidated in order to 
prevent Palmer from benefiting. The court ruled in favour of the daughters, and 
despite lacking a clear statutory or precedential basis, Judge Robert Earl argued that 
‘the tenets of universal laws and maxims would be violated’ by allowing the grandson 
to profit from the crime.  
The above example illustrates appeals being made beyond the law as opposed to 
basing decisions on the content provided within the law. It also identifies a potential 
inadequacy of legal rules in providing just and fair outcomes in some circumstances. 
In Riggs v Palmer, the judges had clear legal rules at their disposal, which they could 
choose to observe and apply to the case at hand. But, because the outcome was 
undesirable and contrary to the principle of not letting people profit from their own 
wrong, they chose not to apply the rules.  
At the same time, it could be argued that Riggs v Palmer does not demonstrate the 
inadequacy of rules per se, but rather, the inadequacy of certain rules. Lord Denning 
suggests that it is the nature of a rule and how well it serves justice that will determine 
the extent to which a given law is applied: 
Habit is not, however, by itself sufficient to explain the respect of 
the English for the law. Moral obligation plays a large part ... But 
most important of all is the moral quality of law itself. People will 
respect rules of law which are intrinsically right and just and will 
expect their neighbours to obey them, as well as obeying the rules 
themselves: but they will not feel the same about rules which are 
unrighteous or unjust. If people are to feel a sense of obligation to 
the law, then the law must correspond with what they consider to 
be right and just, or, at any rate, must not unduly diverge from it. 
In other words, it must correspond, as near as may be, with 
justice.114 
 
                                                      





Similarly, authors such as Fuller,115 MacCormick and Summers,116 argue that legal 
rules should be interpreted ‘from the perspective of justice and public good’.117 
Further consideration of this point can very quickly change the course of the 
discussion towards questions of law and morality. Interesting as this may be, it is not 
the central concern of this thesis. Rather, Denning’s commentary is used here to 
reinforce the important goal of achieving justice and to consider that the extent to 
which rules can perform such a function is conditional upon the content of the rule.  
This also illustrates the dangers which can arise out of making categorical claims 
about rules and principles and their respective limits e.g. ‘all rules do X’ or ‘all 
principles do Y’. It further serves as a reminder of the nature of literature reviews, in 
so far as discussions included are reflections upon conceptualisations of rules and 
principles (and their functions) which will vary depending on the author and the 
particular stance they take. 
Nevertheless, Riggs v Palmer also prompts further consideration regarding how rules 
and principles are employed by the decision maker; might it be that principles are 
appealed to when rules fail to provide a satisfactory result? Do principles not only 
tend to the gaps that exist (in terms of satisfying justice), but furthermore, offer 
something extra but essential i.e. a means of safeguarding against abuse and ensuring 
that just outcomes are delivered? Put another way, might the value of non-specificity 
(typically a feature of principle-like norms) come into play when specificity (typically 
a feature of rule-like norms) leads to an undesirable or unsatisfactory outcome, 
judged holistically? Again, this raises the issue of safeguarding against abuse of 
decision makers and of providing satisfactory results. But, in contrast to discussions 
above where clear legal rules and codification were to serve this function, Riggs v 
                                                      
115 Fuller, L., “Positivism and the Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart”, 71 Harvard Law 
Review (1958), pp. 630-672. 
116 MacCormick, N., and Summers, R., Interpreting Statutes: A Comparative Study, (Dartmouth: 
Aldershot etc: 1991), pp. 518-519. 
117 Feteris, E., “Weighing and Balancing in the Justification of Judicial Decisions”, 28 Informal 





Palmer suggests that principles can fulfil this function. Further, these discussions also 
demonstrate the connection between the themes of form and function in that, 
symbiotically, principles can function to support rules in their application.  
Raz suggests that one of the functions of legal principles can be viewed as providing 
grounds for particular exceptions to laws (rules). This function is at play where laws 
are not applied to cases because to do so ‘in those particular circumstances would 
sacrifice important principles; but the law is not thereby modified’.118, 119, 120 
2.2.2.3 Rules and Principles as justifications for action  
A further proposition from the literature is that legal principles can offer the sole 
ground for action in particular cases.121 It has been mentioned above that varying 
opinions exist around the goal(s) of legal systems as well as how decisions are 
reached. For example, Raz claims that: 
Principles can be used to justify rules (but not vice versa); unspecific 
generic acts serve to encompass more specific acts, we thus use 
general considerations (principles) to justify a limited range of 
actions (principles to justify rules). 122 
 
This appears to be a valid proposition when we consider the context of European 
Union law. For example, the principle of proportionality as a principle of law is 
discussed as follows:  
The explicitness of the principle of law implies that it is made part 
of the reasoning of a court decision—the ratio decidendi. Principles 
are thus made public, which again means that they can form the 
basis of expectations as to how the court will solve similar cases in 
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the future. True, the precedent effect of a court decision first of all 
encompasses the conclusion. However, the outcome of a case is 
difficult to determine without any reference to the reasoning of 
which the outcome is a result. Thus, one could argue that the ratio 
decidendi of a case must have precedent effect in cases where the 
outcome of the case has such effect. This would imply that the court 
is bound not only by the result but also by the fact that all cases that 
are of the same nature would have to be decided in the same way.123 
 
Within the setting of jurisprudential literature, the protagonist decision maker is the 
judge. In contrast, this thesis is primarily concerned with decision-making within 
health research regulation  - where decision makers may not necessarily be judges but 
rather, data custodians and researchers who must determine how and when to share 
and use data for research. Despite this contrast in focus, discussions that centre on the 
judge as decision maker remain insightful as the paradigm example of an 
authoritative actor in society who is called upon to deploy principles and rules in 
their role.  
In particular, parallels can be drawn between discussions around ‘the universal and 
the particular’ and rules and principles. Although this discussion does not explicitly 
relate to one or several identifiable functions of rules or principles, it is worthwhile 
considering at this particular juncture.  
2.2.2.3.1 Principles and Rules as tools for addressing the universal and the particular 
The debate around universalism and particularism is concerned with the ways in 
which determinations are made about the application of rules and principles to cases. 
A universal approach stresses the importance of applying universal rules and 
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principles to a case. In contrast, particularism encourages the decision maker to focus 
on the specific details of the case at hand. 124 
In a collection dedicated to MacCormick’s contributions to legal theory and with a 
focus on the universal and particular, Bańkowski and MacLean draw parallels 
between the tensions that arise between the universal and the particular with those 
arising between formal and substantive justice. These parallels are drawn in the 
context of ‘hard cases’ where difficult decisions must be taken around what to do. 
Their description merits full citation: 
In such situations it might appear as though we stand between two 
opposing and seemingly irreconcilable choices: on the one hand, we 
could choose to stick as closely as possible to the rules and devise 
procedures for strengthening calculability and minimizing as far as 
possible indeterminacy; on the other hand, we could try to be more 
flexible, place weight on our intuitions and ‘act justly’. But both of 
these options have their problems: the former entails a certain 
rigidity or legalism while the latter could be seen as the ‘thin edge 
of the wedge’ (if the rules become flexible then what is there to stop 
them from vanishing into air and thus negating the whole point of 
the ethical life of the law). We can see this as mirroring the divide 
between formal and substantive justice: in the first option justice is 
done precisely because we treat everyone equally under a regime 
of general rules, i.e., justice equals rationality; in the second option 
justice is done when we take note of the purposes and values that 
the law embodies and look to them to do the justice in a particular 
case, which might demand treating the rules as extremely flexible 
or even departing from them. If we take the first option and affirm 
that the answer must stem from the rule then we have preserved 
formal rationality and the rule of law: the answer comes from a rule 
set prospectively. This way of looking at thing denies the particular 
case in favour of the rule and we apply the rule whenever the 
conditions for its applicability are fulfilled. The second option deals 
with what we find unsatisfactory in the first, how it seems to ignore 
the real hurt and pain of the particular case. But if we are flexible 
and concentrate on the circumstances of the particular case do we 
not lose the prospectivity of the rule of law, since we move from 
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connection with the rule to connection with the particular? Do we 
not thereby lose the ethical value of the rule of law? Do these 
opposing solutions not exclude each other automatically? 125 
 
The above description of the tensions which arise between the universal and the 
particular resonates with the tensions which are often conceptualised around rules 
and principles. On one hand rules are rigid but they provide for universality, to treat 
all cases equally, respecting the rule of law, but there is a risk that the particulars of a 
case will be overlooked. On the other hand, the exercise of flexibility (a characteristic 
typically attributed to principles) permits the particular details of each case to be 
accounted for, but also carries risks because the rule of law is endangered.  Thus, 
relationships become apparent between both (1) rules and universalism (rules being 
specific but universal) and (2) principles and particularism (principles being more 
general, but particular).   
The question which arises for the purposes of this thesis is whether some kind of 
middle ground or compromise can be reached between these two extremes of the 
universal and the particular and if so, what this might look like. For example, in 
chapters five and six, the value of best practice instantiations as a middle ground 
between rules and principles is considered. More immediately, the relationship 
between rules and principles is important to consider in terms of how principles 
might underpin rules and this is considered below but first, an interim summary of 
findings thus far would be helpful. 
2.2.2.4 Interim summary on function  
Thus far, three functions of rules and principles have been identified from the 
literature. Rules are regarded as a means of providing certainty, used to provide 
protection from abuse (particularly judicial abuse) of powers. Conversely, others 
problematise rules as failing to satisfy justice and fairness and for overlooking 
                                                      





important nuances within the law. Further, both rules and principles were criticized 
for their open texture which gives rise to uncertainty around interpretation. Dworkin 
described the positivist approach to law as a model of rules and stressed the need for 
principles within a legal system. Riggs v Palmer was considered as an example of the 
necessity of reaching beyond the law for satisfactory results. This all suggests that 
rules are not enough on their own for providing satisfactory decisions and hints 
towards the suggestion that principles are a necessary component for achieving this 
goal. The need to exercise discretion was also acknowledged within the literature and 
in chapter six of this thesis, the introduction of principles to the health research sector 
as a means of assisting decision makers in exercising discretion is considered in a case 
study.  
Tensions around dealing with difficult decisions were highlighted through 
consideration of the question of ‘the universal and the particular’ and I have 
suggested that parallels might be drawn here with the tensions that arise between 
electing between rules or principles for resolving dilemmas. Further functions have 
also been identified and are considered next. 
2.2.2.5 Principles as a basis for new rules 
Raz reminds us that the extent to which principles are used varies depending upon 
the legal system in question and relatedly, the extent to which principles can perform 
certain functions within legal systems will also vary. He has also suggested that 
courts will act to regulate an area by making new rules. Principles can be used as 
ground for making new rules; where an area (i.e. an area to be regulated) contains 
only principles and no rules. 126  
This suggests two important points for further consideration throughout this thesis. 
First, it implies that principles represent a basis or foundation for the formulation of 
rules. Does this mean that principles ‘become’ rules and if so, how? In chapter five, 
                                                      





the process of specification is considered as a method for applying principles and 
extracting specific action-guiding content, rendering them more ‘rule-like’.  
Second and relatedly, Raz’s suggestion could be interpreted as implying that 
principles alone are insufficient and that rules are a necessary feature within 
regulation. Both of these points together, imply that both rules and principles are 
necessary and suggests a co-dependent relationship between the two but, as will be 
demonstrated, this relationship should be one which recognises both as serving 
distinct, yet interconnected functions. 
2.2.2.6 Principles and rules as a means to regulate complex and simple landscapes 
Braithwaite asserts that rules are best employed for regulating a simple landscape. In 
contrast, principles, are more suited to guiding decision makers around complex 
backgrounds.127 Earlier in the chapter, specificity and certainty were discussed. The 
relationship between complexity and specificity is described as follows: 
As the complexity, flux and size of the economic interests increase, 
certainty progressively moves from being positively associated 
with the specificity of the acts mandated by rules to being 
negatively associated with rule specificity.128 
 
Whilst Braithwaite’s analysis considers the role of rules, principles, and certainty in 
the context of economic interests, it remains significant to this thesis. Where actions 
to be regulated do not involve huge economic interests, Braithwaite suggests that 
rules have the ability to regulate with greater certainty (about outcomes and what 
ought to be done) than principles. 129 This is in keeping with Raz’s proposition that 
the complexity of a regulatory setting is a determining factor with regards to how 
useful specificity will be in terms of providing certainty. It is recalled from earlier in 
this chapter that rules are typically characterised as specific in terms of the level of 
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detail which they offer (particularly in contrast with typically vague principles). As 
such, it can be concluded that for complex regulatory environments, specificity is not 
always desirable or useful for decision makers. 
As will be discussed in chapter six, precisely this approach was used in the context of 
the Scottish Health Informatics Programme; guiding principles were developed in 
order to regulate the complex and constantly evolving governance framework for 
regulation of health research. Principles were necessary precisely because of the high 
stakes involved in data reuse and because the applicable rules were complex and 
unclear. At the same time, it is important to take care, as mentioned previously, not 
to make categorical assumptions around rules and principles. Whilst SHIP employed 
principles, the pre-existing rules around data reuse remained important and 
necessary. 
2.2.2.7 Action-guiding and interpretative functions 
It has been suggested that the difference in function between rules and principles lies 
in the outcome that each leads to; rules will lead to an action whereas principles ‘only 
provide guidance for the interpretation or application of a rule or standard, principles 
do not themselves resolve legal issues’.130 This can be contrasted with the earlier 
assertion that principles can represent the sole ground for action.  
Raz, Schauer and Dworkin all agree that rules prescribe specific acts, and in contrast, 
principles generate unspecific actions.131 Dworkin refers to the term ‘principle’ in the 
sense that ‘it imposes an obligation and thus guides the action of courts and 
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officials’.132 It was stated above that Dworkin attacked positivism for failing to 
acknowledge standards which are not rules, for example, principles and policies.133 
Lord Reid suggests that both rules and principles are needed to reach the important 
balance of certainty of law and that the law is just and moves with the times.134 
However, in order to achieve fairness and equity by applying principles of fairness 
and justice, discretion must be exercised. This suggests that the function of rules is to 
provide consistency and of principles to provide fairness. This also highlights the 
important roles which discretion and interpretation play.   
Raz claims that within legal systems, interpretation ‘which makes a “law” conform to 
a principle is to be preferred to one which does not’.135 This suggests that principles 
play a role in influencing the interpretation of rules. In addition to representing a 
function performed by principles, this is yet an additional element of the relationships 
between principles and rules being explored and developed within this thesis. It is 
also related to the idea that principles might underpin rules but remain nonetheless 
distinct. The suggestion that a principle underpins or is the foundation for a rule 
presupposes a more openly recognisable correlation between the two; for example 
obtaining consent prior to using personal data is one (but not the only) means of 
observing the principle of respect for autonomy. 
In contrast, this additional shaping function implies that principles can shape the 
interpretation of rules not only by underpinning the rules as discussed above, but 
additionally, principles which do not inherently underpin a rule in question but are 
relevant nonetheless should be factored in to the interpretation of those rules. 
Consider, for example, common law principles of statutory interpretation. 136 The 
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mischief rule, for example, asks judges to consider the mischief which the rule in 
question was designed to counter.      
Raz also acknowledges that conflicting interpretations of rules can arise (as per Hart’s 
description of the open texture of law) and this interpretative function of principles 
is a ‘crucial device for ensuring coherence of purpose among various laws bearing on 
the same subject’137 for example, the principle of proportionality was considered 
earlier in this chapter. Yet, it could also be argued that principles still give rise to 
conflicting interpretations and principles can conflict with other principles even 
within the same body of rules. Thus, it appears, that both rules and principles are 
vulnerable to the occurrence of conflict. In chapter six, the European Data Protection 
Directive138 is considered and this legislative provision represents the perfect example 
of such conflicts. 
2.2.2.8 Functions which rules and principles are unable to perform 
In order to understand how rules and principles can help decision makers to 
understand ‘what to do’, it is necessary to also consider the limitations of rules and 
principles i.e. to acknowledge where rules and principles may be unable to help. 
Amaya notes that a ‘good choice’ (which I assume Amaya later alludes to as ‘a 
decision in accordance with virtue, i.e., a decision a virtuous judge would have taken’) 
cannot be captured by a system of rules.139 
In adopting an Aristotelian and virtue-based approach, Amaya claims that neither 
rules nor principles can capture the requirements of virtue.140 This could suggest that 
both rules and principles are inadequate and an additional approach is needed in order 
to allow the decision maker to arrive upon ‘good choices’.  If we are to understand 
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the nature of rules and principles and their interactions, and to consider how they 
might be used in a meaningful and valuable way, then we must also consider the 
respective limitations that they might bring in the context of decision-making too. In 
chapter six, an ethnographic case study reveals that ‘something extra’ also relates to 
appropriate training for decision makers. The important question of who the decision 
maker is and how they can become skilled in decision-making is also considered. 
2.2.2.9 Summary on function 
This section has considered some different perceived functions which rules and 
principles can perform. Both rules and principles have been advanced as instruments 
with which to safeguard against abuse from decision makers. Rules are considered to 
provide certainty however it has been acknowledged that no set of rules will be 
complete enough so as to provide guidance for every single eventuality that may 
arise.  
Principles are considered as a means to compensate for short-comings related to rules. 
In particular, they may provide a means to achieving desired ends such as justice. The 
ability of principles to provide ‘good choices’ or decisions, where application of rules 
(the law) will provide for unsatisfactory outcomes is interesting. This raises the 
question of whether rules are still important and if so, in which circumstances and 
how this might relate to principles. This is part of the line of inquiry which this thesis 
strives to investigate.  
Tensions between the universal and the particular were also considered, they form a 
useful comparison point for discussions on rules and principles.  It has been 
suggested within the literature that rules are best placed for regulating simple 
landscapes and principles for dealing with more complex issues. In chapter six, a case 
study tests this claim in the context of health research regulation. 
For other authors, neither rules nor principles suffice in reaching good decisions, and 





throughout the thesis and the latter half of this thesis considers what this ‘something 
extra’ might be. 
This section has also considered the action-guiding and interpretative functions of 
rules and principles. Of importance for future discussion are the typical assertions 
that rules trigger actions and in contrast, principles guide interpretation of rules, 
rather than offering specific prescriptions on ‘what to do’. 
2.2.3 Application: how rules and principles might be applied in the decision-
making context                               
Detmold’s particularity void141 has been described as ‘the space that exists between a 
rule and its application, the space where a judge is existentially alone, and has to make 
a decision’.142  This section explores discussions within the literature which have 
sought to address how the judge navigates such space through the application of 
rules and principles.  
The American Legal Realist’s rejection of Formalism was discussed above. The 
Realists asserted that ‘rules and reasons figure simply as post-hoc rationalizations for 
decisions based on nonlegal considerations’.143 This suggests that rules are used as a 
means for legitimising decisions which have already been made. This seems like an 
overly-reductionist attitude: simply because rules might feature within post-hoc 
rationalisations (as was considered above), it does not necessarily follow that rules 
are only considered after decisions have already been reached. 144 Similar claims are 
made about the use of principles as post-hoc rationalisations within the bioethics 
literature discussed in chapter three.  
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For other authors, the application of rules is described as a means to achieve desired 
ends. For example, Legal Instrumentalism145 relates to the idea that legal rules should 
be applied according to their purpose. This enables the law to serve particular ends 
such as the promotion of justice (in line with Plato’s ideal of justice, and more broadly, 
natural lawyers discussed at the beginning of this section) as well as good social and 
policy aims.  This approach gained favour amongst the American Legal Realists and 
Rule Sceptics.146147 A tension arose between those advocating an instrumentalist 
approach and those insisting upon the Rule of Law:  ‘Law is seen less an order of 
binding rules, and increasingly as a tool or weapon to be manipulated to achieve 
desired ends. Therein the deep rub between an instrumental view of law and the rule 
of law ideal’.148 
The Formalists rejected this room for interpretative creativity, arguing that to grant 
the judiciary such freedom of interpretation (in saying what the law should say and 
not what it did say) would lead to judges interpreting the law in order to serve their 
own ideals about the law, thus instrumentalism and discretion would lead to 
undermining the Rule of Law.149  This echoes the Humean ‘is/ought’ distinction and 
earlier discussions in this chapter which identified one of the functions of rules and 
principles being their ability to safeguard against abuse.  
For the Formalists, the role of judges was to apply the relevant legal rules via 
deduction i.e. applying a general rule to the specifics of a case, similarly to how a 
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mathematician might apply a formula to solve a given problem.150 This resonates with 
the process of specification which is considered in chapter three and (in more detail) 
chapter five. For the purposes of this chapter, the legal theory literature provides 
particularly important discussions around the application of balancing which is 
considered next. 
2.2.3.1 Balancing 
Balancing is a methodology employed when trying to consider which principle(s) to 
prioritise during inter-principle conflict. Within the Constitutional Law setting, 
balancing is often associated with Alexy’s Theory of Constitutional Rights and the EU 
principle of proportionality. Conflicting rights in this setting have been described as 
‘ethical dilemmas’,151 judges must reconcile competing rights and the metaphor of 
balancing is often evoked (and critiqued).  
At the beginning of this chapter, Alexy’s conceptualisations of rules and principles 
were taken as starting definitions for the discussion. The significance of whether one 
is dealing with a rule or a principle is important because, to Alexy, rules imply 
subsumption whereas principles engage ‘the weight formula’ i.e. balancing. 
Subsumption implies: ‘”falling within the scope of” and presupposes the existence of 
a higher-order or subsuming rule’.152 Alexy conceptualizes fundamental rights as 
principles rather than rules, because they are optimisation requirements which can 
be satisfied to varying degrees. Alexy’s balancing process involves three steps: 
The first stage is a matter of establishing the degree of non- 
satisfaction of, or detriment to, the first principle. This is followed 
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by a second stage, in which the importance of satisfying the 
competing principle is established. Finally, the third stage answers 
the question of whether or not the importance of satisfying the 
competing principle justifies the detriment to, or non-satisfaction 
of, the first.153  
 
An alternative more concise iteration, which Alexy refers to the ‘Law of Balancing’ is 
explained as: ‘the greater the degree of non-satisfaction of, or detriment to, one right 
or principle, the greater must be the importance of satisfying the other’.154  
Balancing has been widely criticised, most often due to the lack of clarity around quite 
how to balance,155 even with the description offered above. Whilst assigning weight 
to different principles is a necessary component of balancing, the approach has been 
described as ‘measuring the unmeasurable’.156  
Habermas is particularly vocal in problematizing the approach.157 For him, balancing 
fails to consider what is right or wrong in terms of morality: ‘because there are no 
rational standards here, weighing takes places either arbitrarily or unreflectively, 
according to customary standards and hierarchies’.158 Others have also questioned 
reliance on only the  concept of weight; ‘the assessment of the importance of a 
principle can only be made by taking a concrete stand which cannot be determined 
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by the weight formula itself’.159 
In a similar vein, balancing is perceived to erode the value of human rights by 
attempting to make them quantifiable and by reducing rights to principles or 
policies.160 Such critiques are often directed towards issues of constitutional rights161 
and thus further exploration of this topic is not necessary for the purpose of this 
thesis. 
Nonetheless, some points remain pertinent for present discussions. The objection to 
Alexy’s theory, known as Habermas’ ‘firewall distinction’ rejects balancing because 
‘the balancing approach deprives fundamental rights of their normative power’.162 In 
the constitutional setting, framing rights as principles implies that they are open to 
discussion and balancing, whereas framing them as rules would require them to be 
categorical, ‘deontological levers’.163 This reinforces the significance of whether we 
are dealing with a rule or a principle, and the contribution of this thesis in helping us 
to understand the different conceptualisations of rules and principles. This 
delineation between rules and principles speaks to the ontology of these norms. At 
this tentative stage, I would agree that principles, by their very nature, are more open 
to discussion and balancing than categorical rules. This would be in keeping with the 
conceptualisations offered by Alexy (of rules being applicable or not, whereas 
principles are framed as optimisation requirements). Albeit that, as considered 
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further in chapter four, rules and principles do indeed share many family 
resemblances.  
Regarding more general discussions around the application of principles, Raz notes 
that the conditions within which principles are to be applied is not always articulated: 
Some principles are universal in the sense that the norm-act ought 
to be done whenever there is an opportunity to do so, while others 
are to be applied only in certain circumstances. The conditions of 
application of a principle are not automatically narrowed by the 
fact that it conflicts with an established rule.164 
 
It is not always clear then, when principles are applicable, but it does not necessarily 
follow that because a principle might conflict with a rule, that the principle is no 
longer a relevant consideration.  
2.2.3.2 Summary of application 
Four salient points can be taken from these discussions. First, the suggestion that rules 
may be applied post-hoc implies that something other than rules could be driving 
decisions. For instrumentalists, this ‘something’ is located in the promotion of specific 
goals. This leads to the question of whether principles represent these goals, and 
prompts further exploration of the relationship between rules and principles insofar 
as principles may underpin rules. 
Second, it is not always clear when rules or principles are applicable (recall the 
problem offered by Hart in considering whether a toy car should be subject to the rule 
‘no vehicles in the park’). This raises the question of whether decision makers need 
assistance in discerning when rules and principles are applicable. In later chapters, 
instances of best practice are considered as decision-making aids which sit between 
                                                      





rules and principles on the principle-rule continuum being developed within this 
thesis.  
A third noteworthy point is that these discussions mirror the starting definitions of 
rules and principles included at the beginning of this chapter. It is recalled that one 
of the key purported distinctions between rules and principles is that rules are 
applicable in an all or nothing fashion, whereas principles are optimisation maxims, 
which can be actualised to varying degrees. The significance of whether we are 
dealing with a rule or principle was highlighted through consideration of the process 
of balancing. This has been problematised by some as an irrational approach, albeit 
in the context of constitutional rights discourse.  
Finally and importantly, these discussions on application and the questions to which 
they give rise demonstrate the necessity of further exploration of the application of 
rules and principles. This is one of the valuable contributions which is offered 
throughout this body of work.  
2.2.4 Dichotomisation: how rules and principles might be set up against one 
another rather than treated in a complementary fashion.  
In the introduction to this thesis, it was suggested that discussions on rules and 
principles typically focus on debating whether rules are better than principles or vice 
versa. It is important to note that many discussions may allude to dichotomisation 
between rules and principles indirectly; explicit reference to rules and principles may 
be absent, however upon deeper reflection, relevance to rules and principles, and the 
present line of inquiry, emerges, as demonstrated by the analysis which I offer.  For 
example, Lord Reid’s observations about the balance between achieving certainty and 
fairness and justice was considered earlier.  
Again, with questions of the universal and the particular, parallels can be drawn with 
rules and principles; setting up the antagonisms between respecting the rule of law 





of rules and the flexibility of principles. I do appreciate the limitation to how far an 
analogy might be made here; the parallels are strongest when we consider 
conceptualisations of rules and principles sitting on extreme ends of the principle-
rule continuum.  
A more recent example of this dichotomisation can be offered; Rule Based Regulation 
(RBR) and Principle Based Regulation (RBR) have been contrasted first within the 
financial sector165,166,167 and then in other settings including the health research context.  
As I have described elsewhere in joint-authorship: 
Principle-based regulation (PBR) can be contrasted with rules-
based regulation (RBR) where the former relies upon broad and 
looser principles to guide action and the latter upon stricter pre- 
and proscriptive rules for framing approaches to governance and 
decision-making.168 
 
Discussions on PBR and RBR often advocate a preference for either a principles or 
rules-based approach rather than considering how both rules and principles might be 
complementary in fashion.169 These discussions on dichotomisation are important for 
the central thesis because they highlight a core contribution being made here around 
not only considering the respective merits of rules and principles but in progressing 
dialogue by exploring how both rules and principles can be used in tandem. Use of 
rules and principles alongside each other implies complementarity, however conflict 
also arises between these decision-making aids and this is a theme which is 
considered immediately below. 
                                                      
165 Black, (2010), p. 191. 
166 Black et al., (2007). 
167 Kern and Moloney, (2011). 
168 Laurie and Sethi, (2013), p. 44.  
169 See for example Cunningham, L., “A Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric of Principles-Based 
Systems in Corporate Law, Securities Regulation, and Accounting”, 60 Vanderbilt Law Review 





2.2.5 Conflict: how either conflict between rules and rules, and principles and 
principles occurs, or conflict as it may arise between rules and principles.  
There appears to be general agreement within the literature that principles can give 
rise to conflict with other principles.170,171 In contrast, opinion tends to differ on the 
question of whether rules can conflict with other rules. 
For example, Raz states that non-legal rules and principles do conflict but Dworkin 
argues that this only occurs amongst principles. According to Raz, there is no way of 
setting out all of the qualifications and exceptions to rules (this echoes discussions 
earlier in this chapter around the inability to provide rules for every eventuality). He 
notes, ‘we are on the whole reconciled to the fact that rules may conflict and that they 
impose obligations which may be overridden in particular cases by contrary 
decisions’. 172  This resonates with discussions included above which allude to the fact 
that rules may not always provide satisfactory answers or ‘good choices’. Of concern 
to this thesis, this purported shortcoming of rules bolsters the argument that 
something beyond rules is needed for decision-making, supporting the need to 
further investigate to what extent principles may be of assistance.   
In contrast to Raz, for Dworkin, because rules are conclusive if they apply to a given 
case, they cannot conflict with one another; if tensions arise between rules, one of the 
rules must not be valid. Raz suggests that inter-rule conflict does not negate the 
validity of rules but rather, different rules have different weights. This assigning of 
weights is also, and more frequently, prevalent in discussions around principles and 
how principles should be reconciled when conflict occurs.  It is suggested by Dworkin 
that ‘regarding the resolution of when principles intersect...one who must resolve the 
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conflict has to take into account the relative weight of each’.173 Alexy refers to 
assigning weight to principles as creating a conditional preference.174, 175 
Of relevance to this thesis, this raises the question of how one can assign weight to 
different principles or create this preference.176 This question is specifically considered 
in chapter five, where Principlism is considered as a bioethical principle-based 
approach to decision-making. One of the most common accusations made by critics 
of Principlism is that the principle of autonomy is always prioritised over and above 
the other three principles which are included within that particular framework.   
Where conflict arises between rules and principles, Raz advises that either both the 
rule and principle should be treated as rules or both should be treated as principles 
and the importance and consequence of each should be considered. He claims that 
when conflict occurs, the tendency is to treat both rules and principles as principles.177 
This begs the question of why there is a tendency to treat them as principles; are 
principles easier to handle than rules where conflict arises? Similarly, does this 
suggest that rules and principles can suddenly be transformed to the opposite? Raz’s 
position could be interpreted as implying that rules and principles are 
interchangeable but this goes against the findings so far which suggest that whilst 
interconnected, rules and principles retain some ontological distinctions. Some of 
these distinctions will be laid out in chapter four when the findings from both 
literature reviews are compared.  
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2.2.6 Interrelationship: how rules and principles might be connected to one 
another, and what the nature of this connection might be. 
How are rules and principles used? Might it be that principles are appealed to when 
rules do not provide a satisfactory result? Do principles not only tend to the 
weaknesses which rules carry but offer something extra but essential i.e. a means of 
safeguarding against abuse and ensuring that just outcomes are delivered? 
Earlier in this chapter, different functions of principles were considered. Alexy 
suggested that principles can provide a basis for the formulation of rules and that 
rules are needed in order to regulate an area. This was interpreted as implying that 
both rules and principles are necessary and that each serves interrelated yet distinct 
functions. Braithwaite also argues in favour of the necessity of both rules and 
principles. He suggests that binding-principles ‘buttressed’ by non-binding rules are 
most capable of guiding decision makers through complex landscapes; so long as the 
principles underpinning the rules are clear, then rules which can be modified over 
time are better than ‘fixed rules’ at regulating transitional technology with 
certainty.178,179 
Again, this supports the idea that principles underpin rules but Braithwaite’s 
assertion builds upon this and clashes with typical characterisations of rules (rather 
than principles) as tools for securing certainty in decision-making. Rather, 
Braithwaite is suggesting that principles offer more certainty and that rules can be 
modified over time to offer certainty in areas with uncertainty. Braithwaite himself 
has argued that ‘rules look more certain when they stand alone; uncertainty is crafted 
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in the juxtaposition with other rules’.180  Even further, it is demonstrated that factors 
beyond rules and principles can play a considerable role in decision-making. 
Hart acknowledged that primary rules alone are not enough; identifying secondary 
rules which ‘confer powers, public or private’181 and which are ‘parasitic upon’182 
primary rules.  Dworkin’s explanation of Hart’s secondary rules is helpful. He 
describes secondary rules as, ‘those that stipulate how, and by whom, such primary 
rules may be formed, recognized, modified or extinguished’.183 A society can only 
have ‘the law’ when it has rules of recognition i.e. rules which specify the criteria of 
legal validity, of what counts as law, including, how primary rules are modified and 
when they have been violated.184 
Hart distinguished 3 types of secondary rules (rules of recognition, rules of change 
and rules of adjudication) which needed to be used in tandem with primary rules. 
Both primary and secondary rules needed to be articulated in a clear manner so as to 
avoid giving rise to uncertainty in how the laws are interpreted.  As considered 
earlier, Hart refers to ‘fuzzy edges’185 of legal rules as the ‘open texture’186 of rules and 
acknowledges the role of discretion.  
Hart argues that principles could be legally binding but that they would have to be 
validated by reference to the Rule of Recognition (i.e. social rules existing according 
to two conditions):  
1) Those rules of behavior which are valid according to the system’s 
ultimate criteria of validity must be generally obeyed 
2) The legal system’s rules of recognition specifying the criteria of 
legal validity and its rules of change and adjudication must be 
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effectively accepted as common public standards of official 
behavior by its officials.187   
 
Raz notes that ‘all rules are subject to all principles and may be overridden by any of 
them in particular circumstances’.188 The example offered to illustrate this point is 
where a law which seeks to establish standards of reasonableness is a rule, and then 
it may be overridden by principles. It is not the function of standards such as 
‘reasonableness’, argues Raz, to ‘immunize the law against general considerations 
embodied in certain principles’189 but rather, the opposite is true, although laws which 
prohibit unreasonableness do not refer to all of the considerations which the principle 
embodies, Raz argues that no principle does this. This resonates with observations on 
the bioethics literature considered in chapter three. 
The discussion above raises an important point about the ontology of principles. 
Whilst I am primarily interested in uncovering more about the functionality of rules 
and principles in decision-making, this necessitates consideration of the relationship 
between the two. Because principles are inferred from the law – and sometimes 
explicitly deployed by law - this might suggest that they have the capacity to remedy 
short-comings which rules possess. This might be one of the greatest advantages of 
principles - their ability to compensate for the inadequacies of written legislation, 
their flexibility, which enables them to travel in to gaps where there is no clear or 
concise guidance on what should be done in the particular circumstance. After all, no 
legislator, however open-minded, will be able to legislate for every possible future 
scenario. Our ability to envisage or foresee potential challenging circumstances is 
limited by language, the very nature of which is vague in itself. Might the converse 
also be true in instances? Perhaps where principles when taken as starting points to 
decision-making have failed, rules are needed to offer specific guidance. This raises 
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another important line of inquiry which will inform the case studies undertaken in 
chapters five and six of this thesis.  
Indeed, some literature can be interpreted as hinting towards an evolutionary process 
which might take place between rules and principles. First, Peak Jr summarises 
concisely Dworkin’s attitude towards principles: 
Although “principles” are sometimes well-established (for 
example, by judicial precedent), at times they do not become 
established until there is adjudication of “hard cases”. Yet these 
principles become (indeed are used for) the justification of decisions 
in cases, which (in turn) become rules of law.190 
 
Further, MacCormick notes:  
A system of positive law, especially the law of modern states, 
comprises an attempt to concretize broad principles of conduct in 
the form of relatively stable, clear, detailed and objectively 
comprehensible rules, and to provide an interpersonally 
trustworthy and acceptable process for putting these rules into 
effect. 191 
 
Both observations suggest something about how principles and rules might be 
formed. Raz argues that a new rule can be established by the courts in one judgement. 
In contrast, principles are made into law or only binding once considerable support 
is offered in a line of judgements as binding. 192,193 
Goodin adopts a loose conception of rules and collapses the distinction between 
principles and rules, viewing them as at opposite ends of a continuum; ‘principles is 
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to rule as plan is to blueprint’.194 Thus, rules are viewed as merely more detailed 
principles. This presents a challenge to one of the core claims and contributions of this 
thesis viz identifying and unpacking the related but distinct functions which rules 
and principles can perform. A retort to Goodin’s analysis, and one which I support, 
is that whilst it acknowledges a relationship between rules and principles, it perhaps 
goes too far, in equating rules as merely more detailed iterations of principles. It is 
one thing to say that both are connected (which, again, I agree is the case), and 
reasonable to assert that rules might be based on principles, but an entirely different 
argument emerges when both are equated in such a crude fashion.    
2.3 Summary  
This section summarises the key themes which have emerged as a result of the legal 
theory literature review. These findings will be compared with the findings from the 
bioethical literature review which follows in chapter three. In chapter four, findings 
from both literature reviews will be considered together, leading to the subsequent 
construction of a decision-making matrix. In turn, this matrix will be further refined 
by virtue of the analysis provided in chapters five and six.  
The chapter began with an introduction to the research topic which this thesis 
addresses. The need for further exploration of the different relationships between and 
functions of rules and principles for decision-making was emphasised. Next, an 
analytical template with which to conduct literature reviews was presented. Each 
theme of the template was described and the merits and limitations of the template 
were also considered.  
Two preliminary observations can be made about the template itself. First, as 
suspected, discussions around rules and principles often tend to touch upon more 
than one of the template themes simultaneously. Determining under which theme to 
                                                      





consider each observation is challenging. This cannot be avoided and discretion must 
be exercised in electing which theme to place each discussion under.  
Second, and despite the difficulty of categorising discussions, the analytical template 
has been helpful in focussing the literature review, it was acknowledged from the 
outset that the purpose of the literature review is not to document each and every 
contribution that has emerged, but to highlight those discussions which are of most 
relevance for this thesis.  
2.3.1 Form 
Principles are typically characterised as more vague and abstract in nature than rules 
which, in turn, are described as more specific, rigid and prescriptive than principles. 
Specificity re-emerges within the literature as an important distinguishing feature 
between rules and principles; whilst both norms may be general, only rules are 
characterised as specific. Nonetheless, there is clear acknowledgement within the 
literature that there are considerable difficulties in distinguishing between rules and 
principles at times.  
Further, the literature review suggests that both rules and principles suffer a similar 
fate in terms of interpretative challenges by virtue of open texture, both are open to 
indeterminacy with regards to interpretation, and discretion must be exercised by the 
decision maker in opting for any one interpretation. It might be argued though, that 
the interpretative challenges (if we consider them to be limitations) and the exercise 
of discretion, sit more comfortably with principles (or their proponents) because 
principles are not conceptualised as being definitive in nature (thus, it is reasonable 
to expect a certain level of indeterminacy with principles).   
The metaphor of a continuum was introduced and has been developed throughout 
the chapter. The continuum can be conceptualised as possessing hard rules on one 
extreme and abstract principles on the other extreme. It is suggested that the ‘form’ 





core contribution of this thesis lies in fleshing out this continuum. These discussions 
provide an interesting platform for comparison with the bioethical literature review 
in chapter three. In particular, it remains to be seen whether similar 
conceptualisations of rules and principles transpire beyond the relatively rigid 
jurisprudential context.  
2.3.2 Function  
Exploring the different ways in which rules and principles can be used for decision-
making is a central contribution of this body of work. The jurisprudential literature 
review has uncovered several distinct but interrelated purported functions of rules 
and principles.  
Debates amongst Formalists and American Legal Realists offered a helpful starting 
point for the discussion. It transpired that arguments are made for either rules or 
principles to be used as a means of safeguarding against abuse by the decision maker.  
Certainty with regards to the interpretation of rules and principles also emerged as 
an important theme. Again, opinions differed around the extent to which certainty 
was desirable and whether or not rules or principles were best placed to offer this.   
The Hart-Dworkin debate highlighted the tension that exists around the Rule of Law. 
Dworkin has stressed the necessity for legal principles. This is with a view to 
satisfying justice. Relatedly, rules and principles were considered as means for 
justifying actions however Raz has suggested that only principles can be used to 
justify rules and not the converse.  Parallels were drawn between the universal and 
the particular and rules and principles. The tension became apparent between the 
rigid application of rules to ensure the rule of law and opting for flexible principles 
to ensure the particulars of a case are not neglected.  
The function of principles as a basis for the creation of new rules was also considered. 





chapter five, the role of specification is considered as a process which renders 
principles more ‘rule-like’.  This also raises the question as to whether rules or 
principles, or both are needed for regulatory purposes. 
Braithwaite’s proposition that rules are best placed to regulate simple landscapes and 
principles to regulate complex landscapes was considered. This is of particular 
importance to this thesis because the investigation here takes place through the 
platform of health research regulation which is a notoriously complex landscape, the 
case study in chapter six tests this claim.  
The potential for rules and principles to provide action-guiding/ interpretative 
functions also featured within the literature. It has been suggested that principles 
provide a basis for the interpretation of rules. Standards were also mentioned as a 
means of supporting decision makers in determining what to do and in chapters five 
and six, best practice is considered as a half-way point on the principle-rule 
continuum. 
Lastly, it was stressed that part of understanding the functions of rules and principles 
lies in understanding their limitations so that we do not unduly rely upon these 
norms when in fact, alternative tools are necessary. The question emerged around 
whether something ‘beyond the law’ was required to enable the decision maker to 
arrive upon ‘good choices’, for some, principles could fulfil this function and for 
others, something even further is necessary. The latter half of this thesis will also seek 
to uncover what this something extra might look like. 
To summarise, even at this early stage, exploration of the different functions of roles 
and principles has already uncovered interesting findings which can enrich our 
understanding of the nature of rules and principles. It remains to be seen whether 
similar perceived functions emerge within the bioethics literatures or whether distinct 





2.3.3 Application  
Discussions around the application of rules and principles were closely linked to 
discussions around the different functions which rules and principles are purported 
to play in decision-making. This was illustrated by the tension between those who 
demanded the Rule of Law (strict application of rules) and those who viewed a more 
instrumental role for law (creativity to achieve desired ends such as justice). The 
question of whether rules were applied as post-hoc rationalisations also arose.  
The language of balancing and weights also emerged. The exercise of assigning 
weights was most often attributed to principles though it was argued that rules also 
feature certain ‘added dimensions’. Challenges arise in finding out precisely how one 
is to assign weights and how to then balance these. These problems are considered in 
more detail in chapter five. 
2.3.4 Dichotomisation 
The dichotomisation of rules and principles (in terms of discussing them in an ‘either 
or’ fashion) transpires throughout the chapter and exploration of all of the themes, 
this is often in an indirect way.  
A distinction is made between the purported outcomes of rules and principles. For 
example, Lord Reid’s explanation of the tension that exists between achieving 
certainty (through rules) and fairness (through principles). 
Similarly, discussions around rules and principle-based regulation were also 
consulted and literatures typically lacked reflection on how rules and principles 
might be used in a complementary fashion. Chapter six considers a case study where 
a principles-based approach was employed for decision-making but it also includes 






The theme of conflict between rules and principles emerged within the literature. 
Differences of opinion about quite when conflict arises were apparent. For example, 
Dworkin argued that only principles can conflict with other principles. Where tension 
arose between rules, he argued that one of the rules was rendered invalid and no 
longer constituted law.  According to others, rules do conflict with other rules and in 
such instances, only one rule will remain valid/applicable.  This is apparently not the 
case with principles; where different principles prevail in light of the ends they seek 
to promote (again – resonance with ‘good choices’ appears).  
Where conflict between rules and principles arises it was suggested that either both 
the rule and principle should be treated as rules or as principles and the importance 
and consequence of each should be considered. It was suggest that in practice both 
are treated as principles and this raises the question as to why this is the case. How 
do rules ‘become’ principles for the purposes of resolving conflict? Further, is conflict 
easier to resolve amongst principles? Ethical dilemmas where conflict occurs are rife 
within bioethics and it will be interesting to uncover contributions on conflict from 
that literature base.  
2.3.6 Interrelationship 
The theme which seeks to unpack the nature of the interrelationship between rules 
and principles, which is a core focus of this thesis, provides particularly interesting 
suggestions for further consideration. As mentioned, the metaphor of a continuum 
has been touched upon through which to explore the relationship between rules and 
principles. 
The literature is lacking, however, in any level of detail of what this continuum might 
look like beyond the suggestions that: principles underpin rules; rules may be more 
specific iterations of principles and principles may ‘become’ rules in the context of 





then developing and fleshing out this notion of a continuum. This will advance our 
current understandings of the nature of and relationships between rules and 
principles.  
It remains to be seen whether these interim findings about rules and principles will 
reappear within the bioethics literature, or whether distinct and additional 
observations will emerge. Whilst chapter four is dedicated precisely to answering this 
question, a necessary and prior step is the application of the template to the bioethics 







Chapter Three: What can the Bioethics Literature tell us 
about Rules and Principles? 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter offered a bespoke template with which to analyse discussions 
of rules and principles within the literature. The template was subsequently applied 
to the relevant legal theory literature and the findings and implications for this thesis 
were considered. This chapter moves on to apply the analytical template to the 
bioethics literature in order to examine discussions on rules and (particularly) 
principles. 
Application of the template to the bioethics literature provides several advantages for 
this thesis. First and foremost, principles and their role(s) in bioethical decision-
making have occupied considerable space within bioethical dialogue and thus 
provide fertile ground for exploration. In fact, Principlism195 - the dominant196,197 (if 
not leading) Western bioethical framework - is centred on principle-based decision-
making, rendering it particularly relevant to current discussion. This thesis takes a 
novel and useful closer look at such discussions and progresses them.  
This chapter is structured in a similar fashion to the previous one, beginning with key 
definitions and then moving on to consider each of the key themes in the analytical 
template and how they apply in the bioethics sphere. The chapter concludes with 
discussion of the most significant observations resulting from the template analysis. 
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It is recalled that this thesis as a whole reinforces efforts to move discussion beyond 
stagnant debates which have traditionally offered propositions for or against rules 
and principles respectively (described as dichotomisation). Likewise, the focus here 
is shifted away from contributions in bioethics which can typically tend to assess or 
favour one specific ethical theory over another. Furthermore, it moves past the 
prevailing tendency when discussing principle-based decision-making which is to 
centre arguments around which principles should be used/prioritised, overlooking the 
important questions of how they are used in order to determine what to do and what 
the nature of their relationship with rules might be.  
It transpires that rules and principles can play different functions within the decision-
making context and in turn, this may have implications for the decision maker in 
terms of whether they employ a rule, principle, both, or something 
additional/alternative in order to determine what to do. The findings from this 
investigation may also have implications for regulators in terms of the approaches 
which may be taken for regulating different contexts. The health research setting is of 
particular focus here. 
Finally, the integral function of this chapter lies in providing a platform for 
comparison and contrast with how the key themes in my template are treated 
between the legal theory and bioethical literature included within the scope of my 
research. Both literatures will be considered side-by-side in the subsequent chapter. 
It is argued that in tandem with the application of the analytical template, this 
comparative exercise is a novel undertaking and thus an original contribution to the 
literature in and of itself. The value gleamed is how the comparison sheds light on 







3.1.1.1 Bioethics literature  
Although the meaning of the term ‘bioethics’ may seem self-evident, as with ‘rule’ 
and ‘principle’, diverse definitions of the term exist.198 ,199,200,201 A working definition of 
bioethics set out here may therefore be helpful in order to clarify the scope of my 
literature review. A broad definition of bioethics is adopted here: Reich describes 
bioethics as ‘the systematical study of human conduct in the area of the life sciences 
and health care, insofar as this conduct is examined in the light of moral values and 
principles’.202 The broad scope of this definition facilitates an inclusive literature 
review which appreciates that different strands of bioethics exist, but which does not 
attempt to analyse discussions of rules and principles from any one specific 
perspective.  
It is worthwhile noting that the type of issue seeking resolution may dictate the work 
that a rule or principle is being asked to do. For example, a principle or rule may be 
relied upon in order to indicate specific action to be taken or, in contrast, to provide 
general considerations applicable to the difficult decision at hand. Whilst such 
contextual analysis of the utility of rules and principles is interesting, it is ultimately 
beyond the scope of this thesis. The suitability of different ethical frameworks (in 
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particular, Principlism, which is discussed immediately below) to answering different 
types of questions has already been raised within the literature.203  
Therefore, it is acknowledged from the outset that this thesis does not seek to tackle 
in any detail the contextual aspects of decision-making.204,205 This point merits explicit 
articulation because it is important to be wary that findings here will be 
generalisations and may be relevant to greater or lesser extents depending upon the 
context within which a rule or principle is being used. 
At the same time, where discussions clearly correspond with a particular strand of 
bioethics and obvious implications for how principles and rules are used become 
evident, this will be acknowledged within the discussion. Having laid out this 
intention, and having adopted and justified how bioethics will be considered, a final 
consideration before applying the template to the literature review is addressed next, 
namely, clarification around terminology. 
3.1.1.2 Principlism and principles 
Throughout the course of this chapter, reference is made to Principlism.  A more 
robust account of Principlism is offered later in chapter five when it is considered as 
a paradigm example of principle-based approaches to decision-making. Nonetheless, 
a brief overview of the approach remains helpful for the purposes of present 
discussion because of the prevalence of discussions on Principlism within the 
bioethics literature. 
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Principlism is a key (if not the dominant)206,207 approach to bioethical decision-making 
in Western bioethics.208 The approach was developed by Tom Beauchamp and James 
Childress and it is centred on the use of ‘the Four Principles’ in order to resolve ethical 
dilemmas in determining ‘what to do’. These include respect for the principles of: 
beneficence, non-maleficence, justice and autonomy. Whilst acknowledging the 
existence and importance of additional principles, Beauchamp and Childress argue 
that these fit into clusters under the Four Principles. Principlism has been both 
defended209 and attacked210 within the considerable space which the topic occupies 
within the literature. 
In recounting the emergence of Principlism, Childress describes how a prominent 
feature of biomedical ethics during the 1970s and 1980s was the emergence of 
‘principles that could be understood with relative ease by the members of various 
disciplines’.211  Principlism emerged just after The Belmont Report, developed in 
response to scandals relating to human experimentation such as the Tuskegee 
experiment,212 and then subsequently grew to embody basic principles of bioethics.213 
Before Principlism, the Belmont Report alluded to three basic ethical principles – 
respect for persons (autonomy), beneficence and justice. Within the report, ‘basic 
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ethical principles’ refer to; ‘those general judgements that serve as a basic justification 
for the many particular ethical prescriptions and evaluations of human actions’.214  
Since its emergence, Evans noted Principlism’s expansion into cultural bioethics 
suggesting that it has become an institution itself. Partly this can be explained by the 
spread of Principlism and partly due to the increase in new technologies and the 
emergence of bioethics as a recognised area of expertise. 215,216   
As stated above, Principlism is considered in more detail in chapter five. The 
important point here is that principles (often discussed in relation to Principlism) 
have dominated bioethical discussion more so than rules and this becomes apparent 
within the literature review. This explains why discussion within this chapter relates 
more heavily to principles (rather than rules) and to discussion of Principlism. 
Nonetheless, the literature provides important insights into the different ways in 
which principles and rules are conceptualised within bioethics and the relationship 
between them. Such an exploration of principles is important in turn because of their 
prevalence:  
…ethics cannot avoid principles, whatever the meaning given to them. Whether it is 
the Europeans and the Asians criticizing American Principlism, or Leon Kass blaming 
the principles approach for reducing the validity of ethics, they all appeal to 
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principles. A dialogue is imperative. Until now, each side has defined itself in 
opposition to the other.217 
Two final notes of clarification are necessary before progressing further. First, when 
reference is made throughout this thesis to ‘Principlism’ or the ‘Four Principles’, this 
is in reference to Beauchamp and Childress’ Four Principles approach and is related 
to but also distinct from principle-based approaches more generally.218 Principlism is 
but one expression of a wider principle-based approach – one being a particular sub-
set of the other.  
The comments included within the present discussion will be largely relevant to both 
Principlism and principle-based approaches more generally. But, where discussions 
may be applicable to Principlism specifically, rather than principle-based approaches 
more generally, this is explicitly articulated. This point necessitates explicit 
clarification here for two reasons. First, it is easy to conflate discussions specifically 
relating to Principlism/the Four Principles with those of principles more generally. 
Second, it is important to avoid this conflation here because this thesis strives to 
uncover the meanings and uses attached to principles in general, as opposed to the 
Four Principles within Principlism. With these clarifications out of the way, the task 
of applying the template to the literature review can be undertaken. 
3.2 Application of template to bioethics literature 
In order to structure this discussion in a coherent fashion and to complement the 
approach taken in the previous chapter, each theme from the template is discussed as 
it relates to the bioethics literature. Prior to this discussion, a brief reminder is offered 
of how each theme is defined within the analytical template. Subsequent to the 
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discussion, the dominant characterisations of principles and rules as exposed via 
application of the template are considered with a view to unpacking the implications 
which these might have for this thesis. 
It is noted that the purpose of this chapter is not to compare and contrast the bioethical 
literature review findings with the jurisprudential literature review findings. That 
particular task is performed in chapter four. Thus, this chapter will only include brief 
reference to emerging parallels and points of departure between the two literature 
bases, in order to set up the discussion in chapter four.  
3.2.1 Form 
It is recalled that for the purposes of the literature reviews, form is defined as the way 
in which rules and principles are conveyed, for example the language used to describe 
them or the (legal or non-legal) source in which they appear. 
3.2.1.1 Broad principles 
Principles are often characterised within the bioethics literature as broad, abstract, 
and flexible. For example, Beauchamp and Childress adopt a broad interpretation of 
beneficence ‘so that it includes all forms of action intended to benefit other persons’.219 
Beauchamp argues that ‘although the four principles are abstract, they are universal 
morals’.220 Beauchamp and Childress stress the importance of specification221 and 
balancing222 as companion methodologies to The Four Principles.223 As considered in 
chapter two, balancing involves assigning weights to each relevant principle. 
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Specification is broadly described as ‘the process of reducing the indeterminateness 
of abstract norms and providing them with action-guiding content’.224 These 
methodologies are considered in more detail further below, but the relevant point 
here is that Beauchamp and Childress argue that specification compensates for this 
level of generality of principles. 
It was noted in the previous chapter that the abstract nature and vagueness of 
principles in the legal context was a concern for many legal commentators.  Similar 
concerns are raised within the bioethics literature. This vagueness render principles 
insufficient in terms of providing action-guiding content;225,226 they are ‘too abstract to 
be used in actual decision making’.227,228 On the other hand, it is argued that principles 
must necessarily be vague in nature to ‘do their job’.  For example, Veatch stresses the 
need for principles to be accessible. Equally, it can be argued that rules must also be 
communicated in a manner that is ‘accessible’ to all but even though rules are 
typically characterised as more prescriptive in nature, they are also vulnerable to 
varying interpretation.229,230 
Gert, Culver and Clouser represent the most important opposition, or those who have 
consistently and enduringly engaged with and critiqued Beauchamp and Childress’ 
Principlism. Although Beauchamp and Childress recognise with each new edition the 
critics and criticism that have informed their views over the years. Gert, Culver and 
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Clouser could be considered as some of the few authors who oppose Principlism and 
yet who also work with principle/rule-based ethics.  
Gert and Clouser propose, in their approach to decision-making, ten moral rules231 
for determining what (not) to do. They acknowledge the challenges of interpretation 
but argue that it is not ‘a wide open, free-for-all interpretation’; certain constraints on 
interpretation do exist.  Some rules, they claim, will be less open to interpretation than 
others; ‘disagreement on what counts as death, pain, disability, loss of freedom and 
loss of pleasure is limited to unusual cases’.232 
At the same time, they recognise situations where moral rules are more vulnerable to 
varying interpretation and that these are often culture and context-dependent. Thus, 
decision makers, in their interpretation of what counts as ‘deceiving, breaking a 
promise, cheating’ must be interpreted ‘in light of the cultural context of beliefs and 
practices’.233 
These discussions are echoed elsewhere in the literature234,235 and serve to highlight 
not only the challenges of interpretation, but also a key tension that exists with 
principles and rules; they are relied upon to help decisions makers determine what 
to do. This demands a level of prescriptiveness.  And yet, they are also used to 
communicate norms that must be accessible to a wide-range of stakeholders in 
diverse settings, and which must be sensitive to different cultural factors.236 This 
tension is considered further under the theme of ‘functions’.  
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233 Ibid. 
234 Arras, J., “Principles and Particularity: The Roles of Cases in Bioethics”, 69 Indiana Law 
Review (1993), pp. 983-1014.  
235 Fan, R., “Self-Determination v Family Determination: Two Incommensurable Principles of 
Autonomy”, 11 Bioethics (1997), pp. 309-322. 
236 Cheng-Tek Tai, M., and Seng Lin, C., “Developing a Culturally Relevant Bioethics for Asian 





Further, Gert, Culver and Clouser’s emphasis on the important influence that context 
can play in the appropriateness of principles is also noteworthy. As clarified earlier, 
whilst context is not a central focus of the thesis, it remains relevant because it implies 
that the context in which a rule or principle is being applied (and the setting to which 
it is being applied) can have an impact in how useful a rule or principle will be.  
3.2.1.2 Identification of rules and principles 
On the matter of distinguishing rules and principles, it is recognised that it is difficult 
to draw a clear line between where one ends and the other begins.237 For Beauchamp 
and Childress, this distinction rests upon the level of specificity advanced: 
Rules are more specific in content and more restricted in scope than 
principles. Principles are general norms that leave considerable 
room for judgement in many cases. They thus do not function as 
precise action guides that inform us in each circumstance how to 
act in the way more detailed rules and judgements do.238 
 
This conceptualisation resonates with legal theory descriptions of: (1) rules as more 
specific iterations of action to be taken, and (2) principles as more general norms. 
Beauchamp and Childress’ definition also alludes to ‘room for judgement’ i.e. 
discretion. It associates the exercise of discretion as an activity related to principles 
more so than rules. The need to exercise discretion was also raised within the previous 
chapter and it was acknowledged that even with the application of rules, discretion 
is inescapable. 
Further, the description above explicitly states that the telos of principles is not to act 
as ‘precise action guides’, that this is a job for rules. Once more, this will be considered 
in more detail under the ‘function’ theme. For the purposes of present discussion, this 
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statement bolsters the supposition that varying conceptualisations exist around the 
functions which principles are or are not (normally) expected to perform. 
Explicit discussions on the nature and functions of rules are much less prevalent 
within the bioethical literature, in comparison to both: (1) discussions on principles 
in the bioethics literature and (2) discussions on rules within the legal theory 
literature. As suggested at the outset, this may be because of the divergent objectives 
of the respective disciplines. Where discussions do allude to ‘rules’, this is often in 
reference to moral rules (in contrast with legal rules which were considered in the 
previous chapter). For example - as mentioned above - Gert, Culver and Clouser’s 
ethical approach is based on ten moral rules which they view as binding.239 Their 
approach has however been problematised due to the unclear relationship between 
the rules and what are referred to as ‘ideals’.240  
A further observation is that reference to rules appears to be conflated with principles; 
it appears that the term ‘rule’ and ‘principle’ are used interchangeably at times.241 For 
example, Veatch, in comparing principled approaches to rule-based ethical 
approaches, explains: one might claim there is remarkable similarity between the ten 
general rules of the Clouser/Gert system and the lists of principles of those Principlists 
who generate substantial lists’.242 Further, in reference to problems of conflict and 
balancing, he suggests, ‘the result would be a set of general moral rules (what I would 
call principles)’. 243 
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In the previous chapter, it was noted that Dworkin made reference to standards, 
policies and principles. His use of these terms was confusing because at different 
points, he either differentiated between them or grouped them all together under the 
heading of ‘principles’. This conflation of principles, standards and rules is also 
apparent within the bioethics literature.244 One needs only to glance at the General 
Medical Council245 website and insert ‘principles’ into the search engine, to be lead to 
a list of documents on guiding principles for UK medical professionals including 
principles on end of life care, consent and confidentiality, which appear to be more 
rule-like than principle-like.  
Sachs refers to canonical rules and principles in the context of research ethics.246 
Whilst he is primarily concerned with assessing the content and validity of these rules 
(as is typical of bioethical literature), his suggestions raise some interesting points 
nonetheless. First, he refers to ‘canonical’ ethical rules and principles to be those 
which are well established. Determination of what ‘well established’ constitutes 
might include, for example: 
the rule or principle’s being widely known about by those to whom 
it applies and those who are supposed to apply it, it being the case 
that most people who have thought about it agree that it is valid, 
and that those who disagree with it do not feel that they can simply 
ignore it but rather feel pressure to justify any infringement of it.247 
 
It is recalled that within the legal theory literature, the pedigree thesis and rule of 
recognition proposed that the validity of rules was dependent upon the source of law 
(and the related authority of those advancing the rule) and its acceptance. In a similar 
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vein, Sachs’ description of validity is contingent upon agreement of the validity of a 
rule or principle.  
Of most significance here, is that Sachs identifies six rules which he claims have 
similar manifestations within several ‘ethical pronouncements’ such as the Belmont 
Report, the Council of International Organizations on Medical Science’s International 
Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects’ (CIOMS), the 
Nuremberg Code and the Declaration of Helsinki. Sachs questions the validity of 
these six canonical rules around research ethics which he argues lack support in the 
ethical principles. Thus, for him these rules are only justifiable (and valid) if they are 
underpinned by an ethical principle.  This point is considered further below under 
the ‘interrelationship’ theme.  
3.2.1.3 Moral rules 
Given that explicit reference to the nature of rules is difficult to identify within the 
bioethics literature, the fact that Clouser and Gert’s approach explicitly employs the 
term ‘rule’ merits closer inspection in order to uncover the different connotations 
which are attached to norm in the bioethical context. For example, the first three of 
their ten moral rules read as follows: 
Do not kill (or cause permanent loss of consciousness) 
Do not cause pain (including mental pain, such as sadness and 
anxiety) 
Do not disable (or more precisely, do not cause loss of physical, 
mental or volitional abilities).248 
 
A preliminary observation is that the language employed within their set of ten moral 
rules is rigid and prescriptive (in the sense that it is not vague – it tells the decision 
maker what not to do which, still carries with it an element of action-guiding content, 
                                                      





albeit in the negative). This is akin to the legal rules which were considered within 
the previous chapter (and more specifically, primary rules as identified by Hart). At 
the same time, the language used to convey these moral rules is general in nature. 
Again it is recalled that discussion from the previous chapter also identified 
generality as a feature of some rules (and this was contrasted with the vagueness 
attributed to principles). 
An additional observation is that in explaining the content of each of the rules, 
Clouser and Gert refer to non-observation of their rules as ‘justified exceptions’ or 
‘justified violations’.249 The use of ‘exception’ in particular implies that the rules are 
either respected or not. These ethical rules are perceived to be binding to the decision 
maker. This is in contrast with the purported ability to satisfy or respect a principle 
to varying degrees (which was identified as a distinguishing feature between rules 
and principles within the legal theory literature). 
In delineating between what they refer to as ‘general moral rules’ and ‘particular 
moral rules’, the authors suggest that: 
Looking closely at particular moral rules in a wide variety of 
contexts such as in various professions, occupations, practices, and 
organizations, shows that many particular rules are expressions of 
the general moral rules adapted to a special context. It is as if the 
beliefs, practices, customs, expectations and traditions within 
various communities and sub-communities have combined with 
the general moral rules to produce rules more specifically designed 
for the community or the culture or profession in question….Thus 
particular moral rules are the manifestation of the general moral 
rules as they are expressed within a particular culture or 
subculture.250 
 
Examples offered of particular moral rules are ‘do not commit adultery’, ‘keep 
confidences’ and ‘obtain informed consent’.251 This relationship between general and 
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particular moral rules resonates with the relationship between rules and principles 
which is emerging so far viz the movement from general (principle-like) norms to 
more specific (rule-like) iterations of what to do.  
An aspect of this approach which is somewhat different between the literatures 
though, is that here, rule-like norms are the starting point for decision makers to move 
towards a more specific iteration of what to do. This will be considered in more detail 
later in the chapter. 
3.2.1.4 Summary on form 
Discussions on form have revealed descriptions of rules and principles which 
resonate with legal theory literatures; principles as broad and abstract and rules as 
specific and prescriptive. A tension is apparent between the need for principles to 
carry both an element of vagueness (in order to be broad-reaching) and specificity (in 
order to provide action-guiding content) simultaneously. For the purposes of this 
thesis, this might suggest that competing expectations are placed on principles. 
Interpretative challenges are associated with principles. Authors have stressed that 
interpretation should be subject to contextual constraint. The term ‘rule’ and 
‘principle’ are conflated at times within the literature. It was suggested that in order 
to be valid, both canonical rules and principles need to be established and that 
justifications of the validity of a rule could be located in an underlying principle. This 
suggests that a function of principles may be the justification of rules, and it also 
suggests that the interrelationship between rules and principles should be further 
explored. 
The move from general to particular moral rules was considered and there is some 
resonance with the legal theory discussions about the move from the broad to the 
specific. Yet, in the instance of moral rules, the starting point for decision-making is a 
moral rule (which is either valid or not) as opposed to a general principle which can 





specification necessitates a principle as a starting point or whether a rule may be an 
equally useful starting point for determining what to do.  
3.2.2 Function 
Function relates to the purpose which a rule or principle might be perceived to serve 
in decision-making. The legal theory literature review revealed several different 
functions of rules and principles. Similarly, the bioethical literature has also revealed 
insights into the different ways in which rules and principles are used and these are 
considered within this section. It transpires that there is overlap between both legal 
theory and bioethical contexts around some of the perceived functions that principles 
in particular can perform. Yet, as becomes apparent, some of the perceived functions 
appear on their face to differ between the disciplinary contexts. 
3.2.2.1 Justificatory function 
The Belmont Principles, a (disputed) precursor252 to the Four Principles, are 
considered to have catered to the need for a ‘clear and simple statement of the ethical 
basis for regulation of research’.253  ‘Ethical basis’ when used here appears to imply 
that one function of principles lies in providing a grounding or justification for 
choosing a particular course of action in the research setting. At the same time, this 
justificatory function does not appear to be restricted to only the research setting; it is 
also alluded to within other bioethical contexts (and within jurisprudential contexts, 
as considered in chapter two). Clouser argues that: 
Each principle functions as a reminder that there is an ethical value 
that the agent ought to take into account - the principle does not tell 
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the agent what or how to think, or how to deal with the value in a 
particular instance-but it reminds him to consider it.254  
 
This suggests that principles do not elucidate a particular course of action to take (as 
suggested earlier by Beauchamp and Childress in their differentiation between rules 
and principles). Yet again, this highlights the varying conceptualisations that exist 
around precisely which functions principles perform (and relatedly, the expectations 
attached to them). 
It has been acknowledged that neither the law nor ethics can provide ‘hard and fast’ 
answers around what to do. But, together, they can ‘provide decision makers with 
tools to help in analysing difficult decisions and justifying more robustly the decisions 
that are reached’.255  Law and ethics (in terms of principles) can provide the 
justification for arriving at a morally acceptable course of action.256 Once more the 
importance of justification is stressed and this can be interpreted to mean that rules 
and principles can complement each other in fulfilling this function.  
This assertion that principles serve as a reminder of values embedded within a 
principle and which must be considered in decision-making supports the justificatory 
function of principles which also emerged within the legal theory literature. This 
justificatory facet of principles can also serve to deliver transparency and demonstrate 
reasonableness, which have been flagged as important aspects of decision-making in 
healthcare257 and which is considered further under the ‘accountability’ function. 
This raises the question of how the decision maker might justify departure from a 
particular principle at the expense of another and this is explored in chapter six. 
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3.2.2.2 (Action) guiding function 
The potential action-guiding function is the point of much consternation within the 
literature.258 For example, on one hand, principles are advanced as guides to decision-
making, in order to aid the decision maker in determining which course of action to 
take when faced with ‘circumstances in which moral obligations demand or appear 
to demand that a person adopt each of two (or more) alternative actions, yet the 
person cannot perform all the required alternatives.259 The can assist decision makers 
in considering different possible outcomes and the consequences of prioritising one 
principle over another.260 
On the other hand, a major criticism of principle based approaches lies precisely in 
the lack of (sufficient) action-guiding content associated with principles.261 Proponents 
of principle-based decision-making acknowledge that something extra is needed in 
order to link principles to specific actions, with various methodologies being 
advanced, including specification and balancing (discussed below in section 3.2.3 and 
in chapter five). These discussions resonate with the legal theory literature which 
critiques principles due to their lack of specificity around what to do and where the 
need for something beyond principles and rules emerged.  
For example, Veatch262 offers some sympathy towards the predicament around the 
lack of action-guiding content: 
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Many principlists do not address directly the complete mechanisms 
for the resolution of conflict among principles. But this story is more 
complicated than it may appear. Who is to say, for example, that 
the state of the moral world can lend itself to codification with clear 
guidance to resolve all conflicts. If Kant fails because he cannot 
address the problems of the person who makes a solemn promise 
to tell a lie or to kill another human, it may simply be the state of 
the moral world that no one appeal always wins out.  Still, it is 
appropriate to strive for some form of moral action guidance from 
one’s normative theory.263 
 
Although the statement above defends the critique against principles, Veatch could 
have gone further by reminding us that principles can still provide some form of 
action guidance, but that something needs to take place in order to understand what 
that action might be. This raises the issue of methodologies which have been 
advanced to support the employment of principles (considered further below under 
the application theme). 
But, it appears that despite the aid of methodologies advanced within the literature 
in order to add action-guiding content to principles, there is still potential for 
normative principles to give rise to disagreement around how such principles are to 
be applied, and how they are to guide action.264 Importantly, as considered further 
below, tensions can still arise with regards to the interpretation of the same individual 
principle. Further, as will be considered in section 2.2.3.3, a key weakness of principle-
based approaches can be their lack of over-arching theoretical framework, which 
might help to resolve conflict between different principles in order to determine 
which principle to prioritise and subsequently derive action from. 265 
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3.2.2.3 Standardisation/unifying function 
There are instances within the literature when the term ‘principle’ appears to be 
employed in order to communicate standards or good practice guidance.266 For 
example, the Tavistock Principles267,268 include: rights, balance, comprehensiveness, 
cooperation, improvement, safety and openness. These principles were constructed 
as a response to the existence of individual profession ethics codes and the lack of 
overarching principles for all of the diverse range of professionals involved in 
healthcare. Whilst the value and uptake of the principles is disputable,269,270 they 
highlight a further function of principles: to (attempt) to unify decision makers in 
terms of their decision-making and behaviour across different professions within the 
same discipline e.g. doctors, nurses, dentists, pharmacists etc. 
This raises some important questions around the meanings which we attach to 
principles. Perhaps an important element for consideration here is what the 
implications could be for non-observation. Might non-observation/compliance and 
attached (legal) sanctions help to explain whether something is more or less rule-like? 
This consideration relates to both form and function as a cross-cutting feature which 
may tend more towards a rule or a principle.  
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Muirhead emphasises consistency of decision-making in clinical practice, concluding 
that it is fundamental that the context and the ‘binding obligations of professional 
integrity’ must be the starting points for determining which course of action to take.271 
He also stresses the importance of finding ‘the right ethical course’272 but this is 
problematic if we take on board that bioethical decision-making is about making 
ethically justifiable decisions. Talking about the ‘right’ answer or assuming that there 
is only one ethically justifiable course of action to take may be unhelpful and 
unrealistic.273 Hence the problem of emptiness of principle-based frameworks. 
Sometimes in the bioethical context, it might be acceptable to offer an ethically 
justified/justifiable answer, rather than ‘the absolutely right answer’.274 Such 
criticisms tend to overlook the central role that discretion inevitably plays in the 
context of decision-making, at a group or individual level and Muirhead’s argument 
also presupposes complete consistency in clinical decision-making.275  
A challenge which Muirhead fails to appreciate and which extends beyond the 
interpretation of rules and principles, is that different individuals within different 
organisations may vary in their interpretation of other terminology too. For example, 
when surveying decision-making approaches across different NHS Health Boards, 
there was a lack of shared categorisation of ‘complex cases’, and ‘exceptionality’.276 
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These challenges will be just as evident in clinical ethics settings as policy 
development. 
3.2.2.4 Accountability function 
Related to the idea that principles and rules may provide a means to standardise or 
unify the bases on which outcomes are justified, is the idea that rules and principles 
might provide a means of ensuring accountability amongst stakeholders. A literature 
base exists within and beyond the regulatory and governance context, around 
accountability.277 A clear articulation of rules and principles, even before these have 
actually been applied to a given scenario, can provide a means of accountability in 
that stakeholders will already be expected to conform or respect the rules and 
principles which are relevant to a situation. 
Mulgan notes that the concept is being employed in different ways; accountability 
can mean different things in different contexts. On one hand and at the broadest level, 
accountability can be defined as ‘the process of being called ‘to account’ to some 
authority for one’s actions’;278 this suggests some level of external scrutiny. On the 
other hand, accountability as a principle may also imply the ‘management of 
expectations’279 and this may be on an external or an internal level.  Accountability 
has received increasing popularity within public discourse, particularly in recent 
times as a means of democratic governance – whereby public officials are held to 
account to the public in order to justify or defend actions taken.280  
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If we consider accountability as a process whereby individuals or organisations are 
held liable or ‘to account’ for their actions, then this automatically raises the question 
of to whom individuals will be accountable, and for what?281 For example, Mulgan 
notes that doctors may be held accountable for their professional conduct to 
professional bodies; in the UK, such a body would be the General Medical Council 
(GMC). At the same time, another ‘channel’282 of accountability may lay towards the 
patients and the wider public whose interests decision makers should serve. In the 
data reuse context, data controllers are legally accountable for decisions around 
personal data use for research purposes. Indeed, the term ‘data custodian’ is used in 
Scotland in reference to those individuals such as data controllers, who are holding 
data on behalf of the public.  An important aspect of considering the utility of rules 
and principles may lie in understanding how these tools might be used to facilitate 
accountability. This might include drafting of principles or rules in a way that makes 
intention clear, but also in the way in which principles and rules will be 
communicated and determining to whom such principles are addressed. 
Daniels has proposed an approach to priority setting which is entitled ‘accountability 
for reasonableness’.283 This approach stresses the need for fair process in decision-
making. Where consensus is lacking around which principles should be prioritised, 
it is argued that fair process ensures that consensus can be reached on what is ‘fair 
and legitimate’. This accountability for reasonableness, it is argued, necessitates: 
‘transparency about the grounds for decisions; appeals to rationales that all can accept 
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as relevant to meeting health needs fairly; and procedures for revising decisions in 
light of challenges to them’.284  
Daniels problematises principles because consensus may be lacking in different 
contexts about which principles to prioritise. For example, some have suggested that 
in certain Asian cultures, ‘loss of face’ is more likely to promote discharge of 
responsibilities than the concept of ‘accountability’.285 Once more, this reinforces the 
idea that context may be an important factor when considering the potential 
performance of rules and principles. 
First, concepts such as accountability and transparency may mean different things in 
different countries and organisational contexts in the same way that principles do. 
Further, whilst calls for fair process and transparency should be welcomed, Daniels’ 
approach perhaps overlooks the important role which principles can play as a means 
to providing fair process because, as considered in the following section, these 
principles offer a reminder of the issues at stake and a platform from which to conduct 
such discussions around legitimacy and fairness. 
3.2.2.5 Dialogical function 
It has been claimed that principles can offer a means for achieving ‘an effective form 
of communication which facilitates ongoing moral debate and ongoing reflection’.286 
This implies that principles have a dialogical function; they raise issues pertinent to 
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different bioethical dilemmas and they enable these to be continually discussed,287 
ensuring that they are kept in mind.  
This purported dialogical function could reinforce the evolutionary nature of 
principles in that they can develop to reflect changes or alternatively, the importance 
or relevance of specific principles might change to reflect the status quo. One obvious 
example is the principle of respect for autonomy, which has received considerable 
attention within the literature. It has been asserted that this principle has been granted 
more and more primacy as time has gone by and at the expense of other 
principles;288,289,290,291 a shift was noted in the early 1960s away from medical 
paternalism towards the individual. One manifestation of this can be seen in the 
fetishisation of consent, which has come to dominate medical research.292, 293  
It is recalled that in chapter two, possible challenges to the analytical template were 
considered. One such challenge lies in the fact that different themes may relate more 
closely to either legal theory or bioethics literatures, because of the different objectives 
of each of these disciplines. It might be that this dialogical function is more closely 
attuned to bioethics because, as a discipline, it is concerned with indeterminate 
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questions of morality.294 This is not to say that legal theory is not concerned with 
morality, but rather, in contrast, it is concerned with the relationship between law and 
morality.  
3.2.2.6 Narrowing/exclusionary function (or accusation) 
Principles may play a narrowing function whereby: (1) relevant factors other than 
principles are not given due consideration within determinations of what to do 
and/or (2) sufficient theoretical consideration is lacking.295 Principlism, in particular, 
is accused of promoting minimalist ethics in that deeper theories (for those who 
interpret Principlism as a theory) may be eschewed and ethical deliberation is merely 
reduced to the application of a few rules296 Fiester also holds the four principles as 
being too reductionist:297 
The principlist paradigm is an approach to clinical ethics that recognises a limited and 
fixed set of salient moral considerations that are grounded by the four principles, and 
then searches for these specific elements (and no others) in any particular clinical 
ethics case.298 
Clouser suggests that Principlism offers ‘calculability and predictability’ but again, 
this is not viewed as a positive attribute. It is argued that the approach leads to 
commensuration (defined as ‘measuring different approaches normally represented 
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by different units with a single, common standard of unit’).299 Thus, it ignores or 
‘discards’ ‘aspects of the problem that cannot be translated by the common metric’.300 
Further, Principlism may focus too much on the dilemma at hand and not enough on 
who is experiencing the dilemma; it ‘obscures the complexity of the lives of those 
involved in the situations of moral crisis’.301  
Harris suggests that ‘The four principles impose a sort of straitjacket on thinking 
about ethical issues and encourage a one dimensional approach and the belief that 
this approach is all that ethical thinking requires’.302 It is important to note that Harris 
made this assertion with reference to the Four Principles included within Principlism. 
However, his criticisms could extend to principle-based approaches more generally. 
He does not seek to denigrate the value of principles in decision-making but rather, 
seeks to emphasise that these should not be the only considerations at play. We also 
need to consider, Harris contends, the arguments which are already at play and the 
argumentation put forward.303  
Lee criticises Principlism for being ‘thick in status, thin in content’, thick in status 
because it ‘deals with practical moral issues’ and thin in content because ‘it allows 
different individuals and cultures/traditions to use the four principles…in their own 
usage; thus, what the method provides is only “a thin set of four frames”’. 304 He posits 
that Beauchamp and Childress' method constitutes common morality de jure and 
moral pluralism de facto. He states that ethicists who claim to adopt a common 
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morality stance are essentially assessing the minority culture from the perspective of 
the majority/ ‘mainline’ culture of the West.  
One might be tempted to sympathise with Beauchamp and Childress for choosing to 
include the four principles that they did, given that what they were proposing was 
based in the USA, and supposedly in light of the knowledge and experience they had 
drawn upon formulated in the West. This, however, does not negate the fact that 
Principlism remains open to criticisms of cultural selectivity, and at that, that it 
corresponds to the majority values or norms preferred within Western culture.   
A body of literature criticising Principlism on this basis exists,305 suggesting that the 
principles are not necessarily appropriate in other contexts.306 However, it is 
important to note that this criticism of ‘cultural myopia’307,308 or of an inherent 
difference between different values (whatever ‘Asian’ values may be) has also been 
disputed. 309,310 In any case, as mentioned previously, disputes about which principles 
or which overarching ethical theory should reign supreme are rife within the 
literature and are not of concern in this particular thesis.  
Of import here, is that these discussions mirror the question of the universal and the 
particular considered in chapter two. It is recalled that a tension exists between 
respect for the rule of law (via universal application of rules) and particularism – 
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which should allow flexibility in order to accommodate the particularities of each 
individual case. Once more, the importance of context is raised. 
A further consideration is whether this might teach us something about the 
limitations of principles, or rather of factors which we must keep in mind when 
choosing to give preference to certain principles, theories or sets of principles. This 
might be particularly so given the evolving nature of healthcare today, and the 
phenomenon of globalism more generally, whereby both patients and health care 
professionals are seeking and offering treatment in countries where different ethical 
approaches and principles may dominate. 
The narrowing function above was considered in the sense that principles have the 
potential to lead to neglect of wider cultural sensitivities. A related yet distinct 
narrowing may lie in the potential of principle-based approaches to neglect other 
contextual considerations including the realities of medical practice, the 
organisational systems within which any decisions are taking place311,312 and the 
qualities of the individual patient to whom a decision pertains.313 
3.2.2.7 Summary of functions 
The bioethics literature has highlighted six different purported functions attached to 
principles and these (and the most pertinent points for the current discussion) can be 
summarised as follows:  
(1) a justificatory function: to provide justifications for the course of 
action taken (regardless of whether the principle in question was 
granted priority over competing interests);  
(2) a guiding function:  to guide decision makers in determining 
what to do (although the extent to which additional ‘work’ must be 
done in order to arrive at a decision was highlighted); 
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(3) a standardising/unifying function: to unify different professions 
within healthcare (this raised the question of whether this function 
was performed by principles or rather, the term principle was used 
to refer to what were in fact standards or more rule-like norms) ;  
(4) an accountability function: to offer a means of holding 
individuals to account by offering a clear articulation of 
expectations and by providing a means of demonstrating fair 
process;  
(5) a dialogical function: to provide a means of communication 
which enable ongoing moral debate and reflection (the question of 
how principles can change over time was raised); and 
(6) a narrowing function: to focus only on the dilemma at hand 
(which has raised the question of whether this narrowing occurs at 
the expense of other important considerations). 
 
3.2.3 Application 
This theme relates to literatures which discuss how rules and principles might be 
applied to a particular bioethical dilemma (a difficult decision). More specifically, 
application relates to the methodology adopted in using these norms in order to 
determine what to do. A preliminary clarification is necessary here. A considerable 
literature-base exists around bioethical decision-making as a process more 
generally.314,315,316,317 Such discussions focus on different approaches to understanding 
‘what to do’. These contributions have not been explored in detail within this 
particular thesis because they place a central focus on the cognitive dimensions of 
processes of decision-making within bioethics. Whilst value can be gleaned from such 
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discussions, these are included only in so far as they contribute to the line of 
investigation here which is focussed on the different meanings and uses attached to 
rules and principles, albeit within the context of decision-making.  
Different methodologies are advanced within the literature around how to apply 
principles. Even with these methodologies, normative principles still give rise to 
disagreement around how such principles are to be applied, and guide action.318 For 
example, the Four Principles have been referred to as a ‘checklist’319,320 for confronting 
medico-ethical dilemmas. Whilst Harris stops short of commenting on the utility of 
rules and principles, he offers additional considerations that must be taken in to 
account for decision-making. 321   
3.2.3.1 Balancing and specification  
Balancing and specification are commonly invoked as processes with which to apply 
different principles to difficult decisions. Both of these methodologies are considered 
in more detail in chapter five, and so only a brief overview of the salient discussions 
is relevant here. Proponents of principle-based approaches such as Beauchamp and 
Childress acknowledge the need for methodology, partially in response to 
accusations that principles are indeterminate: 
until we analyse and interpret the principles…and then specify and 
connect them to other norms…it is unreasonable to expect much 
more than a classification scheme that organizes the normative 
content and provides general moral guidance. 322 
 
Balancing is described as a process of assigning weights to different principles when 
conflict arises between two or more principles. As observed within the legal theory 
                                                      
318 O’Neill, (2009), p. 223. 
319 Harris, (2003), p. 303.  
320 Fiester, (2007), p. 684.  
321 Harris, (2003), p. 303.  





literature, the concept of balancing has been criticised within the bioethical setting 
due to the challenge of how to assign weights to principles.323 Some authors 
problematise the notion that weights can be assigned to principles outright 
(incommensurability).324,325 For others, the idea that balancing can provide different 
answers around what to do is concerning: ‘I have always been perplexed as to why it 
is an advantage that by fiddling the weightings of the principles one can come to 
radically different conclusions. It is almost an invitation to cynically shift priorities’.326 
This suggests that the selection or allocations of more or less weight to different 
principles may come from a biased perspective.  
Specification is described as a methodology for obtaining action-guiding content from 
a principle, thus rendering abstract principles more specific and determinate.327 
Clouser, Gert and Culver also highlight the need for specification within their rule-
based approach. Interestingly, there, it appears that specification is occurring at two 
different levels. 
The first level entails specification from general moral rules to particular moral rules. 
The second level is ‘an analogous culturally sensitive specification that takes place 
with respect to moral ideals’.328 Unfortunately, as has already been noted, the authors 
have failed to offer a clear explanation of the relationship between rules and moral 
ideals.329 
An interesting and more helpful approach towards applying principles is offered in 
the NHS Report ‘Making Difficult Decisions in NHS Health Boards in Scotland’.330 
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The Report seeks to lay out a framework for decision-making at both individual level 
and population level in the NHS. The report lays out seven core principles and a 
helpful table included within it provides support to decision makers around each 
principle by offering information on the ‘essence’ of each principle and on what 
‘application of this value means’. For example, support in understanding the 
principle of justice is laid out as follows:331 
Table 1: Making Difficult Decisions example of Justification  
Value/Principle Essence Application of this value means: 
Justice Ensuring that 
those who come 
into contact with 
the delivery of 
healthcare can be 
sure that they will 
be dealt with on 
the merits of their 
case, without 
discrimination 
and with equity.  
• Being even handed, just and fair in our   
actions.  
 
• Ensuring both procedural justice, i.e. 
the inherent fairness of the decision 
making process and distributional 
justice, which means fairness 
characterised as equality of access to 
services and treatments, ensuring equal 
opportunities. 
 
 • The delivery of services on a fair or 
equitable basis.  
 
• Realising that equity can sometimes 
involve treating people differently 
according to their circumstances but 
overall remembering that equal needs 
should get equal chances and 
opportunities.  
 
• Recognising that fairness is not always 




                                                      





Whilst the more detailed iterations above on the principle of justice do not tell the 
decision maker what to do in a specific situation, they do guide the decision maker 
from a broad, general iteration of the principle towards more specific elucidations of 
what respect for the principle implies. This is in contrast with specification which is a 
methodology for applying principles to difficult decisions in order to lead to a 
determination about the specific course of action to follow in a given situation. 
Despite the fact that these examples do not tell the decision maker what to do in 
specific instances, these examples appear helpful nonetheless. By offering more 
detailed examples of the different considerations associated with each principle, the 
decision maker is offered support in their application of the principles. 
These discussions suggest that specification merits closer consideration in this thesis. 
The methodology raises important questions about the ways in which rules and 
principles can be rendered more specific, and can help the decision maker determine 
what to do. Equally, the examples above might offer additional/alternative support 
to the decision maker which does not necessarily imply the need for specification per 
se, but rather, ‘fleshing out’ the principles might help the decision maker to 
understand the meanings to be attached to each of the principles. Such questions are 
tackled in chapter five of this thesis. For now, the important task is to continue to 
gather information on the varying conceptualisations of rules and principles within 
the literature. Of particular relevance to the topic of ‘application’, is the issue of the 
relationship between specification and balancing, considered next.  
3.2.3.1.1 - Relationship between specification and balancing 
Identifying where specification ends and where balancing begins proves difficult. 
Beauchamp and Childress accept that overlap between the two processes may exist 
but ultimately distinguish the processes by explaining that balancing relates to the 
weight or strength of principles. They note for example, that balancing would be 





and conjoined twin case studies). In contrast, they suggest that specification would 
be better employed for the purposes of policy development.332  
Richardson has argued for the displacement of balancing, and its replacement by the 
process of specification.333,334 To remind the reader, balancing refers to a methodology 
of resolving conflict between competing principles whereas specification aims to add 
content to principles in order to render them more determinate.  However, challenges 
emerge even with the process of specification: ‘...equally informed, impartial, rational 
persons can differ not only in how they specify a norm, but also in how they apply 
the same specified norm’.335 As I have argued previously in joint-authorship:  
Even with specification, we cannot escape the fact that the 
application of principles will be subject to varying interpretation. 
However, if principles-based approaches are to be used in order to 
promote reflection on possible courses of action and requiring 
justification of actual courses of action by reference to the principles 
themselves (in accordance with the dialogical and justificatory 
functions of principles discussed above), then specification can still 
be of some utility. This utility however, is dependent upon the 
principles reflecting previously agreed or commonly accepted 
values (which is challenged by previously discussed criticisms 
about ‘myopia’ of principles). If we are to accept that cultural 
specificity cannot be circumvented, then principles can provide ‘a 
common framework or language which does not ensure a 
particular outcome but rather ensures that a particular range of 
considerations or issues are taken into account.336,337 
 
Once more, the literature raises interesting questions around the processes of 
specification and balancing. It appears that these methodologies necessitate further 
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investigation in order to understand more fully the ways in which they can support 
decision makers in determining what to do. Therefore, these themes will be 
considered in more detail in chapter five of this thesis.  
At this juncture, it is merely necessary to note that the application of principles in 
order to determine what to do necessitates action on the part of the decision maker in 
order to balance and/or specify the relevant norms. Likewise the role of context in 
shaping specification is emerging as an important factor. Additionally, it is noted that 
these methodologies suffer from their own challenges and the decision maker must 
exercise discretion in how the relevant principles are to be applied.  An additional 
approach to decision-making which has received attention within the literature is 
casuistry, which is discussed next.  
3.2.3.2 Casuistry 
Casuistry involves basing decisions on what to do by referring to analogous cases. 
Although diverging definitions have been attributed to the approach,338 the 
conceptualisation which is analysed here stems from Jonsen and Toulmin, who, in 
the context of applied ethics, define (and advocate) casuistry as follows:  
the interpretation of moral issues, using procedures of reasoning 
based on paradigms and analogies, leading to the formulation of 
expert opinion about the existence and stringency of particular 
moral obligations, framed in terms of rules or maxims that are 
general but not universal or invariable, since they hold good with 
certainty only in the typical conditions of the agent and 
circumstances of action.339 
 
The way in which their methodology purports to employ principles is interesting for 
the present discussion. In recalling the resolution of difficult cases, they describe that 
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decision makers ‘shared moral perceptions in practice: the moment they turned to 
consider the theoretical principles that underlay those particular perceptions, they 
lacked a similar consensus’.340  
Their approach does not negate the need for principles (what they refer to at points 
interchangeably with the term ‘maxims’). Rather, the focus of their methodology for 
resolving cases implicates principles when used in the context of the three major 
features of casuistry: (1) morphology; (2) taxonomy; and (3) kinetics. 
Morphology relates to the circumstances of a difficult decision, it ‘reveals the 
invariant structure of the particular case, whatever its contingent features, and also 
the invariant forms of argument relevant to any case’.341 The reason that 
circumstances are so significant to the determination of the principles (or ‘maxims’) 
to be applied in the context of casuistry is explained thusly:  
The work of casuistry is to determine which maxim should rule the 
case and to what extent. To what extent means under which 
circumstances, for certain changes of circumstances will lead to 
another maxim emerging as more significant. ‘Circumstances’, say 
the casuists, ‘make the case’.342 
 
Taxonomy relates to the categorisation of cases under a specific ‘type’, for example, 
those involving euthanasia.  Once the morphology of a case (i.e. its circumstances) is 
set out, it is argued that the decision maker can allocate the case under a specific 
taxonomy (i.e. type). The decision maker starts with a ‘paradigm case’ where ‘the 
circumstances were clear, the relevant maxim unambiguous and the rebuttals weak, 
in the mind of almost any observer’.343  
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Next, the decision maker elaborates the paradigm with the circumstances of the case: 
‘these circumstances move away from the paradigm step by step and, as they do, the 
question is in each case whether the circumstances are changed enough to admit 
[other] maxims…[t]hese cases then, are analogous to the paradigm’.344 
In contrast with principle-based approaches which tend to start with broad principles 
and work towards specific determination, casuistry relies ‘not on a principle or a 
theory, but upon the way in which circumstances and maxims appear in the 
morphology of the case itself and in comparison with similar cases’.345 
The final feature of casuistry, as Jonsen describes it, is kinetics which is “a shift in 
moral judgment between paradigm and analogous cases, so that one might say of the 
paradigm, ‘this is clearly wrong’ and of an analogous case, ‘but, in this case, what was 
done was justified, or excusable”.346 
The approach stresses the importance of wisdom gained through experience. In 
explaining the relationship between principles (again, referred to as ‘maxims’), Jonsen 
claims that casuistic reasoning:  
is cultivated by critical reflection upon human experience and upon 
the human condition. In casuistry, the reflection bears upon the 
relation between maxims and circumstance: the former are 
appreciated as valid, but limited rules for the good conduct of life; 
the latter report the actual conditions of living through a particular 
situation.347 
 
This implies an additional factor to decision-making, beyond the use of rules and 
principles, lies in considering previous cases. In the jurisprudential setting, this is 
often referred to as ‘precedent’. It is recalled that within the previous chapter, the 
question was raised of whether something which was less specific than a rule but less 
                                                      
344 Ibid., p. 302.  
345 Ibid., p. 303. 
346 Ibid.  





abstract than a principle is needed to guide decision makers. This in turn, raises the 
question of whether the casuistic approach might offer such support. Might 
identifying the taxonomy to which a particular case belongs help decision makers to 
identify the relevant principles which must be applied to determine what to do? 
Equally, can casuistry ensue without reference to principles at all? Might it only be 
concerned with, and constrained by rules in the legalistic sense? 
Further, one of the potential drawbacks of casuistry is the emphasis which it places 
on experience. First, decision makers may be relatively new to their profession 
limiting their knowledge of analogous cases. Further, even where decision makers 
are experienced, it has been argued that there is still a need for ‘individual decision 
makers to enlarge their conceptual space beyond their experience and, consequently, 
develop a meaningful understanding of new concepts of which they may not have 
been aware’.348 
Again, this suggests that even with case-based reasoning, something extra is still 
needed in order to enable decision makers to ‘reach’ beyond their experiences, 
particularly when confronted with a new challenging dilemma. There may be cases 
where analogies are not self-evident (particularly in the bioethical context where the 
pace of technological advancement is rapid).349 In turn, this raises an interesting 
question about how rules and principles might be used in instances where pre-
existing regulation is lacking. 
These discussions raise three important questions for the purpose of this thesis. First, 
the question arises as to what extent analogous case-based reasoning might offer 
support to decision makers when used in tandem with principles. The second 
question is what role, if any, rules and principles might play in supporting decision 
makers when analogies cases are lacking. A third question is whether casuistry is 
actually constrained by legal rules, obviating reliance on principles at all.  
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3.2.3.3 Over-arching ethical theory/framework 
One recurring criticism against principle-based approaches such as Principlism is 
their lack of over-arching theoretical framework.350 Beauchamp and Childress 
maintain that Principlism is not an ethical theory but rather an ethical framework for 
decision-making, though their approach is referred to within the literature as an 
ethical theory and is simultaneously criticised for lacking an ethical theory. For 
example, Fiester has suggested the four principles are used as a diagnostic ‘checklist’:  
‘ …it is not the theory of Principlism that is taught to student clinicians but rather, a 
very abridged substitute, which is more akin to a checklist than an exposition of a 
nuanced moral framework’.351 Further, Green laments that the ways in which 
principles are applied lacks ‘theoretical sophistication’ partly because of the need to 
‘get to the point’ in applied ethics. 352  
Discussion of whether or not Principlism is an ethical theory (or whether it fails to 
appropriately engage with theory) is beyond the scope of this thesis and for the 
purposes of this chapter, rather than taking a specific stance on whether this is a 
theory or not, I am keeping an open-mind in order to be as inclusive as possible about 
the commentaries which have taken place around Principlism.   
Of significance here is that this criticism of a lack of sufficient theoretical backing 
might suggest that principles on their own are not enough in decision-making. This 
would imply the necessity of a broader over-arching ethical framework which could 
help decision makers by offering illumination on the particular slant of interpretation 
which should be taken but also in prioritising principles. For example, a 
consequentialist/utilitarian approach would place justice/the greatest good for the 
greatest number of people above the individual autonomy of a patient. At the same 
time, because principles can mean different things to different people,   it can be 
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argued that an ethical framework cannot guarantee that the same principles will 
always be interpreted in the same way. 
Campbell posits that Principlism and Virtue Ethics can complement each other.353 It 
is recalled from chapter two that Amaya has suggested that rules and principles are 
inadequate for reaching ‘good choices’ and that Virtue Ethics is a necessary approach 
to doing so. An interesting point about the Virtue Ethics approach is that it 
emphasises the character of the decision maker, as this will shape the way in which 
they will select and apply rules and principles. The question of the nature of the 
person making the decision is important and necessitates further thought within this 
thesis.  
3.2.3.4 Contextual considerations in the application of rules and principles 
It is important to note that the organisational context within which decision-making 
takes place will have a bearing on the extent to which rules and principles will be 
helpful.354 For example, Muirhead argues that principles (and their application) are 
more appropriate in the context of answering biosocial questions (which would 
include policy development) rather than questions of clinical ethics.355 Such questions 
would include, for example, ‘Are there situations in which assisted-dying is morally 
permissible? What criteria must apply for termination of pregnancy to be 
appropriate? Who should make treatment decisions for a patient with reduced 
cognitive function?’356 
Indeed when it comes to questions of clinical ethics, it is argued that Principlism fails 
to address ‘the clinical reality’.357 This ‘is concerned with the specific situations that 
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individual clinicians face on a daily basis’ such as whether or not to discharge a 
diabetic young adult with poor glycaemic levels.358  This differentiation of the 
appropriateness of principles according to the context within which they are being 
applied resonates with discussions in the legal theory literature. It is recalled that 
Braithwaite suggested that rules are more appropriate for regulating simple 
landscapes and principles for regulating more complex-landscapes. Whilst further 
exploration of contextual factors of decision-making is beyond the purview of this 
thesis, it should, nonetheless, be noted that the context in which the decision-making 
takes place may play a determinative role in the extent to which different rules and 
principles may support the decision maker. 
3.2.3.5 Summary on application 
This section has considered key bioethical discussions on methodological approaches 
of applying principles (and to a lesser extent, rules) in order to resolve difficult 
decisions. Balancing and specification are dominant methodologies advanced for 
applying principles. Whilst both approaches have been problematized, specification 
in particular merits further exploration because of the insights it may bring in 
developing the principle-rule continuum. 
Alternative theories around how decisions are reached have also been considered, 
including the propositions that principles merely feature as post-facto rationalisations 
after a decision has been taken. Once more, discussions in the literature appear to 
suggest that something beyond rules and principles is needed for decision-making 
such as consideration of the context within which decisions are being made and the 
experiences the decision maker possesses.  
On this latter point, proponents of casuistry argue in favour of case-based reasoning 
which emphasises drawing analogies from paradigm-cases. The approach also raises 
important questions for further exploration, including the extent to which 
                                                      





considering similar cases may support a decision maker and equally, what role 
principles and rules can play where no analogy can be drawn. 
3.2.4 Dichotomisation 
This refers to a supposed tendency to set up rules and principles against one another 
rather than treating them in a complementary fashion. 
Identifying dichotomisation within the bioethical literature was particularly 
challenging. As considered previously, this may in part be explained by the different 
objectives of the respective legal theory and bioethics disciplines. A further 
explanation might be that there is a conflation within bioethical treatments of rules 
and principles, or a collapsing of any distinctions that exist between them. As argued 
in the introduction to this thesis, more clarity is needed about the relationships that 
might exist between rules and principles. This raises the question of whether the 
bioethical literature might also benefit from the continuum conceptualisation being 
developed in this thesis. 
Nevertheless, some of the bioethics literature does tend to present rules and 
principles in an ‘either/or’ fashion. The most notable example of dichotomisation is 
apparent in discussions which compare and contrast Principlism with the theory of 
morality as a public system advanced by Gert, Culver and Clouser. But even here, 
conflation of the terms is evident. 
Van den Burg and Brom’s ‘interactive paradigm’359 offers another example of 
dichotomisation. It reflects a shift in legal regulation from detailed legislation towards 
‘open standards and procedural norms’.360 They advocate the design of legislation so 
that it is not only effective as a form of communication but ‘moreover that it facilitates 
ongoing reflection’.361 
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Within the implementation process of the interactive paradigm, a ‘different type of 
law’ is envisaged, that is to say, one where citizens are responsible for conducting 
themselves in accordance with principles as proposed by the legislature, citizens 
would be charged with ‘co-operative effort’ for realising these standards. Van der 
Burg and Brom have argued that it is easier to reach consensus on broad based 
principles rather than concrete rules.362 
Interestingly, a different type of dichotomisation has emerged from the bioethics 
literature; this is one which tends to set apart principle-based approaches which lack 
an overarching ethical theory from theory-based approaches as discussed earlier in 
this chapter. Indeed, one of the core justifications for the requirement of an 
overarching theory lies in the necessity to resolve conflict between principles, which 
is considered next.  
3.2.5 Conflict 
Conflict refers to the way in which either conflict between rules and rules, and 
principles and principles occurs, or conflict as it may arise between rules and 
principles. This also refers to the means proposed to resolve any such tensions. 
Beauchamp and Childress’ Principlism instructs the decision maker to balance 
principles in order to resolve conflict which arises between different principles. One 
key criticism of their Four Principle approach is its failure to elucidate in a meaningful 
way how conflict between principles should be resolved or how the principles are 
interrelated.363 This mirrors jurisprudential literatures which refer to assigning weight 
                                                      
362 Ibid. 
363 Kuczewski, M., “Casuistry and Principlism: the Convergence of Method in Biomedical 






to different principles but which similarly fail to delineate exactly how these weights 
should be assigned.364,365  
A further accusation is that in the context of resolving conflict between the Four 
Principles, autonomy is often granted primacy366 at the expense of the other principles 
of beneficence, non-maleficence and justice and that when conflict between the four 
principles occurs, it is most often between autonomy and one of the other 
principles.367  Beauchamp and Childress maintain that no one principle is supposedly 
more or less important than the other.368 Wolpe rejects this, arguing that in American 
bioethics at least, the Four Principles are not assigned equal weighting.369 In defence 
of Principlism, this may be a characteristic of Western ethics rather than a feature 
specific to Principlism.  
There have also been claims of a recent shift in prioritising principles in order to 
achieve ‘moderate protectionism’ which maintains traditional approaches such as 
Principlism ‘with an emphasis on prioritising nonmaleficence to a great extent than 
beneficence, respect for persons and justice’.370  It would be imprudent to extrapolate 
these generalisations to all principle-based approaches but they serve to highlight 
criticisms around the prioritisation of one principle over others.  
It is recalled that some have suggested an overarching framework i.e. a moral theory 
is needed in order to know which principles to prioritise. At the same time, there are 
those who emphasise the need to move bioethical discussions away from the topic of 
theory ‘given the absence of a universally agreed upon background moral theory’.371  
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As has been mentioned previously, Principlism is but one manifestation of principle-
based approaches. Veatch argues that most of the other principle-based approaches 
are ‘single-principle theories’ in so far as one ‘master’ principle should always be 
prioritised. The example offered earlier was of utilitarianism which will always seek 
to value the greatest good for the greatest number of people, and it may be argued, 
this will always trump individual autonomy. But, even where there is a master 
principle, tensions arise because, as Veatch explains: 
the moral considerations become so sweeping that more than one 
consideration can arise under the rubric of the single principle, and 
these considerations can sometimes pull in opposite directions, 
thus not providing any definitive action guidance. The 
commitment to choosing the course of action that will produce as 
much or more good consequences as any other course leaves one 
puzzled over the method for determining which of many actions 
produces the best consequences.372 
 
What can be taken from these discussions is that even where overarching ethical 
theories are available, these will be vulnerable to criticisms of prioritising one or 
several principles at the expense of others. Further, even with only one principle to 
hand, the decision maker may still reach conflicting determinations on how to 
interpret and thus “action” a principle.  
Similarly, when reference is made to ‘moral rules’, conflict also arises. A suggested 
solution is once again, to create ‘a hierarchy of rules’.373 Veatch suggests that where a 
hierarchy does not provide action-guiding content, then ‘the only available 
alternative might be to resort to a very limited acceptance of intuitive balancing of 
competing claims’.374 
This perhaps explains why debates around how to resolve conflict between principles 
and moral rules are stagnated, because conflict cannot be avoided. In a more recent 
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contribution to discussions of Principlism, Gordon et al argue that the ‘meta-
principle’ of common morality can be used as a helpful tool in the balancing process 
where conflict amongst principles might arise.375 Whilst the authors can be admired 
for attempting to bring discussion forward and in attempting to offer a workable 
solution to the omnipresent challenge which conflict brings to principle-based 
decision-making, even Beauchamp himself, one of the ‘Godfathers of Principlism’ 
accuses the example and solution offered of confounding different notions.376 Further, 
the authors offer very vague methodology377 around their approach. 
3.2.5.1 Summary on Conflict 
The key methodology advanced in order to address conflict between principles in the 
literature, is balancing.378,379,380 In a similar fashion to legal theory literatures, the 
concept of assigning weight to different principles is a key component of the 
balancing exercise within bioethics literatures. Yet, as has been suggested, significant 
challenges arise in determining how to assign weight and balance to respective 
principles.381 Balancing can also be compared to ranking principles and rules, placing 
them in a hierarchy. It has been suggested that having an overarching moral theory 
might help decision makers know which principle(s) to prioritise. Balancing is 
considered in more detail in chapter five where further consideration of specification 
is also offered.  
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This theme relates to discussions of how rules and principles might be connected to 
one another, and what the nature of this connection might be.  It is recalled that within 
the legal theory literature, examples were identified which dichotomised rules and 
principles whilst other authors referred to the concept of a continuum upon which 
rules and principles co-exist. Two key points relating to the theme of interrelationship 
have emerged from the bioethics literature and each is considered in turn here.  
3.2.6.1 Loose distinctions 
The first noteworthy point emerging from the literature is the explicit 
acknowledgement of the difficulties in distinguishing between rules and principles 
(considered earlier under the theme of ‘form’). For example, whilst Beauchamp and 
Childress suggest that such a distinction rests upon the level of specificity of each of 
the norms, they still appreciate that this as a ‘loose distinction’.382  
Examples have been offered earlier in this chapter where reference has been made to 
rules and principles interchangeably. Further considerations on this matter are 
offered by Wilde who notes that: 
Reconceiving of principles as 'rules' will not escape the problems 
that beset 'principles'. As Lustig correctly argues, such 
maneuvering encounters the same set of conceptual pitfalls and 
does not provide a plausible alternative to Principlism.383 
 
Such an assertion could be interpreted as implying that rules and principles are 
somewhat interchangeable; if the conceptual pitfalls associated with both rules and 
principles are the same, then does it follow that rules and principles are conceptually 
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the same? Is the relationship between them one of equivalence or more so one of 
similarity (family resemblances) but with nuances nonetheless? 
Whilst it would be imprudent to attempt to answer this question at this early stage, it 
can be noted that the findings thus far suggest that rules and principles may share 
some characteristics (‘family resemblances’). At the same time, nuances between rules 
and principles are also starting to emerge (which bolster Alexy and Dworkin’s 
distinctions of rules as either valid or not and principles as optimization requirements 
with a dimension of weight). For example, principles are broader in scope than rules. 
Principles are seen as general guides rather than determinate prescriptions of ‘what 
to do’. These nuances will be discussed in more detail in chapter four.  
3.2.6.2 A co-dependent relationship? 
In contrast with discussions which tend to compare and contrast rules and principles, 
other discussions have emerged which hint towards a co-dependent relationship 
between the two i.e. the need for both decision-making tools. In tracing changes which 
have occurred in the medical profession, Rothman recalls that:  
outsiders now framed the normative principles that were to guide 
the doctor-patient relationship. The critical pronouncements no 
longer originated in medical texts but in judicial decisions, 
bioethical treatises, and legislative resolutions.384 
 
In discussing new actors such as lawyers, legislators, religion and philosophy 
professors, Rothman explains that: 
whether drawing on a tradition of predictability (in the law) or of 
first principles (in philosophy or religion), they joined together to 
create a new formality and impose it on medicine, insisting on 
guidelines, regulations and collective decision making.385  
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These statements suggest that something beyond principles originating in medical 
texts was needed for decision-making and that the process of formalisation of these 
principles in the form of guidelines and regulation (rules) was also necessary. This 
implies the necessity of both principles and legislation (in the form of rules). This 
echoes discussions within the sphere of legal theory; to me it evinces the idea that 
both rules and principles are needed for decision-making.  
This might also suggest the limitations of only (or predominantly) relying upon rules 
or principles separately for decision-making. A worthwhile line of investigation in 
this thesis will be to conduct an analytical exploration (offered in chapters five and 
six) on both rule and principle-based approaches, in order to compare and contrast 
the different implications which are associated with electing for one approach at the 
expense of the other.  
At the same time, the observation above suggests that rules (in the form of legislation) 
are more formalised manifestations of principles. This reinforces the concept of the 
principle-rule continuum being developed here. In the context of research ethics, 
Sachs suggests that the validity of certain rules should be brought into question 
because these rules ‘find no support in the principles’.386 This suggests that in order 
to a rule to be ‘valid’, reference to an underlying principle is one means of justifying 
the rule: ‘this leaves anyone who would insist that we not abandon those rules in the 
difficult position of needing to establish that we are nevertheless justified in believing 
in their validity….this is not likely to be accomplished’. 387 
3.2.6.3 Summary on interrelationship 
The bioethics literature reveals examples of reference being made to rules and 
principles interchangeably or acknowledgements of a ‘loose’ distinction between the 
two. This bolsters the need to investigate the relationship between the two, as this 
thesis does, in order to understand the extent and nature of conceptual similarities 
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and distinctions between the two. Another dynamic of this relationship seems to be 
the use of rules as a manifestation/expression/formalisation of principles. This raises 
the question of whether rules and principles may exist in a co-dependent relationship 
with necessary reinforcement of the respective principle/rule in question. 
3.3 Summary  
This section summarises the key findings from the literature review and considers the 
implications of these finding for the lines of inquiry being pursued in this thesis. As 
mentioned previously, a vast amount of the literature reviewed discusses principles 
in the context of Principlism. It is not always easy to discern whether commentaries 
within the literature which discuss Principlism are specific to the Four Principles or 
whether, rather, they speak to the nature of principles on a more general level.  
3.3.1 Form  
In line with the legal theory literature, principles are generally identified within the 
bioethical literatures as broad, abstract and vague. Rules are differentiated as more 
‘specific in content and more restricted in scope’388 although it has been 
acknowledged that it is not always easy to distinguish between the two. Further, 
examples were prevalent within the literature of the use of the terms ‘rule’, ‘principle’, 
‘maxim’ and ‘standard’ interchangeably.  
For some, the task of principles is to provide action-guiding content and for this 
reason, the vagueness and indeterminacy that principles often have is a great 
hindrance and disadvantage. Paradoxically, for proponents of principle-based 
approaches, this weakness is in fact considered a strength and a necessary feature of 
principles. Abstract and high-level form is necessary in order to communicate these 
                                                      





norms in an accessible manner and because they necessitate vagueness/scope/room 
for interpretation to ‘do their job’ so to speak. 
 In turn, this has highlighted that alongside varying interpretations which can arise 
out of one specific principle or rule, decision makers appear to place varying 
expectations on the functions which rules and principles are expected to perform. 
Another challenge associated with principles and rules, and once again, a challenge 
also identified in legal theory literatures, is that they are vulnerable to varying 
interpretation. Clouser, Gert and Culver suggest that this interpretation is 
constrained to some extent because their moral rules must be interpreted in light of 
context, culture and practice.  
3.3.2 Function 
One of the most interesting aspects of the legal theory literature review involved 
considering the different functions which principles and rules might be relied upon 
to perform. The bioethics literature has also revealed insights around the different 
expectations which are placed on rules and principles:  
3.3.2.1 Justificatory function: to provide justifications for the course of action taken  
This function suggests two things: (1) that principles provide a basis upon which to 
justify decisions taken around which action to pursue; and (2) that simply because a 
principle is ‘engaged’ or relevant to the resolution of a difficult decision, this does not 
necessarily imply that the principle ought to take primacy. Again, this exemplifies the 
conflicting nature of principles but also suggests that the deployment of principles is 
not restricted to granting primacy to one principle at the expense of others. Rather, it 
may also entail demonstration on the part of the decision maker that they have 
considered all of the principles at stake and (justifiably) decided that the course of 





3.3.2.2. Guiding function: to guide decision makers to determine what to do 
The literature points to many criticisms about principles lacking action-guiding 
content. Even advocates of principle-based approaches acknowledge that additional 
mechanisms (balancing and specification) are needed in order to uncover the action 
which should follow. In contrast with the legal theory literature, deeper engagement 
with the issues of balancing and specification are apparent in the bioethics literature 
but they still leave room for further analysis.  
A question emerges as to whether ‘guiding’ need relate to specific action, or rather, 
can this guiding function relate to guiding the decision maker towards considerations 
that should be taken on board when determining what to do?  
3.3.2.3 Standardising/unifying function: to unify different professions within 
healthcare 
It was suggested that consistency in clinical ethics is important and Muirhead 
disputed the potential for principles to offer a standardising function because 
principles left too much scope for interpretation. And yet, examples appear within 
the literature of the term principle being used in reference to professional standards, 
as a benchmark against which conduct and decisions might be assessed.  
3.3.2.4 Accountability function: to offer a means of holding individuals to account 
and provide a means of demonstrating fair process 
It was suggested that upfront and clearly articulated rules and principles can offer 
accountability (the process of being held to account) amongst various stakeholders. It 
was argued that principles (despite the challenge of cultural myopia) can play an 
important role in achieving accountability for reasonableness when considered as a 





3.3.2.5 Dialogical function: to provide a means of communication which enable 
ongoing moral debate and reflection 
It was claimed within the literature that principles offer a means of communication 
of pertinent ethical issues which relate to a particular bioethical dilemma. Further, 
principles can evolve in order to reflect the status quo, the principle of autonomy was 
considered in this regard. Again, this function relates to the justificatory function 
considered earlier on. This may be an important point for our expectations around 
principles i.e. to acknowledge that principles do not only have one (action-guiding) 
function.  
3.3.2.6 Narrowing function  
Whilst on the one hand principles are critiqued for being overly broad, it has also 
been claimed that they tend to be too narrow and reductionist which leads to neglect 
of other pertinent considerations that should be taken into account when determining 
what to do. For example, the organisational structure/cultural context to which the 
decision relates. 
It is questionable whether rules would be any more inclusive of contextual matters 
than principles. In fact, because rules are often conceptualised as more rigid and 
specific in nature, it would follow that principles may be better or at least, no less 
suited to accommodating cultural considerations than rules. Or, an alternative theory 
might be that regardless of whether decision makers are employing rules, principles 
or a combination of both, contextual considerations are necessary additional factors 
demanding inclusion within deliberations around what to do. Context may be the 
‘something extra’ in decision-making that both legal theory and bioethical literatures 
are eluding to. 
Another suggestion of this ‘something extra’ which is needed when relying upon 
principles, is the need for an over-arching ethical theory. This can be compared with 
legal theory literature which demonstrates its own theoretical preoccupations such as 





prioritisation of the principles within a hierarchy, a further problem is encountered; 
principles are criticised for being too flexible thus leading them to ‘massive scope for 
interpretation’389 and rendering them ‘too abstract to be used in actual decision 
making’.390 Principles will mean different things to different people.391 This argument 
appears particularly pertinent when one considers the cultural (ir)relevance of 
principles.392 This in turn leads to many more questions, such as how we determine 
which ethical theory should be used, different principles will feature more or less (or 
not at all) depending on the framework adopted, and within these frameworks, such 
principles will be prioritised in different ways. 
If we consider openness to interpretation as a vulnerability rather than an asset, then 
this raises a paradox of principles; that they are employed in order to rationalise or 
justify decisions, but that they may fail in the endeavour and actually undermine the 
rationality of arguments because of how open to interpretation they are.  
As clarified earlier in this thesis, the primary pursuit here is not to consider ethical 
theories and evaluate which might be considered most suitable for decision-making. 
At the same time, the questions outlined above remain salient for this thesis, because 
they highlight external factors which will influence how principles interact, which 
speaks to the nature of principles, their role(s) within decision-making and their 
functionality (or lack thereof).  
3.3.3 Application 
Numerous discussions within the bioethics literature discussed various aspects of the 
application of principles to decision-making. Discussion on the application of rules 
was discussed to a much lesser extent. Balancing and specification are two 
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methodologies most often associated with the application of principles. Both 
methodologies have been problematized yet Beauchamp and Childress maintain they 
are both integral methodologies in order to be able to balance and garner action-
guiding content from principles.   
Given the important expectations placed on these methodologies for supporting 
decision makers in exercising discretion, they merit further exploration within this 
thesis. Specification in particular necessitates closer inspection because of the insights 
that it may bring to the rule – principle continuum which is being developed within 
this thesis. 
It has been suggested that rather than being applied prior to determining ‘what to 
do’, principles merely feature as post-hoc justifications. If principles are not the 
primary driver for action, then the question arises as to how the decision maker is 
arriving at her decision. One suggestion is that an overarching moral theory would 
help decision makers to determine which principles should be prioritised when 
conflict between principles might arise. But, this presupposes that overarching 
theories are applied uniformly and that consensus can be achieved on which moral 
theory to select. 
Another approach which was considered is casuistry, whereby decision makers rely 
upon paradigm-cases in order to draw analogy with the case at hand. The support 
which case-based reasoning can provide decision makers merits further 
consideration. A question which arises is what role casuistry leaves for rules and 
principles (for surely the paradigm-case was resolved based on rules/principles). 
Another question which arises is how the decision maker might approach a case 
where no analogy can be drawn, if there is no paradigm-case, then how might rules 
and principles be employed? 
Two final considerations of relevance to this thesis centre on the continual emergence 
within the literature of the significance of discretion and context. The exercise of 





bioethical literature (which parallels with the legal theory literature). Yet, it seems 
that even with:  balancing; specification; post-hoc rationalisation; casuistry; over-
arching moral theories and the different contextual factors which are factored in to a 
decision, interpretation and thus the necessity to exercise discretion is omnipresent, 
albeit to varying degrees. Whilst further exploration of context is beyond the purview 
of this thesis (necessitating its own thesis entirely), further consideration will be 
offered on the exercise of discretion and more specifically, how rules and principles 
might support the decision maker in exercising discretion.   
3.3.4 Conflict 
The key methodology advanced to address conflict between principles in the 
literature is balancing. In resonance with the legal theory literatures, the concept of 
assigning weight to different principles is often described as a key component of the 
balancing exercise. Yet, commensurability and balancing both pose significant 
challenges.393 
As mentioned, it has been suggested that having an overarching moral theory might 
help decision makers know which principle(s) to prioritise. This raises the question 
of how decision makers are to balance principles where an over-arching moral theory 
is lacking and where the appropriate weight/hierarchy is not self-evident. This will 
be considered in more detail in this thesis. 
3.3.5 Dichotomisation 
In comparison to the legal theory literature, overt examples of dichotomisation were 
sparse within the bioethics literature. Where examples did tend to compare and 
contrast rules and principles in an either or fashion, upon further investigation, the 
discussions actually served to highlight similarities between rules and principles, 
                                                      





rather than amplifying how one approach might be better or different than the other. 
This was particularly notable through discussions of moral rules and Principlism.  
An observation that was unique to the bioethics literature was that a form of 
dichotomisation was apparent not between rules and principles, but rather, between 
approaches with and without overarching ethical theories.  
3.3.6 Interrelationship  
It is recalled that in chapter two, it was suggested that a helpful approach in order to 
enrich our understanding of rules and principles, was not to consider these as 
‘either/or’ options for decision-making, but rather, to consider them as 
complementary to each other. Part of this process involves mapping out how rules 
and principles are related to each other. In this regard, the bioethical literature has 
flagged up the use of the terms ‘rule’ and ‘principle’ interchangeably. This reinforces 
the need to unpack the principle-rule continuum being developed here in order to 
gain some conceptual clarity about the family resemblances which principles share as 
well as their differences.   
In the previous chapter, an analogy was used to describe the relationship between 
rules and principles: rule is to principle as plan is to blueprint. I suspected that this 
was an overly-reductionist conceptualisation. Yet, similar suggestions have emerged 
within the bioethics literature, where principles are deemed to underpin rules, and 
rules are often seen as more specific or formalised manifestations of principles. This 
suggests that a principle might ‘evolve’ into a rule. This in turn raises the question of 
how this transition might take place and I suspect that specification may help in this 
regard.  
3.3.7 Next steps 
In this chapter, the analytical template has been applied to the bioethics literature. 





as well as some discussions which appear to be more distinct to the bioethical 
disciplinary setting.  The following chapter offers a detailed comparative analysis of 
the findings from both literature reviews. This is a relatively novel undertaking in 
and of itself and it remains to be seen what each of the respective legal theory and 
bioethics literatures might ‘learn’ from each other regarding the ways in which rules 
and principles are used, and the meanings attached to each of these norms. In 
addition, the discussion will map out further lines of investigation which will be 






Chapter Four: Comparison of Legal Theory and Bioethics 
Literature Reviews 
4.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is two-fold. First, it offers a comparative analysis of legal 
theory and bioethical literatures pertaining to rules and principles in decision-
making. This culminates in a portraiture of typical characterisations of rules and 
principles from both literatures. Second, and in light of this analysis, key themes are 
identified from the discussion which will form the basis of investigation for the 
remainder of this thesis. The metaphor of a tree is introduced as a helpful analytical 
device around which to shape the enquiries that follow.   
It is recalled that chapter two began with the construction of a template of themes 
relating to rules, principles and their interrelationships. These themes include: form, 
function, application, dichotomisation, conflict and interrelationship. The analytical 
template offered a useful means of framing the discussion and focussing analysis. It 
is recalled that a central contribution of the thesis lies in unpacking how rules and 
principles are conceptualised in the context of making difficult decisions about ‘what 
to do’. 
Having outlined the template and the key themes that it encompassed, chapter two 
continued by applying the template to the relevant legal theory literature. Chapter 
three also employed the template (for consistency and to offer a platform of 
comparison) and applied it against the bioethics literature. Both chapters concluded 
by outlining key characteristics of rules, principles and their interrelationships which 
emerged from the respective literatures. 
The primary goal of this chapter is to consider via comparison, the different issues 
which have surfaced as a result of the literature reviews. It is important to consider 
how the different literatures treat rules and principles. Such a comparison will shed 





the expectations that we might place upon them - might differ (or converge) between 
different - in this case legal theory and bioethics - literatures. This comparison is in 
itself, a relatively novel undertaking and it is argued, an original contribution to 
existing literature.   
Such a comparative exercise also works towards fulfilling the central line of inquiry 
of this thesis, namely in understanding ‘against the backdrop of health research 
regulation, what are the meanings and functions attached to the use of rules and 
principles in order to determine what to do and what are the relationships between 
rules and principles?’ 
This chapter begins with reflections on the application of the analytical template, 
considering the successes and failures of the approach from a methodological 
perspective. It is important to consider the relative strengths and drawbacks of the 
template, having now had the opportunity to apply it in practice. In particular, noting 
the limitations or challenges to which the template gave rise might impact the extent 
to which the literature review findings might be generalisable or extrapolated in 
subsequent discussions. Similarly, understanding the merits and defects of the 
template will help to frame the context in which the discussions take place. 
The next section considers findings as they relate to each theme from the template in 
turn. Then, a more general discussion is offered on the parallels and contrasts that 
might be drawn from the different literature bases. Key characteristics are categorised 
within tables in Section 4. This leads to the final section, which draws upon the 
research conducted in this thesis thus far. It involves the construction of a conceptual 
tree metaphor which not only reflects preliminary tentative findings, but also serves 





4.2 Reflection on the analytical template  
It is recalled from chapter two that the analytical template was employed in order to 
facilitate a pragmatic and directed approach towards conducting the literature 
reviews. It offered a means of framing discussion and focussing analysis in correlation 
to the themes of most relevance to the thesis.  
The key themes included within the analytical template were: form, function, 
application, dichotomisation, conflict and interrelationship.  These key themes were 
included in the template because each theme (re)emerged during my preliminary 
background research on the topic of this thesis. This suggested that further 
exploration of these themes might provide particularly fruitful insights into 
understanding the nature, roles of, and interrelationships between rules and 
principles. 
A further advantage of the bespoke template is that it provided a coherent and well-
structured means of reviewing the bioethics and legal theory literatures. In contrast, 
not using a template exposed me to the risk of offering an unfocussed and potentially 
unproductive documentation of every discussion which has taken place around rules 
and principles within my target literatures. 
The template has already uncovered interesting observations around rules and 
principles. For example, it suggests that rules and in particular, principles, can 
perform several different tasks for those applying them.  This might tell us something 
about when their deployment might be most (in)appropriate, depending upon which 
outcome(s) are intended and the context in which the particular rules or principles 
are being deployed. This observation around different functions of rules and 
principles is also relatively under-developed within current literature, thus 
representing another key contribution of this thesis. 
Important questions for further inquiry have also emerged. For example, both 





which rules and principles can aid decision-making, and that ‘something extra’ is 
required. This raises the question of what this ‘something extra’ might be, and this 
will be considered in chapters five and six. At this preliminary stage, possible 
supplements to rules and principles might include: an overarching moral theory (in 
particular, Virtue Ethics); inclusion of contextual considerations when applying rules 
and principles, and the need for an indicator of what to do which is less rigid than a 
rule and yet more specific than a principle. 
Another outcome from the application of the template was that it would provide 
structure and coherence when conducting the literature reviews. The template did 
indeed prove helpful in narrowing the scoping of the literature in order to hone in on 
those discussions which were of most relevance to the specific template themes. In 
order to compare the literature review findings, an analytical table was constructed, 
whereby salient points emerging from both literature bases could be considered side-
by-side. This constituted a valuable and effective method with which to analyse the 
findings.  
There were also some challenges associated with both the template and the analytical 
results table. First and foremost, as initially anticipated, it was not always clear under 
which theme heading certain discussions were best situated; some discussions 
corresponded to more than one template theme. For example, when discussing 
‘form’, authors such as Dworkin from the legal theory literature and Beauchamp and 
Childress from the bioethics sphere all admit to the potential challenges associated 
with distinguishing rules and principles. This not only speaks to ‘form’ i.e. how we 
might identify rules and principles, but equally, it can tell us something about the 
interrelationship between the two. The fact that rules and principles might be 
conflated can tell us that they may share many (family) resemblances and also raises 
the question of how the two can be differentiated.   
Rather than only including such cross-cutting discussions under one heading, I chose 





it in turn under the corresponding themes.  For example the theme relating to how 
principles are applied in the decision-making context (‘application’) can involve 
weighing and balancing. In turn, balancing is a methodology which is also discussed 
in the context of resolving conflict between different principles. 
I judged this approach to be more beneficial than making arbitrary exclusions for the 
sake of neatly fitting each discussion point under only one category. Similarly, some 
discussions were initially included under one heading, but upon reflection and 
progression of my analysis, it transpired that those discussions more directly 
corresponded to a different theme than that to which they had originally been 
connected. Amendments and repositioning to the most appropriate analysis theme 
were made accordingly. 
To summarise, the template offered an effective and directed means with which to 
review and analyse the literatures. Having assessed the utility of the template and 
bearing in mind the limitations of the model, we are now better placed to compare 
and contrast the key findings from the previous two chapters. 
4.3 Comparison of template application findings in legal theory and 
bioethics literature 
This section considers the respective legal theory and bioethics literature review 
findings together. It is argued that this is a valuable contribution in and of itself, in 
that the comparison sheds light on how the utility, limitations and ultimately, 
conceptualizations of rules and principles might overlap or vary. 
It may be that each of the disciplines can ‘learn something from the other’, as to how 
rules and principles are employed. In particular, with my primary interest lying 
within bioethical decision-making, it may be that we can import some 





adopt and apply rules and principles in the future. Thus, the contribution here can 
yield both theoretical and practical value.  
Rather than comparing and contrasting every observation emerging from the 
literature reviews (which can be found in the preceding two chapters), this chapter 
focusses on the key points which have surfaced, particularly when the literatures are 
considered collectively. Discussion is centred on what the key findings might signify 
regarding the characterisations of rules and principles and their interrelationships, 
seeking to uncover not only basic similarities and differences, but complex nuances 
which might exist. Ultimately, these findings might help us to better understand how 
we can maximise the potential which rules and principles can offer us, whilst 
understanding how both might co-exist.  
In order to offer a coherent, well-structured discussion and to provide continuity with 
the analytical template which was applied to the literatures in chapters two and three, 
the findings from each of the literature reviews are considered together once again 
under each of the template theme headings. Where more than one key topic is 
discussed under a theme, a short summary paragraph is also included. 
4.3.1 Form 
Form was defined in the analytical template as the way in which rules and principles 
are conveyed, for example the language used to describe them or the (legal or non-
legal) source in which they appeared. 
Understanding the form which rules and principles take can help us to better 
recognize them. It is important for us to know whether we are dealing with a rule or 
a principle in order to help us to use these in the most appropriate (and effective) 
ways. That is to say, if we understand the relative strengths, limitations and 
contextual factors that determine the utility (or lack thereof) of rules and principles, 





fulfilling the task at hand, rather than trying to use a principle to do the work that a 
rule is better equipped to do and vice versa.  
A notable observation from the outset, when considering form, is that discussions 
appear considerably more often within the legal theory literature than the bioethics 
literature.  There may be several reasons for this. Form may be more prevalent in the 
former literature base because of the dominant space which debates on the validity 
of the law take up within the jurisprudential sphere. For example, chapter two 
considered the long standing tensions between Rule Formalists394 and American Legal 
Realists,395 the Hart-Dworkin debate396,397,398 and contributions from Raz399 and Alexy.400 
All of these discussions have provided considerable insights for this thesis, into the 
different conceptualisations (and expectations of function), which have been formed 
around rules and principles.    
Additionally, form may appear more frequently within the legal theory literature 
because of the inherent genus of the discipline, which is one which seeks to 
understand the nature of the law401 which entails ‘working with rules’.  In contrast, 
bioethics can be considered to be both a species of practical/applied ethics, concerned 
with the resolution of practical problems402 and, in contrast, a conceptual discipline 
also.  
This is not to say that bioethics and legal theory have completely separate and 
unrelated goals. However, the purpose of legal theory necessarily predisposes the 
discipline to more ontological questions for example, ‘what is a rule?’, whereas within 
                                                      
394 Veitch et al., (2007). 
395 Tamanaha, (2005), pp. 131-154.  
396 Hart, (2012).   
397 Dworkin, (1967). 
398 Peak, (1991), p. 22-32. 
399 Raz, (1972), pp. 823-854. 
400 Alexy, (2002).  
401 Granted, the different strands of legal theory will tend towards different goals, with 
normative and analytical jurisprudence, for example. 





the bioethics literature, focus is more closely located to outcome or questions such as 
‘what are the rules and principles?’, ‘what values are at stake?’ etc.403  Thus the 
comparison of both literatures provides a more holistic perspective which 
accommodates both discussions of the ontological underpinnings  and the more 
practical considerations.  
4.3.1.1 Principles 
Discussion on the form which principles take appeared most prolific across the legal 
theory literature, potential explanations for this were considered earlier. And so, this 
section explores the findings from both literature reviews and what the implications 
might be for conceptualisations of principles, and for the further investigations within 
this thesis. 
4.3.1.1.1 Recognising principles 
Both literatures portrayed principles as broad, vague and abstract.404,405  Similarly, the 
difficulty in discerning whether one is dealing with a rule or a principle was noted 
within both literatures. Whilst Beauchamp and Childress acknowledged the difficulty 
in drawing the line between rules and principles, they maintain that rules are ‘more 
specific in content’406 than principles. Principles, in turn, are described as more 
‘general norms’.407 It is recalled that Alexy and Dworkin’s definitions of rule and 
principle were taken as a starting point for the thesis; principles can be fulfilled to 
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varying degrees, they are optimisation maxims which carry a dimension of weight, 
whereas rules are either valid or not.408  
Dworkin also asserted that it was difficult to know the status which principles hold.409 
Similarly, different types of principles might exist such as legal and normative 
principles.410  Thus, we can see that identifying principles and distinguishing them 
from rules on the basis of form alone is not a straightforward task. Understanding 
how principles and rules are used may therefore help us to make a clearer distinction. 
It is suggested here that reference is often made to principles in instances where these 
are not always articulated in a broad and abstract nature but rather, more like 
prescriptive and specific rules.  Form or nomenclature of rules or principles may not 
always be accurate indicators of whether, as a practical matter, we are dealing with a 
typically rule-like or principle-like norm. 
If pure reliance on form is unreliable for identifying and distinguishing between rules 
and principles, this raises the question of what other characteristics we might be able 
to use to distinguish between them; a key research question addressed in the 
remainder of this chapter.  
4.3.1.1.2 Vagueness and uncertainty 
Principles were problematized by scholars in both literatures due to their tendency to 
give rise to vagueness and indeterminacy411,412,413 around which specific course of 
action to take in a given situation.  Numerous possible actions can arise out of the 
application of one principle. These characteristics, according to some, limit the utility 
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of principles to perform an action-guiding function and leave them exposed to 
varying interpretation.414 
The accusation of a lack of action-guiding content forces us to reflect upon what we 
are asking principles to do. Although function is considered below under its own 
heading, it is worthwhile noting here that a key criticism within the bioethics 
literature is that principles fail to tell us exactly what we are supposed to do in a given 
situation. Contrastingly, rules are often conceptualised as specific iterations of what 
(not) to do. This suggests a communicative difference between rules and principles. 
But, as considered previously and further below, rules face their own interpretative 
challenges. 
Further, it is suggested that this is misplaced criticism which takes a myopic view of 
principles, based on false expectations and relatedly, misunderstanding about the 
functions which principles can serve.  Principles are offered as guides to flag-up the 
different considerations which should be factored-in to decisions about what to do.415   
In contrast, it is rules which are supposed to offer action-determining content.416  
Given the misplaced expectations of principles, it appears that a clarification/ 
reminder of this point would be helpful for decision makers. The case studies will 
provide an apt opportunity to test out whether these false expectations are placed 
upon principles and rules and the respective functions which rules and principles 
might play are considered in more detail later in this chapter. 
4.3.1.1.3 Flexibility 
It was noted that as a counter-argument to accusations of vagueness (and relatedly, 
limited utility) of principles, it has been argued that the abstract nature of principles 
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is indeed an asset; principles are adaptive and thus allow flexibility. 417,418  At the same 
time, paradoxically, both literatures offer examples of the conceptualisation of 
flexibility as a negative attribute. Thus, a tension appears to emerge here, between the 
need for flexibility of principles and the resulting lack of determinacy. An important 
question that arises is: what do we actually mean by ‘determinacy’ or ‘(un)certainty’?  
Is this uncertainty in relation to interpretation and to lack of action-guiding content 
as discussed above with regards to which precise course of action to take, or 
uncertainty with regards to not knowing which principles to apply in different 
circumstances? This is an important distinction; the first question on determinacy 
relates to all principles – focussing on a supposed inability to specify outcomes and 
the room for interpretation which principles can generate. The latter relates to 
versatility and is based on the circumstances of the difficult decision begging 
resolution.  
4.3.1.1.4 Accessibility 
 For proponents of principles, the broad nature of principles is a necessary 
characteristic and one which renders them accessible in terms of their reach; they need 
to be legitimate and understood by all.419, 420  It could also be argued though, that 
accessibility is also an important goal for rules. After all, rules are intended to have a 
wide reach and to be understood by all.421  Indeed, as we considered in chapter two, 
codification of the law into rules was seen both as a means to provide some level of 
certainty to the populace around permitted and prohibited conduct (thus protecting 
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them from judicial abuse).422 Thus, it appears that accessibility is an important element 
of both rules and principles.  
4.3.1.1.5 Authority  
Both literatures implied that authority played a part in determining how principles 
become established and the importance which they carry. Raz asserts that new 
principles can only evolve through custom, they are binding only if they carry 
considerable authoritative support.423 Similarly, he suggests that both rules and 
principles can lose their status through precedent. It was suggested that authority 
also plays a role within bioethics; in determining which principles to respect, it is 
argued that we also look to what the government/authority accepts or rejects at the 
time424 (but this does not imply that additional factors such as what patients and the 
medical community deems appropriate will not be taken into account).  
4.3.1.2 - Rules 
Discussion of the nature of rules was difficult to encounter within the bioethics 
literature. Again, I consider why so later in this section. 
Within both literatures, the locus of the distinction between rules and principles 
appeared to rest in the level of specificity of prescription.425 The implication being that 
rules offer a greater degree of precision than principles, which are more inherently 
abstract in nature. This being said, it was acknowledged, most notably in the 
influential contributions of H.L.A Hart, that by virtue of the open texture of the law, 
even rules were open to interpretation and as such, are left exposed to some level of 
indeterminacy 426 (although, not to the same extent as principles). Distinctions were 
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also drawn between ‘hard’ and ‘easy’ cases,427 whereby, according to positivists, rule-
based judgements are determinate. Indeterminacy remains an issue when hard cases 
arise, this suggests a limitation of rules in their ability to aid decision-making around 
complex scenarios – a recurring observation throughout this chapter.  
4.3.1.2.1 - Recognising rules 
Discussion of how to identify rules and their subsequent categorisation into types of 
rule has also been considered within the legal theory literature. Examples of tools of 
identification include: (1) the pedigree428 of, and the authority of,429 the proponents 
who advance the rules in question, and (2) primary and secondary rules.430  It was 
suggested in the bioethics literature that ‘canonical’ rules had to fit similar criteria 
and Sachs questioned the validity of rules which lacked ethical underpinning.431 
Similarly, nuances between hard and soft rules were flagged up,432433 and the difficulty 
in distinguishing the two was acknowledged.434 The language used within the 
bioethics literature related to general and particular rules.435 It was argued that as a 
rule becomes ‘softer’, discerning the criteria for its application and related 
consequences for non-observation become more difficult. This discussion of ‘hard’ 
and ‘soft’ rules resonates with the metaphor of a continuum which is being further 
developed and fleshed-out by virtue of this thesis; where it is not always a straight-
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forward process to distinguish between rules and principles in certain circumstances, 
particularly where the sanctions for non-observation are not clear. 
4.3.1.3 A middle-ground? 
It is recalled that chapter two included consideration of the fact that positivism was 
criticised for ignoring the roles and value which principles and standards can bring 
to bear. Standards are defined within the legal theory literature confusingly as both 
separate to rules and yet at times were likened to principles and at other times 
differentiated. Indeed, subsequent exploration of literature from the finance sector 
suggests that standards can be both rule-based and principle-based.436 This not only 
introduces the idea that standards may occupy a middle-ground on the principle-rule 
continuum being developed here, at times being more ‘rule-like’ or ‘principle-like’ 
but also introduces standards as benchmarks against which to measure or evaluate 
decisions. 
At the same time, the question is raised as to whether standards might also play a role 
as decision-making tools in order to guide decision makers in their determination of 
‘what to do’. They are characterised as tools which guide decisions, leave room for 
discretion and at times offer a set of mandatory considerations which should be 
factored in to decision-making. 
Within the bioethics literature, instances of principles and standards being conflated 
are also apparent. In particular, this appears to occur within the guidance of 
professional bodies. For example, there is a tendency for General Medical Council 
(GMC) guidance to use the terms ‘principles’ and ‘standards’ interchangeably. 
At the same time standards have been differentiated from principles based on the fact 
that the outcome of not achieving standards are different to those of not granting 
primacy to one principle – the decision maker needs to demonstrate they had 
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considered a principle in their deliberation, whereas the implications of not observing 
a standard might be more closely associated to repercussions such as sanctions. In 
order to maintain a manageable and focussed investigation, I have purposively 
elected not to engage with standards in this thesis. In the final chapter, I acknowledge 
that this is a topic which merits further consideration as a next step following on from 
the contributions offered in this thesis.  
4.3.1.4 Summary 
The findings on form and the questions which they give rise to can be categorised 
under two over-arching themes. The first theme relates to a movement from the broad 
to the specific on the continuum being developed here and the second theme 
corresponds with interpretative challenges inherent in employing rules and 
principles. Each is briefly considered in turn here. 
4.3.1.4.1 Movement from the broad to the specific 
Both literatures offer similar characterisations of rules and principles. If we had to 
place these conceptualisations on the principle-rule continuum which was discussed 
earlier, then on one end there are broad, abstract, general principles and on the other 
end, specific, rigid and prescriptive rules.  
At the same time, it has become apparent that distinguishing between rules and 
principles is not a straightforward process. Whilst legal theorists might argue that the 
distinction between rules and principles rests in the source of the rule (by virtue of 
the authority from which it has been issued),437,438 one wonders whether this source-
based discernment is sufficiently explanatory in practice. Let us consider the 
regulatory landscape governing medical professionals in the UK, where a plethora of 
rules and guidelines (often in the form of principles) are continually advanced, 
revised and (re)released.  We will come to see in the following chapter that even with 
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an on its face ‘easy case’ of applying the 8 ‘principles’ of data protection emanating 
from the EU Data Protection Directive,439 differentiating between a rule and principle 
is not a straight-forward undertaking.  
This reinforces the claim that differentiating between rules and principles is a 
challenging exercise and one which should not rely so heavily on ‘form’ to do so. It is 
recalled that the Wittgensteinian analogy of family resemblances440 was preferred as 
an approach in this thesis. This implies uncovering how rules and principles are used 
in order to understand how a norm may be more ‘rule-like’ or ‘principle-like’ but also 
acknowledges that there may be overlapping features which both rules and principles 
can share. 
Thus, upon closer inspection, nuances seem to be emerging at different stages of the 
continuum.  This bolsters the necessity of revealing the different nuances between the 
two, and the principle-rule continuum can offer a helpful conceptual device through 
which to explore these matters.  
4.3.1.4.2 Interpretative space and discretion 
The second core form-related theme which has emerged from the literature reviews 
is the interpretative challenge for both rules and principles.  This challenge appears 
to be more prevalent when dealing with principles however the open texture of 
language also leaves rules vulnerable to varying interpretation. For example, Rumble 
argues that both rules and principles are exposed to interpretative challenges due to:  
ambiguity of language, the ability to find precedents for either side of an argument, 
the broad scope of precedents and the fact that no two cases are identical.441  
This suggests that decision makers must exercise discretion in determining which 
meaning should be given to a rule or principle and consequently, which action should 
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follow. It has been suggested within the bioethics literature that that the method of 
specification can reduce the indeterminacy of principles and render them more 
specific, supplying the decision maker with action-guiding content. This suggests that 
specification merits further analysis in order to uncover more information on how 
this methodology can support decision makers in exercising discretion. 
4.3.2 Function  
Function relates to the purpose which a rule or principle is perceived to serve. 
Application of the function theme of my bespoke analytical template has provided 
particularly interesting insights into the different roles which rules and principles can 
play.  It is argued that these insights represent a key and novel contribution to the 
literature. Further, this analysis can provide significant practical value; 
understanding the different jobs which rules and principles can perform (and 
correspondingly, the situations in which these will be most effective) is a key step in 
enabling actors and decision makers in any given setting to choose the most 
appropriate conduit to promote or deter conduct.  
This section considers the different functions of rules and principles in turn. It 
becomes apparent that some of the respective functions of rules and principles are 
similar (though not necessarily identical) across both legal theory and bioethics. 
Although some functions were identified as distinct in the previous chapters, they 
will be considered here under over-arching function-themes where appropriate. For 
example, in chapter two, identified functions included ‘satisfying justice’ and 
‘justifying action’. In chapter three, a ‘justificatory function’ was also identified. 
Rather than considering all of these functions distinctly, a more pragmatic approach 
is to consider them all under the overarching theme of ‘justification’.  
Further, in order to facilitate comparison between the respective literatures, but also 
between the functions which both rules and principles are perceived to serve, rules 





4.3.2.1 Justificatory Functions 
Both literatures considered the roles which rules and principles can play in 
safeguarding against abuse from decision makers, enabling decision makers to arrive 
at satisfactory and ‘just’ decisions, and legitimising these decisions. Although 
distinctions could be drawn between each of these functions, they are inherently 
related – decisions which are a result of abuse of power could perceivably also 
undermine the ideal of justice. It is argued here that the ultimate goal being sought is 
that of ensuring just decisions are arrived at and that reasoning behind these is 
apparent.  
4.3.2.2 Protective function 
In chapter two, it was noted that the legal theory literature uncovered discussions on 
the importance of safeguarding against abuse of judicial powers. Formalists desired 
certainty around how the law was to be applied and it was suggested that this was 
something achievable by predetermined and announced rules.442 American Legal 
Realists argued that judges were faced with interpretative challenges and forced to 
reach beyond the law. Rules were used to legitimise decisions which were in fact 
based on extra-legal factors.443 
A tension subsequently arose between the desire for predictability and the pursuit of 
fairness. The long-standing and widely influential Hart-Dworkin debate contributed 
significantly to the discussion of this tension. Long-standing critic of positivism 
Dworkin suggesting that principles have a role to play in satisfying justice and that 
rules alone are inadequate for achieving this end.444  The case of Riggs v Palmer445 was 
used to illustrate (and reinforce) this point.  
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In contrast, this ‘protective function’ was not explicitly flagged up within the 
application of the analytical template to the bioethics literature in relation to rules. 
This may be due to the paucity of discussion of rules as they relate to principles and 
vice versa. This being said, principles were considered within bioethical discussions 
as a means of providing an ethical basis for arriving at decisions and it is recalled that 
Belmont Report was considered as an example of this.  
4.3.2.2.1 Function of satisfying justice 
Principles were also identified within legal theory literature as tools for satisfying 
justice. Dworkin asserted that legal principles are legally binding and necessary for 
satisfying justice. In contrast with rules, which are binding because of certain criteria 
(pedigree), principles are binding based on their (justificatory) content. The case of 
Riggs v Palmer was used to highlight: 
a) the need to reach beyond the law;  
b) the fact that rules are limited in their capacity to provide justice 
and fairness; and 
c) that principles are appealed to in order to compensate for these 
shortcomings. 
 
Raz has suggested that in some cases, principles can be the sole ground for action and, 
as above, can provide exception to rules.446 This might suggest that principles tend to 
fill the gaps that rules leave and offer a safeguard against abuse from decision makers. 
The problem is that whether or not we achieve ‘satisfactory’, or ‘fair’ results may 
depend upon which rules/principles we are adopting. Similarly, the question arises 
as to whether it matters if we are using a rule or a principle in order to do so - the 
knowledge gleamed from this research will contribute towards answering that 
question.  
                                                      





In chapter two, it was noted that Hart highlighted the penumbra and fuzzy edges that 
exist around rules. Braithwaite built upon this observation by adding that the more 
complex that the case is, the higher the chance that rules get swallowed up by this 
unclear penumbra. This raises the question of whether principles are better suited 
than rules at safeguarding against abuse in complex landscapes and if so, why. This 
will be considered in more detail in the following chapter.  
4.3.2.3 Guiding Function 
One of the five purposes of principles within the law, as advanced by Raz, is as an aid 
to the interpretation of laws (in the form of rules). Thus, principles can be viewed as 
guides or supplements which shed light on the meaning that might be given to a 
specific rule. This might reinforce the notion that rules and principles can be 
complementary to one another; in this instance, principles support decision makers 
in understanding how to enact rules. This guiding function is construed similarly 
within the bioethics literature; however, it appears that the expectations which are 
put upon principles might be slightly higher there. There appears to be an expectation 
from some authors that principles should offer a guiding function in order to help 
decision makers determine precisely which course of action to take when faced with 
an ethical dilemma.   
Principles have faced much criticism due to their lack of action-guiding content. I 
have already suggested that this may be because of a misplaced expectation on 
principles to provide specific guidance on which course of action to take. In contrast, 
it is argued that principles are designed to guide decision makers around the different 
ethical values at stake, and helping with interpretation of rules, as opposed to 
specifically prescribing which action should be taken in any given case.  
This difference between functions has already been suggested by advocates of 
Principlist approaches such as Beauchamp and Childress. In contrast with principles, 
rules are portrayed as being specific and prescriptive in nature and function. It has 





regulatory landscapes, and that principles are most appropriate for offering guidance 
around complex areas.447 Similarly, in the bioethics literature, it was suggested that 
different methodologies fit better according to the type of question being resolved 
and that whilst principles might be most appropriate for answering questions around 
policy development, they may be inadequate for clinical ethics. 
This is an important assertion that repeatedly emerges and the case-studies included 
in the following chapters may shed some insight on this issue. This could have 
valuable implications for how we choose to regulate different regulatory landscapes. 
For example, where a particularly complex area must be navigated, regulators may 
wish to choose overarching principles because they offer the flexibility448  needed to 
address the complicated issues and decisions which must be taken, principles may 
offer more support here because of the greater role which discretion might play. In 
contrast, more straight-forward rules may be more appropriate for clearer-cut 
landscapes because the room for and need to exercise discretion may be narrower.  
Furthermore, as considered above, this observation around the utility of rules and 
principles varying depending upon the complexity of the case in hand might suggest 
that rules and principles exist in a symbiotic relationship, each tending to the gaps 
that the other leaves; rules could provide the specific content that principles fail to. 
Alternatively or additionally, given that rules are also criticised and have their own 
limitations, might it be that rules and principles can only take us so far when it comes 
to determining what to do?  
This again supports the idea that ‘something extra’ is needed in order to help decision 
makers. We have already considered above the possible space and utility of having 
an over-arching ethical theory in place when dealing with ethical theories.  
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4.3.2.4 Standardising/Unifying Function 
The bioethics literature review revealed that one function of principles is to unify 
different professions within healthcare. We can consider, for example, the plethora of 
guidance which is offered to medical professions on good medical practice. The 
bodies/groups which draft and advocate such guidance, which often takes the form 
of principles, do so with a view to standardising practice. It is worthwhile questioning 
the extent to which principles might facilitate standardisation of practice. In any one 
case, different principles might be prioritised differently by each decision maker,449 
depending upon the ethical framework which they are basing their judgement on. 
Similar questions around the desirability of standardisation arose when we 
considered in chapter two, the role of rules in providing certainty and predictability 
as a means of safeguarding against abuse.450,451 Indeed we cannot anticipate all future 
eventualities, rules can become outdated, and a tension arises between aspiring for 
justice and providing predictability. This, in turn, raises a fundamental observation 
around the tensions that seem to arise between different authors, and it appears 
applicable regardless of whether we are discussing rules or principles, within 
bioethics or legal theory: we need to decide what we want to achieve in order to 
understand how we can get the most out of rules and principles.  
Could it be argued that rules would also (even more so, by virtue of their rigidity) 
strive to unify and standardise practice?  These are important questions because they 
can tell us more about whether rules or principles are best used for unifying practice 
or whether, in fact, something additional/alternative is needed to guide decision 
makers in this regard.  In chapter six, the roles of rules and principles and their 
potential to fulfil this function is explored.  
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It might be, and it appears from the different functions that have emerged throughout 
the literature reviews, that we want different and even contradictory things (like 
certainty or freedom to be flexible or both) from rules and principles, and perhaps 
even these demands can be different depending upon the context in which the 
decision is being taken. If this is the case though, then we need to understand all of 
the different functions that rules and principles can offer. This reinforces the value of 
the contribution that this thesis is making.  
4.3.2.5 Dialogical function 
The bioethics literature flagged up that one potential function of principles may lie in 
providing a means of communication which enables on-going moral debate and 
reflection about the different issues which are pertinent to a given debate or topic.  
Principles can be seen as a means of facilitating discussion of ethical issues. One of 
the reasons why this function emerged from the bioethics literature  might be partly 
because inherent to the nature of bioethics as a discipline is the ‘business’ of debating 
ethical dilemmas. Principles provide a platform with which to argue one’s standpoint 
and in turn, to drive further discussion. The prioritisation of one principle over 
another, for example, can itself propel discussion and so on. This suggests that 
principles can provide a platform or conduit through which to articulate and express 
concerns and preferences, thus facilitating discussion around what to do (in contrast 
with specifically guiding action).  
This suggested function of principles as motivators for dialogue and indeed, change 
in legislation, or even transformation into rules was also discussed within the legal 
theory literature. Raz suggested that two of the roles of principles within the law is 
that they can introduce new rules and change laws.452  
                                                      





4.3.2.6 Accountability function 
Related to the justificatory/protective functions considered earlier, the use of 
principles and rules as a means to provide accountability was particularly considered 
in chapter three. Two different ‘channels’ of accountability were considered. On one 
hand, accountability was conceptualised as a means of offering transparency around 
the different expectations and obligations placed on various stakeholders within a 
given decision-making setting (i.e. being both ‘called into account’ for ones actions 
and managing expectations).453,454,455 Equally, Daniel and Sabin’s ‘accountability for 
reasonableness’456 framework was considered. This approach stresses the need for fair 
process in decision-making and it was suggested that Daniels had overlooked the 
important role which principles in particular can play in providing a means of fair 
process by their inclusion in a regulatory approach.  
4.3.2.7 Narrowing/exclusionary function  
One criticism of Principlism is that it can ignore other relevant factors which should 
be taken into consideration in a decision-making process, for example, the cultural 
and organisational setting in which a difficult decision arises and must be resolved. 
One challenge here and throughout this thesis, is in understanding whether such 
criticisms relate to the four principles in particular, or rather, whether they can be 
extended to principle-based approaches more generally. Either way, this points to a 
suggestion that principles can exclude the consideration of important factors to 
decision-making.  
Discussions thus far have painted this narrowing function in a negative light, 
suggesting that it is a drawback. Perhaps the converse might also be proposed; might 
it be that narrowing down to the principles which are most relevant is actually 
helpful? Here, however, we cannot escape the fact that in some situations it may be 
                                                      
453 Braithwaite, (1999), pp. 90-97. 
454 Mulgan, (2000), p. 555.   
455 Romzek, and Dubnick, (1987), p. 228. 





more challenging to decide which principles are and are not relevant to the case at 
hand. In chapter three, we considered the approach which has been developed for 
decision-making in Scottish Health Boards which included within it a helpful table 
laying out potential considerations associated with each principle.  
4.3.2.8 Summary 
The section on function has, as initially suspected, yielded insightful observations 
which in turn, provoke important questions for the case-studies. And, more generally, 
questions are also raised around how we might conceptualise and (perhaps at times 
wrongly) (under)employ rules and principles. There was some overlap in the 
functions we expect principles and rules to perform, regardless of whether they are 
rules or principles and regardless of the context (or rather, regardless of whether we 
are discussing them within bioethics or legal theory).  
Conversely, a challenge when discussing the functions of rules and principles was 
that it is not always clear whether a function may be more typically performed by a 
rule or a principle. Different functions in themselves have different aspects.  For 
example, if we consider the umbrella ‘protective’ function, this speaks to protection 
against abuse – this, in turn, can be achieved through predictability via rules or 
ensuring justice via principles. The key work which remains, and which will be 
provided through the remainder of the thesis, lies in understanding how rules, 
principles and perhaps additional decision-making tools, can support each other in 
performing these functions. A necessary step towards achieving such an 
understanding is laying out the nature of the interrelationships between principles 
and rules, which will be achieved through further development of the principle-rule 
continuum. 
4.3.3 Application 
This theme considers methodologies adopted in using rules and principles. The 





decision makers must navigate through in order to apply principles (and rules).  
Understanding how to apply principles in particular is thus a necessary step in 
supporting decision makers in this space. 
4.3.3.1 Balancing 
Balancing is most often referred to within the literatures reviewed regarding 
application. This involves assigning different principles relative weights. Within the 
legal theory literature, Alexy’s discussions of the Law of Balancing457 in the 
constitutional rights context has attracted considerable criticisms. For example, 
Habermas has argued that balancing, and the conceptualisation of rights as principles 
diminishes the normative value of principles.458 Additional critiques have emerged 
due to the lack of clarity around how balancing should be performed. 
The concept of balancing is equally problematised within the bioethics literature 
reviewed. Guidance is lacking on precisely how this balancing of principles should 
take place, beyond an ‘intuitive sense of which set of considerations “weighs” 
more’.459 Discussions often fixate upon which principles should feature within the 
decision-making framework i.e. which ethical framework to adopt.  
In the previous chapter, we noted the lack of clarity regarding when the process of 
specification ends and balancing begins (or vice versa). We saw that proponents of 
Principlism base the distinction on the type of question or dilemma-begging 
resolution. Balancing – which relates to the weight or strength of principles – was 
deemed apt for case resolution i.e. clinical ethics-studies.  On the other hand, it was 
posited that specification - which seeks to narrow the scope of a norm thus rendering 
it more determinate - is more suited to answering policy questions. As suggested, due 
to the significant expectations which are placed on balancing and specification as a 
means to support the decision maker in applying principles (and thus, exercising 
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discretion), these processes necessitate further exploration. Deeper analysis is not 
only important for this thesis, but more generally. Literature is also lacking on 
specification and thus a deeper understanding of the process is a further contribution 
of this thesis.  
4.2.3.2 Specification and subsumption 
Within the bioethics literature, ‘specification’ is advanced by Beauchamp and 
Childress as a means to counter the vagueness of principles. Specification is described 
as ‘the process of reducing the indeterminateness of abstract norms and providing 
them with action-guiding content’.460 We will recall Richardson’s suggestion that the 
process of specification should replace that of balancing or ‘interpreting norms’.461 
Additionally, specification is seen as a mechanism for distinguishing between rules 
and principles. Legal theory literatures also treat it as a means of adding meaning to 
principles and to rules. Beyond this, discussion on the process of specification is 
generally lacking.  
Subsumption was characterised within legal theory literature as a process associated 
with the application of rules.462 In contrast, in the bioethics literature, ‘deductive 
subsumption’ (also referred to as ‘application’463), was described as the process of 
bringing guiding action to a principle, particularly where principles conflict. 
Subsumption was criticised due to its reliance on expectations that principles can be 
universally generalizable. It was also noted that it is not always clear when a principle 
is applicable. It was suggested that specification merits further exploration within this 
thesis because it might tell us more about how action-guiding content can be extracted 
from a broad starting norm. Deeper reflection on both balancing and specification is 
offered in chapter five. 
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4.3.3.3 Something beyond rules and principles 
Throughout chapters two and three, the question emerged of whether something 
extra beyond or in addition to rules and principles is needed for decision-making. 
One possibility of this ‘something extra’ might be the use of precedent but it was 
noted within the legal theory literature that precedents can be found in favour of 
either side of an argument and that precedents often carry broad scope.464  This 
implies that the decision maker could first decide upon a course of action and 
retrospectively include within their justification the principles which most 
appropriately correspond with the pre-selected outcome.  
At the same time, the accountability function of principles was also considered. 
Perhaps incorporating aspects of accountability within the decision-making process 
might help to mitigate some of these challenges. 
Within the bioethics literature, casuistry – a method of case-based reasoning whereby 
analogies are drawn with a paradigm case and the case at hand- was also considered. 
Casuistry also suffers from certain challenges, particularly where no paradigm case 
exists and thus analogy is not possible or where the experience of the decision maker 
and thus their ability to refer back to previous cases is limited. Despite these 
challenges, it was suggested that such an approach may support decision makers in 
determining what to do. 
All of these discussions suggest that the use of case-based reasoning merits further 
exploration within this thesis. 
4.3.3.4 Summary 
The question of how the decision maker is to apply rules and principles has generated 
significant questions for closer inspection in the remainder of this thesis. The methods 
of balancing and specification have been invoked repeatedly as processes through 
                                                      





which to extract action-guiding content from principles and in order to resolve 
conflict between different principles of rules. An overarching theme regarding both 
methodologies is that the effectiveness of these processed have in turn, been called 
into question. Balancing and specification thus merit further attention throughout the 
remainder of this work. 
4.3.4 Dichotomisation 
This refers to a supposed tendency to set up rules and principles against one another 
as opposed to treating them in a complementary fashion. 
Before embarking upon the respective literature reviews, preliminary background 
research had suggested that there might be a tendency to dichotomise rules and 
principles, hence its inclusion as one of the template themes. Dichotomisation did 
appear prevalent within the literature, much more so within the legal theory literature 
than within the bioethics sphere. The legal theory literature played host to an array 
of discussions on rules and principles, with scholars often championing either a rule 
or principle and criticising the other.  I considered earlier in this chapter that this was 
also the case for discussions of form, considering that this might be due to the inherent 
disciplinary nature of jurisprudence in comparison with bioethics. Legal theory 
literatures can unhelpfully dichotomise principles and rules, overlooking important 
nuances and interrelationships between them (and ontological fuzziness). Equally, 
bioethical literatures can tend to overlook important differences between the two, and 
use the norms interchangeably (risking conflation). The fact that both legal theory and 
bioethical literatures differ in their treatment of rules and principles suggests that 
both literatures can benefit from the development of the continuum which is being 
offered in this thesis. 
The legal theory literature played host to an array of discussions on rules and 
principles, with scholars often championing either a rule or principle and criticising 





and inadequacies that the respective other gives rise to. I will consider later that this 
latter observation goes one step towards, but not so far as one of the key conclusions 
of this thesis, that rules and principles can co-exist in a complementary, rather than 
antagonistic relationship.   
4.3.5 Conflict 
Conflict refers to the way in which either conflict between rules and rules, and 
principles and principles occurs, or conflict as it may arise between rules and 
principles. This also refers to the means proposed to resolve any such tensions. 
In terms of discussing conflict between principles, both literature bases 
acknowledged the occurrence of inter-principle conflict (conflict between different 
principles), Dworkin suggested that conflict arises between principles precisely due 
to their vague and abstract nature465 (an added dimension which rules do not possess). 
Lord Reid suggested that due to the rival goals of rules (certainty) and principles 
(fairness and justice), one is necessarily achieved at the expense of the other.466 
Both literatures proposed the need to assign different weights to principles in order 
to resolve conflict and within the legal theory literature. Raz suggested that rules can 
also conflict – as with principles, rules are also assigned different weights. Raz argued 
that where conflict occurs between rules (R) and principles (P), then both the rule and 
principle should be treated either as two principles (P) v (P) or as two rules (R) v (R). 
In the latter case, the same rule will always prevail. He suggested though that that the 
tendency is to treat both rule and principle as (P) v (P).467 Again, as with many of the 
other template themes, the bioethics literature reviewed did not yield discourse on 
conflict between rules, however, one can imagine situations where two or more rules 
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might conflict and where principles may be brought in to justify the prioritisation of 
one rule over another.  
4.3.6 Interrelationship 
This theme relates to discussions of how rules and principles might be connected to 
one another, and what the nature of this connection might be. 
Both literature bases included reference to the complexities around differentiating 
between principles and rules, and authors repeatedly alluded to the fact that rules 
and principles can be conflated. Whilst these points do not, on their face, necessarily 
imply that rules and principles are inextricably linked, when combined with other 
discussions within the literatures, this does suggest some connection between the two 
decision-making mechanisms. These discussions bolster the conceptualisation of the 
principle-rule continuum and the need to further unpack this continuum.   
Whilst I would agree with the theory of existence upon a continuum or spectrum, I 
would be reluctant to reduce principles to merely vague rules, or rules as merely more 
descriptive iterations of principles. This reluctance is based on the preliminary 
findings thus far which suggest that although rules and principles possess 
overlapping ‘family resemblances’, nuances also exist regarding the meanings and 
expectations attached to each of these norms differs.  
This being said, the above assertion could be considered in light of a potential 
evolutionary relationship between rules and principles, which some findings within 
the literature tend to hint towards, but do not acknowledge explicitly in those terms. 
Most notably, for example, MacCormick commented on the tendency of positive law 
in modern states to attempt to ‘concretize broad principles of conduct’ in the form of 
clear rules.468   
                                                      






It could be argued that ‘ontological fuzziness’ of rules and principles i.e. the ability 
for a norm to be interpreted as either a rule or a principle might actually be 
advantageous in some circumstances. This would depend upon the intention of the 
decision maker. For example, if it is unclear whether an applicable norm is a rule or a 
principle, the decision maker could argue for the most appropriate conceptualisation 
for the case at hand. A rule-based approach would imply stricter adherence, whereas 
a principled-approach could leave a decision more open to discussion and debate. At 
the same time, such ontological fuzziness could be dangerous and open to abuse. This 
would depend on how each rule/principle is constructed.  
4.4 Discussion  
Having compared and contrasted the key findings from both the literature reviews 
above, this final section lays out key themes which are beginning to emerge from the 
literatures. The metaphor of a decision-making tree is developed as a helpful 
conceptualisation of the findings thus far. These key themes – and the questions 
which they raise - will be further explored throughout the remainder of this thesis.  
4.4.1 Key characteristics of rules and principles 
This section lays out key characteristics which have emerged around rules and 
principles as a result of the literature reviews which are of most interest to the current 
discussion. The following pages include three tables which each summarise key 
findings on the form, function and application themes of the template. The findings 
are categorised into ‘rule-like’ and ‘principle-like’ characteristics and a central column 
highlights areas where there appears to be some overlap between rules and principles 
in terms of shared characteristics. It is these shared characteristics which are of 
particular interest because further exploration of these aspects will help to develop 





It is important to note that it is not being suggested here that the following 
characteristics are a definitive and exhaustive guide to key features which all 
principles and all rules possess in all situations.  Indeed, some of the characteristics 
which have been discussed in the previous chapters are not explicitly included here. 
This is because the scope of the thesis does not permit exploration of all of the 
different aspects of rules and principles. Rather, as has become apparent from the 
discussions thus far, context can impact significantly on the ways in which rules and 
principles may be employed. 
 It naturally follows, then, that principles and rules may vary too in the characteristics 
which they may feature in a given setting. For example, whilst, in general terms, a 
rule may be more specific in nature than a principle, this does not mean that this may 

















• Specific, prescriptive, rigid (more 
so than principles) 
• Open to interpretation (and some 
indeterminacy but less than 
principles) 
• Method of identifying rules: 
pedigree, authority, second-order 
rules 
• Less suitable for complex cases 
than principles 
• Different types of rule – hard and 




• Interpretative scope 
and need to exercise 
discretion 
 
• Broad, abstract, flexible, less 
specific than rules 
• Open to interpretation and 
indeterminacy (more than rules) 
• Evolve through custom 
• More suitable for complex cases 
than rules 
• Only carry weight if accepted by 
relevant authority at the time 
• Different types of principles – 










Theme Rule-Like Characteristics Overlapping Characteristics Principle-Like Characteristics 
Function • Protective function (provide 
predictability/certainty) 
• Guiding decision makers 
through simple regulatory 
landscapes 
• Provide specific content which 
principles fail to 
• Standardisation of practice 
• Accountability 
• Justificatory function 
• Guiding decision makers to 
determine what to do (to 
different extents) 
• A means of accountability 
• Standardisation 
• Flagging up different 
considerations which should be 
factored-in to decision-making 
process 
• Guiding function around 
interpretation of rules and/or 
provide action-guiding content 
• Safeguarding against abuse 
• Satisfying justice 
• Standardising/unifying  
• Provide means of accountability 
• Dialogical function – provide 
means of on-going moral debate 
and reflection 








Table 4: Summary of key characteristics of application  
 
Theme Rule-Like Characteristics Overlapping Characteristics Principle-Like Characteristics 
Application • All or nothing fashion  
• Specification 
• Balancing 
• Use of precedent  
• Importance of context 
• Balancing 
• Specification 
• Use of previous cases 
• Importance of context 
• Optimization requirements 
applicable to varying degrees 
• Specification 
• Balancing  
• Casuistry 
• Importance of context 
• Post-hoc rationalization to justify 
actions already taken 
• Utility potentially limited 






It is important to note that the characteristics mapped out here are limited in relation 
to the fact that they are based upon observations made around how they have been 
discussed in only two literature bases. This potential limitation (and thus, the need to 
extrapolate with caution to other areas) has been noted from the outset. 
Such limits do not take away from the significance, originality or rigour of the work 
being carried out here. A valuable and novel contribution to the pre-existing 
understanding of rules and principles can still be made in spite of the limitations 
discussed above. Specifically, this contribution is to contribute to our understanding 
of the different meanings (and functions) which are attached to the term ‘rule’ and 
‘principle’ and in particular, to map out the nuances that exist within the 
interrelationships between rules and principles. This will advance our 
conceptualisations on both theoretical and practical levels of how to use rules and 
principles in order to determine ‘what to do’ when faced with a difficult decision. 
4.4.2 Key observations: tree metaphor 
The comparison of the literatures has provided a rich insight into the characteristics 
attributed to rules and principles within the literature. Key themes have emerged 
which will form the specific focus for the remainder of this thesis and these themes 
and the reasons which they merit particular attention are considered here. First, the 
metaphor of a tree is laid out as it relates to the current discussion and assists in 
bringing together the emerging findings. 
The reason that a tree metaphor will be employed here is because parallels are 
beginning to emerge between the imagery of a tree and the relationships between 
rules and principles, the different functions which they employ and additional factors 
which may influence decision-making. Before laying out the nature of the tree 
metaphor, it is first necessary to consider the value and implications of using 




Metaphors are defined as analogies, and in turn, analogies are ‘in the form of sensory, 
usually visual, imagery’.469 Tree metaphors have been previously used in other 
contexts. Descartes employed the tree metaphor in order to communicate his view of 
philosophy.470 Most notably, such metaphors have been used within science.471 One of 
the most famous examples of the tree analogy is Charles Darwin’s ‘the living tree 
metaphor’ which featured in The Origin of Species.472  
The use of metaphor also extends beyond merely offering an explanatory device for 
an analogous concept or theory. Metaphors have also been employed in order to 
problem-solve and further develop theories and it is the intention here that the tree 
metaphor will help to uncover more insights into rules and principles within 
decision-making. Such use of metaphor has been described as ‘insight’ which occurs 
when: 
one finds a stimulus pattern (the analogy) in which parts of the 
form or structure are like the structure of the problem-situation and 
the rest of the structure of this stimulus pattern (the analogy) 
indicates how to organise the unintegrated materials of the 
problem….thereby completing the whole which is then the solution 
of the problem.473 
The tree metaphor will first be employed in the consideration of the key findings, 
then it will be employed as a way of developing hypotheses to be tested in the 
following two chapters. Finally, ‘the whole’ of the analogy will be presented in the 
concluding chapter where the findings of the entire thesis are presented. Whilst the 
metaphor is a helpful device through which to communicate, analyse, test and 
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develop the emerging original contributions in this thesis, it is important to note 
several challenges associated with its use.  
Though questions of truth do arise for new metaphors, the more 
appropriate questions are those of action. In most cases, what is at 
issue is not the truth or falsity of a metaphor but the perceptions 
and inferences that follow from it…In all aspects of life, not just 
politics or in love, we define our reality in terms of metaphors and 
then proceed to act on the basis of metaphors. We draw inferences, 
set goals, make commitments, and execute plans, all on the basis of 
how we in part structure our experience, consciously and 
unconsciously, by means of metaphor.474 
For example, the use of metaphor to explain concepts and issues is that metaphors 
can be stretched too far. In order to validate the use of the metaphor, there is a risk 
that superficial analogies are drawn between the tree metaphor and the original 
contribution. In recognition of this potential pitfall, I will attempt to limit the use of 
metaphor only where there genuinely appears to be clear resonance between the 
metaphor and the thesis findings.  
Another associated danger is that the reader may draw her own analogies between 
the metaphor and the concept being developed and use this to challenge the concept 
itself. Where any potential challenges of this nature are anticipated, they will be 
explicitly flagged up and addressed.  
Despite these challenges, I see real value in the use of the tree metaphor. In addition 
to the fact that the metaphor has been used in other contexts, I see genuine parallels 
between the tree metaphor and the emerging findings of the thesis. Furthermore, the 
tree metaphor has been relied upon within the bioethics context. For example, within 
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bioethics, reference has been made to ‘the regulatory tree’,475,476 and ‘the human rights 
tree’.477   
At this point in the thesis, four key analogies can be drawn between the imagery of a 
tree and the findings thus far as they relate to rules and principles in decision-making. 
These analogies are laid out in turn below. The discussion on the findings of the 
literature reviews is shaped around these analogies and the questions which 
subsequently arise in order to develop the metaphor and the thesis, are also laid out.  
4.4.2.1 From trunk to branch to twig: from the broad to the specific 
The trunk of a tree forks into branches which, in turn, fork into twigs and these in 
turn nourish leaves that represent new life. With each fork, the branches and twigs 
become narrower. An analogy can be drawn with this narrowing characteristic and 
the principle-rule continuum which is being developed here. On one end, we have 
the trunk (broad, abstract principle- like norm) which progressively narrows 
(becoming more specific and prescriptive – more rule-like) ultimately leading to 
leaves (different options of what to do). This analogy is more helpful than the pre-
existing conceptualisation of the continuum because whilst acknowledging the 
movement from the broad to the specific, it also accounts for the forks, i.e. different 
interpretations which can be taken from each rule and principle.  
It is suggested that the space spanning the trunk, branches, twigs and leaves is 
analogous to the interrelationships that might exist between rules and principles. It 
represents the space where the shared ‘family resemblances’ between both norms 
appear. For example, we have considered that the reliance upon form in order to 
distinguish between the two is not reliable. Beyond Alexy’s distinction which states 
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that rules are applicable in an all or nothing fashion and principles as optimisation 
requirements, the distinctions between the two become particularly fuzzy.  
The spaces which run along the trunk, branches and twigs reflects the ontological 
fuzziness where it is not clear whether we are dealing with a rule or principle but 
nonetheless, a norm which is closer to a twig may be more rule-like and a norm which 
is closer to a trunk than a branch may be more principle-like. This resonates with 
references in the literature to ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ rules and it offers recognition of the fact 
that rules can be broad and general and principles can be specific.  
This analogy also implies that whilst it is important to know what a branch or a twig 
‘is’ i.e. what rules and principles are in essence, it is not helpful to focus only on the 
task of differentiating between the two but rather, understanding how they are 
connected and how they can support each other. This reflects the need to move away 
from dichotomisation of rules and principles which has been argued here.  
But, at the same time, the question arises as to whether there might be certain 
functions which only principles and rules can respectively perform, thus there is a 
risk associated with prematurely dismissing important distinctions that do exist 
between the two norms. Indeed, as has been pointed out, the corresponding 
rule/principle status is itself ambiguous. On the other hand,  it is also recalled that 
rules and principles do have some attributes which are typically more ‘rule-like’ or 
‘principle-like’ and it might be that real value can be gleamed from drawing upon the 
respective but distinct strengths of each decision-making tool. 
In turn, this raises the question of what might appear in the middle areas. For 
example, might best practice which (as will become apparent in later chapters) appear 
to share characteristics with both rules and principles, also occupy this area across 




4.4.2.2 The space that runs across the entirety of the tree 
On another level, this space running from the roots of the tree, across the trunk, 
through the branches and twigs and towards the leaves also represents the 
discretionary space which decision makers must self-navigate in order to determine 
what to do, in order to first locate a bunch of leaves and then decide which particular 
leaf (action) to pick.  
The massive scope for interpretation is most typically associated with principles and 
has been significantly problematized within the literature. At the same time, it has 
been acknowledged that rules are also vulnerable to such accusations, given their 
open texture, albeit to a lesser extent. An important question arises as to how to 
support decision makers in exercising this discretion and navigating through this 
space. 
In the legal theory literature, parallels were drawn between the tensions of the 
universal and the particular and the need for over-arching general norms which can 
be applied to specific situations. This raises the question of how the decision maker 
can be supported in this quest, in this movement from the trunk towards a leaf. It is 
recalled that in the context of Principlism, specification and balancing have been 
advanced as methodologies which can help the decision maker to garner action-
guiding content from a principle and to resolve conflict between principles. This 
suggests that both of these methodologies necessitate further investigation in this 
thesis. 
4.4.2.3 The tree as a living organism 
A tree in its entirety can be conceptualised as the decision-making process. The tree 
is a living organism which is primarily comprised of a trunk, branches and twigs 
(principles and rules) and leaves (decisions on what to do). Nevertheless, the tree also 
comprises of roots, it is unable to survive without nutrients and a healthy root 




Repeatedly, throughout the discussions thus far, reference has been made to the 
possibility that neither rules nor principles, neither alone nor when used together, 
suffice for decision makers. If so, then this implies that something in addition to rules 
and principles may be at play, and/or required for reaching decisions. These nutrients 
and this root structure might be analogous to the need for ‘something extra’. 
Thus far, several different potential considerations beyond rules and principles have 
been raised through the literature. For example, both precedent and casuistry (if 
appropriate) have been used in decision-making. Another strong theme on this 
matter is the role of context, which continually emerges as an influential factor in the 
applicability (and therefore, utility) of any given rule or principle.  
This raises the question of quite how these additional considerations can be used in 
tandem with rules and principles. For example, how might casuistry be better 
incorporated into the tree metaphor and the decision-making process? And 
importantly, how can we ensure that the tree remains healthy? 
Understanding whether this may be the case is important for two reasons. First, such 
an appreciation can realign our expectations about the functions which rules and 
principles can perform. This will provide for a more holistic approach to decision-
making which might implicate additional factors such as contextual considerations. 
In turn, and secondly, this can support the ways in which we use rules and principles 
i.e. how effective they are.  
4.4.2.4 The tree is comprised of different parts 
The anatomy and surroundings of a tree is comprised of different components for 
example, leaves, roots, soil, and bark. These all serve different functions within the 
tree. In the same way, we have considered the different functions which rules and 
principles can perform in the decision-making process. Equally, a tree is not a tree 





This chapter has compared and contrasted findings from the application of my 
bespoke analytical template to bioethics and legal theory literature. The analytical 
template was constructed with a view to focussing both the reviews and the 
subsequent discussions on areas of particular significance to the central line of inquiry 
of this thesis. Whilst the template had some challenges (potential for overlap between 
themes, potential to exclude poignant observations), ultimately, it has provided a 
helpful and coherent methodological approach to reviewing and discussing the 
literatures.  
The application of the template and the subsequent comparison of the literature 
review findings has ultimately culminated in the construction of a ‘portrait’ of 
principles and rules. Additionally, certain questions for further inquiry have also 
emerged.   
Having laid out the tree metaphor and the questions which it gives rise to, it is 
necessary to consider how the metaphor can be tested and refined. There is a way to 
explore both the ontological fuzziness between rules and principles whilst 
simultaneously identifying the respective strengths of rules and principles-based 







PART TWO - BRANCHING OUT: CASE STUDIES AND THE 
CONCEPTUAL TREE 
Part One of this thesis laid out the research problem which this body of work seeks 
to address. Namely, this centres on exposing a deeper understanding not only of the 
operationalisation of rules and principles separately, but in revealing how they can 
work better together in order to resolve difficult decisions. A bespoke analytical 
template was employed in order to conduct two focussed literature reviews. 
Consequently, a normative proposition was made which, through the metaphor of a 
tree, conceptualises various relationships between and functions performed by rules 
and principles. The normative proposition was made that rules and principles should 
be viewed as co-existing within a symbiotic relationship.  
Part Two of this thesis considers the tree metaphor (and the questions which it has 
generated) alongside two examples. This is with a view to testing the key features 
(claims) within the metaphor whilst simultaneously developing the metaphor further 
by virtue of the insights which will be garnered through the carefully selected 
examples.  
First, chapter five, which is theoretical in nature, focuses on Principlism – a dominant, 
if not the predominant decision-making approach within Western bioethics. This is a 
principle-centric approach to decision-making which, as discussed previously, relies 
upon specification as a methodology for guiding decision makers towards identifying 
specific action. An extended analysis of Principlism and specification is important 
because of the important space which principles occupy within the Principlist 
approach. In particular, specification merits closer analysis because of the important 
work which the methodology (or rather, proponents of the methodology) claims to 
do viz providing the decision maker with much needed action-guiding content from 
abstract principles. It is recalled that the lack of action-guiding content 
(indeterminacy) is one of the largest criticisms of principle-based approaches. This 




determination of what to do and thus analysis of specification is essential. Further, it 
has been suggested that literature on specification is notably lacking and thus, an 
analysis provided here contributes towards deepening our understanding of this 
approach. 
The case study in chapter six focuses on the Scottish Health Informatics Programme 
(SHIP), which ran from 2009 - 2013. The SHIP case study, whilst not an 
autoethnography per se, is modelled around that approach nonetheless. It is typically 
described as ‘an approach to research and writing that seeks to describe and 
systematically analyse personal experience in order to understand cultural 
experience’.478 This serves to highlight the practical value of the contribution of this 
thesis. It also offers an example of a ‘rule-centric’ approach to health research 
regulation, whereby there is a tendency to appeal to (and desire for the introduction 
of more) rules for decision-making purposes.  
It becomes apparent that a rule-centric approach to regulating the reuses of health 
data for research can often limit and hinder research in the public and private 
interests. Thus, similarly to principle-centric decision-making, the rule-centric 
approach generates its own limitations. This reinforces one of the central arguments 
laid out in this thesis: the necessity and value of conceptualising rules and principles 
as co-existing within a symbiotic relationship, moving past traditional dichotomised 
approaches which focus on either rules or principles, or indeed that seek to adopt 
more rule-like or principle-like approaches. 
A Good Governance Framework (GGF) was developed during the SHIP Project, in 
which I played a central role. The GGF moved decision makers from a predominantly 
rule-centric approach towards one that harnessed the value of a rule and principle-
based approach to decision-making. The example is, moreover, a very real evidence-
based test ground for the central ideas in this thesis in that the GGF that was 





developed – contrary to initial expectations of a rule-based approach – has since been 
taken up effectively by various actors.   
The fact that chapter five is framed around a theoretical example, whereas chapter six 
offers a practical real-world example for consideration serves as a valuable 
counterpoint. In particular, the value of best practice instantiations as decision-
making aids is explored throughout both chapters. First, chapter five will consider 
best practice from a theoretical perspective, with a view to considering the 
relationships between specification and best practice. Understanding this conceptual 
relationship is particularly important given the fact that both the methodology of 
specification and the use of best practice instantiations strive to offer the decision 
maker action-guiding content from abstract principles. Next, chapter six will 






























Chapter Five: Principlism and Specification 
5.1 Introduction 
An obvious first order question for this chapter is ‘why focus on Principlism and 
specification?’. It was suggested in bioethics literature that the decision maker 
progresses via specification from a starting abstract (principle-like) norm, towards a 
more specific determination of what to do. One of the key conclusions from the 
previous chapters was that the process of specification merited further exploration. 
Expressed in the language of the conceptual tree metaphor which is being developed 
and refined in this thesis, this chapter seeks to explore how decision makers can be 
supported in their journey from branches and twigs (principles and rules) towards 
selecting a specific leaf (determinations of 'what to do'). It is argued here that this 
support is provided by instantiations of best practice, which represent bunches of 
leaves with similar ‘features’ to the specific leaf.  
Whilst it has already been acknowledged in the literature that there is room for 
casuistry alongside specified Principlism,479,480 the contribution here builds upon this 
and further progresses it. It is suggested that through drawing upon the respective 
strengths of both specification and casuistry, instantiations of best practice can be of 
considerable value to decision makers. This chapter explains why this is so. This 
discussion further develops the contribution of this thesis by unpacking the principle-
rule continuum and exploring the space between typically rule-like and principle-like 
norms.  
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Principlism is a dominant decision-making model within Western bioethics and has 
been discussed extensively within the literature, as demonstrated within chapter 
three.  The notoriety which it has gained is evidenced by the fact that the Four 
Principles are repeatedly cited within bioethics literatures in discussions about ‘what 
to do’.481 Hence, Principlism (and the methodology of specification contained within 
it) represents a fitting exploratory topic at this juncture. The wealth of literature 
provides a rich resource of both support and critique of this particular branch of 
principle-based approaches, thereby providing deep insights in its operation. It is 
upon this valuable basis that this thesis seeks to make a further contribution.  
This chapter begins with an overview of Principlism, tracing its emergence in the 
1970s/1980s and its further development since that time. The considerable debate 
which has emerged within the bioethics literature both around the value and 
limitations of Principlism and the methodologies which it encompasses will be 
considered. Rather than tritely offering an account of all of the existing critiques, the 
account included below focuses on those contributions which relate to the lines of 
inquiry being pursued within this thesis: namely around the different functions 
which rules and principles can perform in decision-making and exploring the 
relationships between them. 
This includes consideration of specification, the prime methodological focus of 
analysis here. Discussions thus far in this thesis have suggested that it merits closer 
attention because it may offer meaningful and much needed support to the decision 
maker. It is purported to render principles less indeterminate, thus countering one of 
the most prominent attacks made against principle-based approaches – that they lack 
determinacy.  
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Whilst deepening our understanding of this methodology has been described as an 
important ‘next step in the development of principlism’,482 I am not seeking to offer 
an in-depth exploration of this methodology. Rather, my contribution lies in 
unpacking how the telos of specification (reducing indeterminacy) can be supported 
(and improved) by the inclusion of best practice instantiations as supplements to 
guiding principles and specification. This is important for understanding how we can 
add meaning and action-guiding content to high-level norms such as principles.  
It will become apparent in this chapter and the next chapter that, whilst principles 
and the process of specification and the deployment of best practice have much to 
offer decision makers, they too carry limitations. Here, a particular challenge is posed 
by the potential conflict which can arise between principles. Given that balancing is 
advanced as a methodology for resolving conflict between principles, the chapter also 
considers the implications which specification might have for balancing.  
In the penultimate section, additional limitations (and their implications for the 
decision-making tree metaphor) are considered. Finally, the conceptual tree 
metaphor (as laid out in the previous chapter) is refined, in order to incorporate the 
findings of this particular discussion. First though, in order to unpack these findings, 
a necessary introduction to Principlism is provided.  
5.2 Background: Principlism 
Principlism is an approach to resolving bioethical dilemmas which centres on the 
application of the four ethical principles of beneficence, justice, autonomy and non-
maleficence. Its proponents (notably Beauchamp, Childress483 and Gillon484)  praise 
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the approach for its flexibility and applicability to a wide variety of ethical dilemmas. 
At the same time, critiques have also emerged (especially from Culver,485 Clouser,486 
Gert487 and Harris488).  
Critiques have contributed towards a conceptualisation of the limitations of 
principles similar to those limitations considered in the previous literature reviews. 
Common charges include the vagueness of (the four) principles leading to 
indeterminacy around ‘what to do’489,490,491,492 and the potential for conflict between the 
principles. 
Despite these attacks, advocates of Principlism have continued to defend the 
approach, arguing that it remains a particularly helpful system for dealing with 
difficult decisions.493,494 Most markedly for this thesis, Principlism now incorporates 
specification - a methodology which seeks to reduce indeterminacy, narrowing the 
scope of principles in particular contexts and ultimately aiding the decision maker to 
determine ‘what to do’.495  
In order to consider the development and subsequent uptake of the approach, it is 
important to understand the context in which Principlism first emerged. This first 
section tracks the emergence of Principlism and its subsequent establishment as a 
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dominant approach within Western bioethics.496,497,498,499 This is with a view to 
highlighting key features of the approach. This includes an overview of both the 
positive and negative caricatures of Principlism (and principle-based approaches 
more generally).  
5.2.1 The need for principles  
As briefly considered in chapter three, Tom Beauchamp and James Childress are the 
founding fathers of Principlism. Shortly before introducing their Four Principles 
approach to bioethics, Beauchamp was approached by the National Commission for 
the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioural Research (the 
National Commission) in the USA, in order to assist them in investigating ‘the ethics 
of research and the exploration of basic ethical principles’.500 This focussed exercise 
was driven by Congress in response to extensive media revelations of highly 
unethical human experimentation (including the Tuskegee Syphilis and Willowbrook 
Hepatitis B Studies). 501,502   
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The Commission was alert to the dangers (and lasting damage) of such practices, 
particularly in the aftermath of the atrocious human experimentation during the 
Second World War which led to the development of the Nuremberg Code.503 The 
Commission emphasised the need to differentiate between biomedical research and 
therapy; a set of overarching principles was required in order to ‘assist scientists, 
subjects, reviewers and interested citizens to understand the ethical issues inherent 
in research involving human subjects’.504 
The core output of this task of identifying ethical principles was the Belmont Report 
which included within it three basic ethical principles, commonly referred to as ‘The 
Belmont Principles’. These are namely; respect for persons (autonomy), beneficence 
and justice.505  Research conducted on human participants was consequently required 
to comply with these principles and they remain an important frame of reference for 
Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) which are responsible for ethical review of 
research proposals in the USA.506 The rapid adoption of these principles has been 
attributed to ‘the need for principles, widespread agreement about the principles, and 
their applicability to current situations’.507 
Subsequently, Beauchamp and Childress published the highly successful and 
influential textbook Principles of Biomedical Ethics508 now in its 7th edition.509 The 
textbook lays out a principled approach towards resolving ethical dilemmas which 
builds upon the Belmont Principles. Beauchamp and Childress also introduced a 
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fourth principle of nonmaleficence.510 The term ‘Principlism’ was latterly coined to 
describe the four principle approach.511 
5.2.2 (The Four) Principles  
As mentioned, Principlism is an ethical framework for decision-making which is 
comprised of four overarching principles of beneficence, justice, nonmaleficence and 
autonomy. Only a brief description of how each of these principles is characterised 
by Beauchamp and Childress is necessary for present purposes:   
• Beneficence: ‘obligations to provide benefits and to balance 
benefits against risks’512; 
• Justice: ‘obligations of fairness in the distribution of benefits 
and risks’513; 
• Nonmaleficence: ‘the obligation to avoid causing harm’514; 
and 
• Respect for Autonomy: ‘the obligation to respect the 
decision-making capacities of autonomous persons’.515 
 
Beauchamp and Childress claim that the four principles capture within them all 
concerns demanding attention in order to resolve a bioethical dilemma. The 
principles above are considered in detail in Principles of Biomedical Ethics516 and as 
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mentioned earlier on, contain within them further related principles categorised 
under the ‘clusters’ of the four principles outlined above.517  
Before considering how Principlism has been further developed, praised and 
critiqued within the literature, an important point of clarification is necessary. 
Throughout this chapter, it should be assumed that all discussions which consider 
characterisations of principles within Principlism can be generalised to relate to 
principle-based approaches more generally, unless explicitly stated otherwise.  
Such a distinction may seem banal but it is not. Commentaries on Principlism may 
relate to principle-based approaches more generally, but some of the criticisms of 
Principlism may be specific to that particular approach, rather than all or most 
principle-based approaches.  Consider, for example, the common allegation (and one 
which Beauchamp and Childress strongly deny)518 that autonomy is always granted 
more weight than the other three principles when considering Principlism.519 This 
may not necessarily be the case in other principle-based approaches (or indeed, it may 
be a criticism which applies generally to many non-principle-based approaches in 
Western bioethics). Having made this clarification, we can return to considering how 
and why Principlism has been so widely adopted. 
5.2.3 The successful uptake of Principlism 
Since its emergence, Principlism has taken on a life of its own; this may be attributed 
in part to the rise in bioethical debates and expertise and the increase in new 
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technologies.520,521 Additional explanations for the uptake of Principlism, as a 
principle-based approach, may relate to the usefulness of a mid-range approach 
which avoids the pitfalls of higher-level ethical theories such as utilitarianism.522,523 
Beauchamp and Childress claim to have envisaged the goal of Principlism and the 
Four Principles as offering an ethical framework with which to arrive at reasoned and 
justifiable decisions when more than one option of what to do is available. 
Beauchamp has offered the following explanation for the success of principle-based 
approaches: 
General principles are easy to understand because they condense 
morality for persons who may be unfamiliar with philosophical 
ethics and nuanced dimensions of professional ethics. Principles 
gave bioethics at its modern birth a shared set of assumptions that 
could be used to address bioethical problems, at the same time 
suggesting that bioethics has principled foundations…’.524 
 
The monumental success and widespread adoption of Principlism which followed its 
introduction stands as testament to the appeal of general principles as means of 
resolving ethical dilemmas. Yet, by the late 1980s, criticisms of this approach were 
emerging. As discussed in more detail below, Clouser, Gert and Culver have been 
particularly vocal in expressing their challenges to Principlism.  
For example, rather than representing guides for action (a key feature of principles 
according to Beauchamp and Childress), Clouser, Gert and Culver suggest that a 
more accurate depiction of principles is that they are ‘chapter headings for a 
discussion of some concepts which are often only superficially related to each 
other’.525 Beauchamp and Childress have repeatedly and explicitly acknowledged 
that their Four Principles are actually ‘cluster headings’ for groups of related 
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principles. As we will see further below, the back and forth exchange between 
Clouser, Gert , and Culver on one side and Beauchamp and Childress on the other,  
has continued for some time and has led to some amendments to the Principlism 
itself. 
Newer voices have also sought to engage with the debates526 and almost four decades 
after the introduction of Principlism, it remains a topic of discussion (albeit less so in 
this decade than previously) within the literature.527,528 Commentary within bioethics 
literatures tends to focus either on the Principlist approach itself, or on the merits (and 
limitations) of one or more of the specific principles included within the approach.  
As observed in previous chapters, there is a common tendency in much of the 
literature on principles and rules more generally to focus on discussing a particular 
principle or rule, rather than the nature of principles and rules per se. This is an 
important distinction as it highlights the contribution of this thesis in developing our 
understanding of the nature of rules and principles, as opposed to considering 
specific rules or principles and assessing their content. The next section considers 
some of the key commentaries which have taken place around Principlism. 
5.3 Principlism: key commentary 
This section considers the relevant (acclamatory and critical) expositions which the 
Principlist529 approach has catalysed. Discussion is provided on what these 
evaluations might tell us about principle-centric approaches to making difficult 
decisions. In turn, such an exercise builds upon and furthers our current 
understandings of the nature of principles and their interrelationships with rules. It 
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should be noted from the outset that the metaphor of balancing, which is a central 
methodology within Principlism, is often the subject of criticism against the approach. 
Commentaries which specifically relate to balancing are considered in more detail 
separately. 
A general overview of key critiques of Principlism is helpful to set up the later 
discussion and to begin to outline some of the challenges towards adopting principle-
based approaches to decision-making. Such critiques can be categorised under two 
broad themes: (1) a lack of coherent basis and (2) challenges to the application of 
principles. The discussion which follows is set out accordingly. 
5.3.1 Principlism, principles and the question of theory 
The relationship between ethical theory and bioethics is a complex one.530 Critics have 
questioned the existence and/or lack of ethical theory associated with Principlism.531 
Beauchamp and Childress stress that they have never claimed to have advanced an 
ethical theory per se,532 but rather an ethical framework.  
Additionally, the authors have allocated increasing space within each edition of 
Principles of Biomedical Ethics to discussion on common morality.533 Beauchamp and 
Childress claim that whilst ethical frameworks can vary within different cultures and 
societies, their Four Principles are universal and can be applied across cultures and 
internationally.534,535 This approach is Beauchamp and Childress’ interpretation of the 
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common morality, it is described by them as ‘the set of norms shared by all persons 
committed to morality’.536  
More specifically, common morality is based on ‘general rules and ideas of morality 
– those that correlate rather directly with the harms that all rational persons would 
want to avoid unless they had a reason not to’.537 Such morals are held to be those 
everyday morals which are inherent and intuitive, because of how they (and their 
violations) are received publically.  
In contrast with Beauchamp and Childress’ interpretation, Gert, Culver and Clouser 
include ten ‘moral rules’ rather than the Four Principles538 within their own 
conceptualisation of common morality. They consider common morality as an ethical 
theory (whereas Beauchamp and Childress state ‘we do not understand the 
principles…as alone constituting the common morality; rather, these principles are 
drawn from the territory of common morality’).539 Furthermore, this theory, it is 
claimed, is related to and compelling on all members of society.  
Clouser and Gert explain that their theory can be adapted to the sensitivities of the 
bioethics context. The Principlist account of common morality, according to them, 
fails on three core points. First, the goal of common morality is to minimize harm 
rather than to promote good, therefore nullifying the rules of obligation included in 
Principlism. Second, principles are ‘themes’ and thus indeterminate. Finally, 
Principlism is vulnerable to subjectivity in assigning weights to principles where 
conflict arises between these principles. This gives rise to a further lack of 
determinacy in adjudication between principles.540  
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Beauchamp and Childress have responded to these criticisms by arguing that norms 
such as principles are designed to be general (and, they contend, Gert, Culver and 
Clouser’s ten moral rules are open to the same criticisms, in addition to other 
weaknesses).541 Beauchamp and Childress also acknowledge that principles can be 
reduced to checklists, because principles need to be specified and connected to other 
norms. It is unreasonable, they argue, to expect anything more from principles. 
Indeed, no decision-making framework can anticipate all potential conflicts that may 
arise between principles542 and the value of Principlism lies in the fact that: 
Instead of focusing on the epistemic differences of various 
philosophical and religious perspectives, Principlism focuses on the 
intersubjective agreements, and that is why it works so effectively 
in interdisciplinary pluralistic environments.543  
 
Further consideration of the universalisability of the Four Principles (or of any 
principles) and common morality is unnecessary here.  The point pertinent for 
present discussion is that many (if not all) principle-based approaches will be 
vulnerable to accusations of ‘cultural myopia’ and open to the challenges posed 
against common morality. At the same time, this accusation can be dispelled if we 
agree that, as one proponent of Principlism has argued: ‘It [principlism] accepts that 
the framework only broadly delineates the normative landscape of morality and that 
much more is needed to produce a context specific guide to action’.544  
This, in turn, relates back to a point made previously in this thesis - that we need to 
consider the different functions which we expect principles to perform. I have argued 
that it is not the telos of principles to provide specific prescriptions of what to do but 
to assist the decision maker towards making such determinations.  
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A similar point has is made by Meslin et al. in explaining the value of principles 
applied in a clinical trials setting: 
our interpretation of principlism requires, not that the principles 
provide a clear and simple solution to each and every moral issue 
that surfaces in research ethics review, but rather that they provide 
a reasonable account of the moral topography of research ethics 
review in language and concepts that are familiar and readily 
understandable to REB members.545 
 
Rather than considering whether the four principles are universilisable, or expecting 
them to offer specific answers to every ethical dilemma, a more helpful question for 
present purposes is emerging: ‘what does it mean to provide a framework based on 
principles?’ This chapter contributes towards answering this important question 
through the exploration of principle-based approaches to decision-making and how 
these might be supplemented by specification and best practice.  
Moving on to consider other criticisms of the approach, Principlism has been 
notoriously criticised for granting autonomy primacy at the expense of the other three 
principles. 546,547,548,549 Beauchamp and Childress maintain that this is not the case 550 
despite the enduring nature of this criticism. 
Another common criticism of Principlism (and one which is more interesting for this 
discussion) relates to principles more generally: that the Four Principles are 
inadequate on their own, and that additional principles are needed.551 This is in 
contrast to other prevalent theory-based approaches within bioethics such as Virtue 
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Ethics,552 Deontology553 and Casuistry.554  Critics problematize Principlism by 
describing it as an 'anthology' of unrelated principles which are meshed together.555 
Thus, when conflict between different principles arises, decision makers are deprived 
of a means (i.e. an overarching theory) of working out which principle to prioritise. 
The implication of this criticism seems to be that an overarching moral theory might 
offer effective guidance on how to reconcile the potential (and arguably frequent) 
antagonisms arising between principles.  
However, in contrast, others have suggested that an ethical theory may actually 
impede the utility of Principlism. It has been argued that the reason Principlism has 
gained so much popularity was because physicians did not want to be tied up with 
ethical theories but rather needed an approach which can be applied to a wide set of 
dilemmas556 quickly.557 Limentani suggests that the weight attributed to respective 
principles is not dependent upon moral systems, and that the latter are merely 
granted ‘superficial consideration’.558 Thus, it is questionable whether, even if a 
coherent moral theory were at hand, this would assist in reconciling conflicting 
principles in practice.  
Although Principlism has been described as relating to both utilitarian and 
deontological theories, it has been suggested that those theories are too broad and 
that Principlism represents a middle level approach559 (even though Callahan has 
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described the Four Principle approach as ‘individualistic’, ‘narrow’ and 
‘mechanical’).560 
It could be argued that the application of an overarching normative ethical theory 
would not necessarily solve problems such how to apply a principle in particular 
circumstances, or what weight to assign to each, because different ethical theories 
would be likely to provide different answers to these questions. So this would only 
push the uncertainty back a stage to the question of which overarching theory to 
choose.  
It seems that what those who call for an overarching moral theory may actually be 
taking issue with here is the difficulty of knowing how to apply principles. For 
example, when the Belmont Principles were first introduced, it was acknowledged 
that conflict between the principles would inevitably occur:  
These principles cannot always be applied so as to resolve beyond 
dispute particular ethical problems. The objective is to provide an 
analytical framework that will guide the resolution of ethical 
problems arising from research involving human subjects.561  
 
If we are to expand our consideration to principle-based approaches more generally 
(which may be similarly void of any overarching moral theory), then the question 
arises as to how to use such an analytical framework, this has also been the topic of 
much critique and one which is considered next.  
5.3.2 Problems of applying the (four) principles 
It has been suggested that in the context of Principlism, reference to principles is made 
in a superficial way thus leaving the decision maker wanting in terms of 
understanding how to meaningfully apply the principles to a dilemma. For example, 
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Foster argues that where an individual is said to be autonomous, this is taken to mean 
that their decision deserves respect and says nothing ‘about what it means to be 
autonomous’.562 Whilst Foster’s attack is directed towards the supposed primacy of 
autonomy in the Four Principles approach, the point which he makes about a lack of 
consideration about ‘what it means to be autonomous’ merits consideration in a 
broader context. 
Is this an accusation which extends to all principles and thus a limitation from which 
they all suffer?  It could be argued that the principles are used in a superficial way 
(the terms ‘checklist’563,564 and 'minimalist ethics'565 have often been assigned to the 
Four Principle approach), rather than considering what the concepts enshrined 
within those principles actually mean. There may be a danger that referring to 
principles in such a way (and in the absence of an overarching moral theory), 
overlooks the important exercise of considering what these concepts actually mean 
or entail.566 Edgar has stated that Principlism ‘may prematurely cut short the process 
of ethical reasoning, and therefore should never be seen as an exhaustive account of 
ethics’.567 
Further, Clouser warns that:  
Each principle functions as a reminder that there is an ethical value 
that the agent ought to take into account – the principle does not 
tell the agent what or how to think, or how to deal with the value 
in a particular instance – but it reminds him to consider it.568  
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An obvious rebuttal to such accusations is that provision of 'thick ethics' (in contrast 
to minimalist ethics569) is an unrealistic ‘ask’ of any decision-making framework if it 
is to have practical value. Even where we do reflect on particular concepts, they may 
represent just one of many possible conceptualisations of a given principle. Indeed, it 
has been argued that the simplicity of the Principlist approach ‘is largely gained by 
discarding information about deeper epistemological or theoretical commitments’.570  
Beauchamp and Children defend their principle-based approach by acknowledging 
that: 
norms are designed to be general; 
the ten moral rules advanced by Gert, Culver and Clouser are also 
general in nature (albeit one level more specific than principles); 
whilst Principles are broad, specification and balancing are 
available to the decision maker; and 
ultimately, no framework can anticipate or resolve all potential 
conflicts. 
 
Sokol’s more recent commentary attempts to counter criticisms of Principlism 
through the analogy of a chessboard. One does not automatically know how to play 
chess at all, let alone well, simply because one is seated in front of chess pieces placed 
upon a chessboard. The novice chess player does not know what each of the pieces 
‘do’, the different relationships between the pieces, or where each can move on the 
chessboard. Similarly, a decision maker will be ill equipped to use the principles until 
she understands what different principles mean and how they can be used.571  
This analogy can be extended and related back to earlier discussions about the need 
for overarching moral theory; even in the world of chess, various differing openings, 
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middle-game and end-game theories are at the player’s disposal, but a lack of elected 
chess theory does not preclude someone from playing, let alone triumphing in a game 
of chess! Hence, due to their prima facie nature,572 it can be argued that principles can 
be accepted on their face independently of connections with overarching moral 
theories. It should be noted that it is not my intention to denigrate the value which 
overarching moral theory may bring, but rather to keep discussion focussed on the 
use of principles in se. 
Indeed, rather than focussing on theories of playing chess, what the player must be 
aware of in order to be able to ‘win the game’, are the rules of chess. For example, the 
player can only move each of the pieces in distinct ways across the chessboard. 
Similarly, perhaps a better way of exploring the utility of principles is to consider the 
‘rules’ of principles viz understanding how they should be applied. Through 
exploration of the methodologies associated with the application of principles, a 
contribution of this thesis lies in enriching our understanding of what the ‘rules’ of 
application for principles are.  
On this point, the Principlist approach incorporates two methodologies which merit 
consideration: specification and balancing. These are the methodologies which 
purportedly (a) add action-guiding content to principles and (b) resolve conflict 
between principles.  
As considered in previous chapters, the method of balancing has attracted 
considerable criticism within both legal theory and bioethical literatures. Whilst 
specification also features as a topic of debate, discussions on balancing have tended 
to dominate. Extensive discussion on balancing would be an unhelpful distraction 
from the value which can be gleaned for a deeper exploration of specification. Thus, 
the central focus of the remainder of this chapter lies in uncovering how specification 
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(and specifically my suggestion for best practice instantiations as a necessary feature 
incorporated into the methodology of specification) can support decision makers.  
Discussions on balancing will feature within this chapter, but only for the purposes 
of considering the implications which balancing might have for the inclusion of best 
practice in decision-making.  
5.4 Specification 
This section takes a closer look at the methodological approach of specification. First, 
an overview of the process is offered. Next, the questions of whether, how, and why 
best practice should be incorporated into specification are considered. It is worth 
reiterating that the purpose of this chapter is not to offer an exhaustive account of 
specification or related commentaries. That would demand a sophisticated critique of 
the methodology which is beyond the remit and requirements of this body of work. 
Rather, the aim here is to identify key features of specification and to consider its 
potential, alongside best practice, in supporting decision makers in determining what 
to do. 
This boundary demarcation does not detract from the value of the contribution being 
made here. Specification has been under-explored to date, remaining ‘somewhat 
mysterious’.573 Even a modest contribution towards exploring this methodology can 
contribute towards ‘the next step in the development of principlism’.574 Indeed, as will 
become evident, this thesis takes the novel approach of considering specification 
alongside best practice, which can be of real value to decision-making. 
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5.4.1 Specification as a method for applying principles 
Although specification (described as ‘putting flesh on the bones of principles’575) is a 
key component of the Principlist approach today, it was not included within 
Beauchamp and Childress’ original incarnation of Principlism. Criticism from 
Richardson576 catalysed the later adoption577 of ‘specified principlism’ as Beauchamp 
and Childress refer to it. Acknowledgement of the need for specification has been 
explained thusly: 
Often, no straightforward movement from general norms, 
principles, precedents, or theories to particular judgments is 
possible. General norms are usually only starting points for the 
development of norms of conduct suitable for specific contexts. 578 
 
Three common features of specification can be identified from the literature: 
(1) the goal of reducing indeterminacy;  
(2) the process of progressive deductive reasoning; and 
(3) the provision of and reliance on justification for a particular 
determination of what to do.  
 
Specification has also been characterised by Richardson as a type of 
interpretation579,580 which is superior to both other types of interpretation i.e. 
deductive subsumption and situational or perceptive intuition. He explains the 
reasons for the superiority of specification as follows: 
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deductive subsumption involves deductively subsuming a case 
under a rule and is reliant upon universalizable generalisations 
whereas specification is not; and 
situational or perceptive intuition does not include the provision of 
reasons for a particular judgement whereas specification does.581 
 
Further consideration of these points is offered elsewhere582 and is unnecessary for 
the discussions here. As such, I have chosen to focus on the three key characteristics 
of specification. In the discussion that follows, each of these core features is briefly 
considered in turn. 
5.4.2 Reducing (but not completely eradicating) indeterminacy  
It is recalled from previous chapters that varying expectations are placed on rules and 
principles in terms of the different functions which each might perform. A similar 
divergence of expectations becomes apparent in the context of specification. On one 
hand, Beauchamp and Childress conceptualise specification as a process aimed at 
‘reducing the indeterminacy of abstract norms and generating rules with action-
guiding content.’583 This implies that the outcome or ‘end-product’ of specification is 
a rule. In keeping with the characteristics of rules outlined in the previous chapters,  
a rule-like norm is a specific determination of what to do which is either applicable 
or not and which lacks the dimension of weight which principle-like norms possess. 
At the same time and in contrast to the above description, specification has been 
critiqued on the basis that the methodology fails to offer specific determination to the 
decision maker about what to do. Beauchamp and Childress have defended it against 
this criticism by explicitly acknowledging that providing definitive determinations of 
what to do is not the purpose of the methodology.584,585 Rather, it strives to reduce 
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indeterminacy by narrowing the scope of abstract initial norms. Thus, one can 
sympathise with arguments in favour of both claims and the confusion surrounding 
specification, particularly when Beauchamp and Childress themselves offer 
competing goals of the process!  
Instead of fixating upon whether or not specifications generate rules per se, a more 
important activity lies in considering how the methodology can support decision-
makers in determining what to do. After all, this question can offer real practical value 
to the decision maker. For this reason, I am adopting the interpretation that 
specification aims to reduce indeterminacy (with the understanding that this may 
stop short of the creation of a solitary hard and fast rule-like determination of 
precisely what to do). Another and alternative focal point offered in this chapter is 
the consideration of best practice instantiations as a type of specification which are 
neither principles nor rules but which occupy middle-ground on the principle-rule 
continuum. This point is considered further below in more detail. 
5.4.3 The process of progressive narrowing  
In order to progressively narrow the scope of a principle, it is axiomatic that first, the 
decision maker starts out with a broad abstract norm - a principle. They then 
progressively narrow the scope of the initial norm in order to generate a modified 
norm whilst simultaneously retaining a relation to (and respect for) the initial norm.586 
A pre-condition for specification is that a given norm is not ‘absolute’ i.e. it must not 
imply that it should always be respected but rather, it is taken as a ‘general rule’. 587  
This resonates with legal theory contributions considered previously in chapter two, 
where it was suggested that neither rules nor principles are generally absolute; rules 
have exceptions built-in to them and principles are optimisation maxims (which 
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means, where applicable, they can be applied to different degrees). Such norms, to 
use the Kantian term, are norms of ‘latitude’.588  
Examples of specification (and particularly clear and satisfactory examples) are 
extremely difficult to locate within the literature. One of the rare examples is offered 
by Richardson who considers the case of ‘whether to withhold nutrition and 
hydration from a severely malformed newborn so as to let it die’.589 Although 
Richardson fails to provide further details on the circumstances of the case, in 
working through the dilemma, he suggests that the following three principles are in 
play: 
(1) a prohibition on directly killing innocent persons (here, the 
newborn); 
(2) a duty to respect the reasonable choices of parents regarding 
their children (suppose that in this case the mother and father want 
to let their baby die); and  
(3) a duty to benefit the persons over whom one has responsibility 
(here, from the point of view of the medical personnel, the patients 
i.e., the infant and the mother.590 
 
As a process, specification involves ‘spelling out where, when, why, how, by what 
means, to whom, or by whom the action is to be done or avoided’.591 Further, 
‘specification proceeds by setting out substantive qualifications that add information 
about the scope of applicability of the norm or the nature of the act or end enjoined 
or proscribed’.592 Specification and the preceding discussions raise an important 
question for the principle-rule continuum around the nature of the relationship 
between a specification and a principle, considered in the following section. 
                                                      
588 Lake, P., “Being Virtuous and Virtues: Two Aspects of Kant’s Doctrine”, Betzler, M., (ed), 
Kant’s Ethic of Virtue, (Germany: Walter de Gruyter, 2008), pp. 101-122, p. 116.  
589 Richardson, (1990), p. 303. 
590 Ibid.  
591 Ibid., p. 289. 




5.4.4 Specifications – middle-ground on the principle-rule continuum? 
If we accept that a specification must always relate back to the starting norm – in this 
case, a principle, then the question arises as to if and how the specification (i.e. the 
outcome of the methodology of specification rather than the methodology itself) is 
different to the starting principle.  
In contrast to a principle which is an initial norm or starting point for deliberation, 
Richardson asserts that through specification, a ‘mid-level’ norm is created which can 
‘serve as a bridge between a general precept and a concrete case.’593,594 Thus, 
specification moves us a step closer to knowing ‘what to do’. In keeping with the tree 
metaphor employed within this thesis, specification can be represented by the space 
which spans across the limbs of a tree, right up to its leaves, but which may stop short 
of guiding the decision maker towards one particular leaf i.e. determination of what 
to do. Through Richardson’s insistence (and Beauchamp and Childress’ subsequent 
modification of their approach to specification), the trajectory or path from the limbs 
to the leaves (i.e. the different choices of ‘what to do’), in order to reflect true 
specification, must be clearly visible i.e. the initial norm must ‘travel’ down to the 
leaves, just like the vascular system within a tree.  
At the same time, the above definition of specification suggests that in addition to 
adding more certainty to principles, through the process of specification, principles, 
having been altered into new, more specific norms, become more rule-like; they move 
closer to the rule-end of the principle-rule continuum.  This advances the 
conceptualisation being progressed here, of the interrelationship between rules and 
principles co-existing upon a continuum.  
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It further supports the suggestion on the evolutionary nature of principles, that they 
can be rendered more ‘rule-like’ (but not necessarily transforming into rules). Indeed, 
strong parallels emerge between specification and instantiations of best practice, 
which are offered as supplements to guiding principles in the context of SHIP (the 
Scottish Health Informatics Programme) which is considered in the following 
chapter. A working group was set up in order to draft overarching guiding principles 
around which health data should be used. The working group (which I led with a 
colleague) decided to include best practice instantiations alongside each of the 
principles in order to add action-guiding content, in a similar way that specification 
appears to operate.  
An example can be offered from the SHIP Guiding Principles (which will be 
examined more closely in the next chapter). Consider the following principle and a 
corresponding best practice instantiation:  
Principle: Data controllers should demonstrate their commitment 
to privacy protection through the development and 
implementation of appropriate and transparent policies.  
Best Practice: Appropriate disclosure control should be applied to 
all outputs; this should be carried out under the authority and 
oversight of the designated privacy officer.  
 
Thus the above best practice instantiation offers the decision maker one example of 
how data controllers can balance their commitment to privacy protection with the 
specific example of disclosure control, but it does not imply that this is the only way 
to demonstrate respect for the initial principle.595 Discretion must still be exercised by 
the decision maker.  
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This thesis goes one step further and in building upon this move from principle-like 
to rule-like norms, explores the middle-ground within the continuum. This will be 
further demonstrated by the special attention which will be given to best practice and 
its relationship with specification later in this chapter and in chapter six which 
follows. First though, it is necessary to consider the remaining core elements of 
specification which have been set out in the literature.  
5.4.5 Need for justification (and the valuable way in which specification can 
offer such justification) 
The third core (but disputed) feature of specification is that it offers a justification for 
a particular determination around what to do. DeGrazia emphasises this feature in 
order to explain why Principlism is particularly suited to the process of specification: 
It acknowledges the need for a justification procedure that can (at 
least generally) distinguish correct intuitive judgements from 
incorrect ones, so that the whole theory is not reducible to 
intuitionism.596 
 
This line of reasoning can also be extended to principle-based approaches more 
generally when such approaches do not stem from an overarching ethical theory.  
Before considering how justification relates to specification, it is important to clarify 
the type of justification which is under discussion here. It is a matter of contention 
whether specification (as discussed by Beauchamp and Childress) can fully act as a 
process of moral justification. As Hine argues, on one hand, a justification can relate 
to a morally ‘right’ answer i.e. to reach moral truth. On the other hand, a justification 
can relate to an acceptable reason for a particular (morally acceptable) course of 
action. Specification (when linked to reflective equilibrium discussed further below) 
can be viewed as a procedure through which to provide morally acceptable 
                                                      




justification for action.597 I choose to set aside the concern of whether specification also 
leads us to the right moral answer (without the justification from a high-level moral 
theory).  
All that is necessary here is to state that it is justification as 'good reason for action' 
which is being considered in this thesis as constituting a core component of 
specification. With this important clarification established, the core concern for 
present purposes is to consider how justification of a decision on what to do can be 
provided through specification. 
In Principles of Biomedical Ethics, Beauchamp and Childress acknowledge the 
important role of justification and assess different justificatory models, categorising 
them as: top-down, bottom-up, and integrated models,598 these merit brief 
consideration at this juncture.  
5.4.5.1 Deductive reasoning 
In top-down or deductive reasoning, the decision maker starts with an ethical theory 
or principle(s), works towards a (moral) rule and arrives at a judgement. Deductivism 
has been criticised namely due to indeterminacy and conflict.599 A further challenge 
is ‘infinite regress of justification’600 i.e. the constant pursuit of an additional level of 
final justification and the lack of self-justifying principles.601  
5.4.5.2 Inductive reasoning and analogy 
In contrast, bottom-up or inductive models start with particular cases and work 
towards more general positions. Casuistry, which was considered in chapter three, is 
an example of such reasoning. Limitations to the approach can be summarised as 
follows: 
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• Casuistry is vulnerable to interpretation and varying classifications just as 
much as principles; 
 
• There is an inherent risk of ‘moral diagnosis’ in the way that cases may be 
framed and interpreted by the decision maker, thus competing 
determinations of what to do can still result; and 
 
• Analogies are not always helpful, they can produce false statements.602 
 
It is noteworthy that parallels can be drawn between casuistry and the use of 
precedent and analogy in legal reasoning, which have been discussed extensively 
within jurisprudential literatures.603,604,605,606 In-depth engagement with such 
literatures is unnecessary, although those points which remain salient for current 
discussions will be drawn upon. For example, Schauer identifies that one of the core 
challenges of analogy lies in determining which features are sufficiently ‘similar’ in 
order to draw analogy between the analogous case and the current case necessitating 
consideration.607 Despite the challenges of casuistry, Beauchamp and Childress 
nonetheless appreciate that there is a role for case-based analogy in decision-making 
however, ultimately, ‘it lacks initial moral premises, tools of criticism, and adequate 
forms of justification’.608 Casuistry will be considered in more detail later in the 
chapter. 
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5.4.5.3 Integrated model and reflective equilibrium 
A third form of justification, the integrated model which Beauchamp and Childress 
subscribe to, is based on Rawl’s Reflective Equilibrium.609 Numerous accounts of this 
theory are offered elsewhere.610 For the purposes of this discussion, Beauchamp and 
Childress’ explanation (and interpretation) is helpful: 
Whenever some feature in a person’s or group’s prevailing 
structure of moral views conflicts with one or more of their 
considered judgements (a contingent conflict), the must modify 
something in their viewpoint in order to achieve equilibrium. Even 
the considered judgements that we accept as central in the web of 
moral beliefs are, Rawls argues, subject to revision once we detect 
a conflict. The goal of reflective equilibrium is to match, prune, and 
adjust considered judgements, their specifications, and other beliefs 
to render them coherent. We then test the resultant guides to action 
to see if they yield incoherent results. If so, we must further readjust 
the guides.611 
The authors argue that reflective equilibrium should supplement both inductive and 
deductive reasoning and suggest that common morality is needed in order to supply 
initial norms which are then developed by specification, balancing and reflective 
equilibrium. Further, they explain that  
We also need to link specification to a method of justification that 
allows for a reflective testing of our moral principles and other 
relevant moral beliefs to make them as coherent as possible.... If 
proposed specifications are shown to have incoherent results, we 
must continue to readjust the guides further. In this way, we 
connect specification as a method with a model of justification that 
will support some specifications and not others.612  
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Thus, it is important to clarify here (and this is a point which may be overlooked in 
discussions around specification) that specification itself may not provide moral 
justification, but rather, specification as part of an exercise in reflective equilibrium can 
provide moral justification to the decision maker.  
Beauchamp and Childress also acknowledge limitations of reflective equilibrium, in 
particular, ambiguity around the method, knowing when it is being carried out well 
and difficulty identifying explicit uses of the approach within the literature.613 Space 
does not permit further exploration of reflective equilibrium and it is not necessary 
for present purposes. Instead, it is noted that Beauchamp and Childress’ ‘dialectical 
and discursive’614 approach combines common morality with ‘wide reflective 
equilibrium’ and acknowledges the fact that case resolution is not a linear process nor 
is it one which can simply be conducted via inductive or deductive reasoning alone. 
It necessitates on-going ‘pruning’ and this resonates with one of the key themes 
included within the conceptual tree metaphor viz the tree as a holistic organism and 
one which evolves as trees do within different seasons and environments.  
5.4.6 Is specification only for principles? 
The question arises as to whether specification is a process that exclusively functions 
for principles, or whether it can also be applied to rules. It is recalled from previous 
chapters that rules are also open to interpretation and are not necessarily prescriptive 
in terms of clarifying to the decision maker what they ought to do. 
Beauchamp seems to suggest that specification does apply to rules when defending 
Principlism against attacks from long-standing critics:  
Clouser and Gert’s rules must also be specified or else they too will 
be too abstract and will fail on normative guidance. That is, their 
rules are like our general principles in that they lack specificity in 
their original general form. Being one tier less abstract than 
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principles, their rules do have a more directive and specific content 
than abstract principles. However, a set of rules almost identical to 
the rules embraced by Clouser and Gert is already included in our 
account of principles and rules. We maintain that principles 
support these more specific and directive moral rules and that more 
than one principle (for example, respect for autonomy and 
nonmaleficence) may support a single rule (for example, medical 
confidentiality). Their rules, then, either do not or need not differ in 
content from ours, and their rules need not be more specific and 
directive than our rules.615 
 
Whilst this does not suggest that rule-like norms necessarily ‘become’ principle-like 
norms in the way that principle-like norms can transform into rule-like norms via 
specification, it still tells us something about the nature of rule-like norms. On one 
extreme of the continuum, we may have general, broad rule-like norms which can 
become more prescriptive further down the continuum and more detailed through 
the process of specification. This supports the proposition being further developed 
here that it is not always helpful to dichotomize principles and rules or to rely solely 
on features which are typically attributed to only one of the norms (for example, 
‘broad’ and ‘general' are often terms used to describe principles, rather than rules). It 
strengthens the claim of their coexistence upon a principle-rule continuum with 
greater and lesser degrees of prescriptiveness/abstractness at different ends. It will be 
argued that instantiations of best-practice can be conceptualised as manifestations of 
specifications (and casuistry) and thus may sit on the middle-of this continuum, and 
as part of the tree, this proposition is explored in more detail further below. 
5.4.7 Interim Summary 
Discussion thus far has considered the background to the emergence of Principlism 
and the key commentaries which have emerged around the approach. Two 
overarching criticisms of the approach were identified as: 1) lack of overarching 
                                                      




moral theory and 2) challenges associated with applying principles. Next, the 
methodological approach of specification was considered. In particular, the three core 
features of specified principlism were discussed in turn. It was noted that the 
methodology strives to reduce indeterminacy of abstract principles, narrow the scope 
of principles and provide justification for determinations of what to do.  
It was suggested that through the process of specification, mid-level norms are 
created and that these sit half way between broad abstract principle-like norms and 
specific rule-like norms on the principle-rule continuum. The potential role of 
reflective equilibrium as a means of offering justifications of a determination of what 
to do was also considered. Likewise, the casuistic approach to resolving difficult 
decisions was briefly contemplated and despite Beauchamp and Childress’ rejection 
of the approach, it will be argued below that case based analogous reasoning can 
support decision makers when combined with best practice and specification. This 
proposition is considered next. 
5.5 Best practice, specification and casuistry   
Having examined Principlism and specification, the remainder of this chapter is 
dedicated to laying out and justifying the proposition that instances of best practice, 
when conceptualised as a combination of both specification and casuistry, and 
offered alongside guiding principles, can play a significant role in aiding decision 
makers in determining what to do. It is also suggested that such an approach also 
mitigates some of the challenges which purely specification/casuistry-based 
approaches encounter.  
Before considering how best practice might support decision makers, it would be 
helpful to revisit the reasons why best practice instantiations have emerged in this 
thesis as a key topic of exploration. In chapter four, a theme was identified as 
emerging from both legal theory and bioethical literatures – that something extra, in 




conceptual tree metaphor was developed and within it, one of the core topics of 
exploration to be considered in the subsequent case studies was what this ‘something 
extra’ might be. 
The SHIP case study to follow in chapter six will recount the introduction of best 
practice instantiations alongside guiding principles in order to support decision 
makers in exercising the necessary discretion associated with making difficult 
decisions. One of the key action points emerging from this analysis will be  to further 
consider best practices and the potential space that they might occupy as a middle-
ground between rules and principles. A further potential suggestion for something 
extra which emerged was casuistry – case based analogous reasoning - which was 
considered earlier in chapter three. Equally, it was suggested that best practice 
instantiations offer similar approaches to casuistry in that they offer examples of 
paradigm cases where principles are applied to resolve a difficult decision.  
This section is dedicated to bringing together all of these discussions in considering 
the complementarity between best practice, specification, casuistry and the nature of 
the support which these approaches (as conceptualised here) can bring to the decision 
maker.  
5.5.1 Best Practice inspired by specification and casuistry 
In chapter three, the core features of Jonsen and Toulmin’s conceptualisation of 
casuistry was laid out. Whilst it is not necessary to revisit the entire discussion here, 
their definition of casuistry does merit repetition. They describe casuistry as: 
The interpretation of moral issues, using procedures of reasoning 
based on paradigms and analogies, leading to the formulation of 
expert opinion about the existence and stringency of particular 
moral obligations, framed in terms of rules or maxims that are 




certainty only in the typical conditions of the agent and 
circumstances of action.616 
 
Jonsen and Toulmin are notable critics of Principlism and alongside Strong, they 
argue that casuistry is a superior method for the resolution of ethical dilemmas in 
comparison with Principlism. In contrast, Beauchamp does not categorise casuistry 
as a rival approach to decision-making but rather, as a methodology which is 
complementary to the four-principle approach. Paradigm cases, he states, ‘often 
become enduring and authoritative sources of reflection and decision-making’617 but 
the central role of principles remains nonetheless in order to achieve the ‘discovery 
of linking norms’.618 Other authors have also argued that the two approaches are not 
mutually exclusive.619 
Thus, whilst a place for casuistry within specified Principlism has already been 
argued for, this thesis suggests best practice examples can be conceptualised as 
casuistry- and specification-type manifestations, which can support decision makers 
in the application of guiding principles. This proposition is laid out in the image 
below.
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The image above demonstrates the move from an abstract overarching principle 
towards specified norms in the form of best-practice which may support decision 
makers towards identifying potential iterations of what to. This move from an initial 
principle towards a modified norm principle and down even further towards best 
practice resonates with the ‘progressive specification’ advanced by Beauchamp and 
Childress as well as the use of analogy proposed by casuists, but does not necessarily 
lead the decision maker to a specific prescription of what to do per se. Rather, it 
embraces the room for discretion which decision makers must navigate through by 
providing decision makers with guides i.e. best practice examples of how the 
principles can be enacted. 
It is acknowledged that explicit reference to rules is notably missing from the image 
above, this is because this discussion is predominantly concerned with principles and 
best practice. Nonetheless, something can be said with regard to rules and the 
conceptual tree-metaphor here. Best practice instantiations can be located in between 
principles and rules. Best practices are not quite specific prescriptions of what to do 
for the exact circumstances which the decision maker is faced with i.e. best practice 
instantiations do not provide the decision maker with a determination of how to 
resolve the difficult decision they are taking (as would typically be the case with a 
rule). Rather, best practices furnish the decision maker with demonstrations of how 
more specific prescriptions might be extracted from the principle in other, similar 
contexts, but not necessarily the exact context in which the decision is being taken. 
Further, best practice instantiations still require more work on the part of the decision 
maker in terms of drawing analogy with the example offered and the specific 
decision-making context demanding resolution.  
To return to the discussion at hand, casuistry relies upon the decision maker having 
experience of the decision-making context in order to identify a paradigm case from 
which to draw an analogy to the problem case. Best practice examples when already 




experience because paradigm cases are already available to the decision maker in the 
form of best practice instantiations. 
An obvious challenge associated with specification and casuistry is that they both 
require some pre-acquired skill or training in order to understand how to employ the 
methodologies. For example, it is unlikely that a decision maker within the data 
sharing context will be trained in either specification or casuistry. On the evidence of 
bioethical literatures which argue in favour of both methodologies, it is also clear that 
the example cases offered are often unsatisfactory. 
For example, cases which are discussed, especially within literatures tackling 
casuistry, are very detailed and often relate to the clinical setting. Whilst it has already 
been established that the data sharing context gives rise to difficult decisions, it is 
questionable whether the level of detail which decision makers will have corresponds 
to the types of case which casuists seek to resolve. 
All of these discussions may be interpreted as undermining what I am proposing 
here. If there are so many problems associated with specification and casuistry, then 
why bother to argue in favour of them? I am not claiming that best practice examples 
should be perceived as prima facie manifestations of casuistry but rather that the crux 
or central feature of casuistry – the use of analogy and paradigm cases - can be 
adopted alongside specification in the form of best practice.  
Indeed, if we consider the principle-rule continuum and the idea of movement from 
broad to specific, the casuist approach to decision-making works in an opposite 
direction from specification. Rather than adopting an abstract norm (principle) as a 
starting point (as with specification), casuistry (as Jonsen and Toulmin describe it) 
relies upon inductive reasoning from the specific details of the case, making reference 
to analogous cases and subsequently leading to the identification of broader 
principles, rules or maxims. Thus the move here is away from the specific towards 




A best practice instantiation as conceptualised here, can be described as an example 
of determination of ‘what to do’ when a particular principle is engaged. Thus, it is a 
modified norm stemming from an initial norm but with contextual content. In 
casuistic language, best practice is a form of ‘taxonomy’ and a bridging principle.  
As laid out previously in chapter three, ‘taxonomy’ relates to the categorisations of 
cases under a specific ‘type’, for example, those involving euthanasia.  Once the 
morphology of a case (i.e. its circumstances) is set out, it is argued that the decision 
maker can allocate the case under a specific taxonomy or type. The decision maker 
starts with a ‘paradigm case’ where ‘the circumstances were clear, the relevant maxim 
unambiguous and the rebuttals weak, in the mind of almost any observer’.620  
Richardson has acknowledged the transition from an overarching norm towards a 
‘bridging principle’ as follows:  
the notion of specification provides a clear sense to the notion of a 
"mid-level bridging principle" which might otherwise be lacking. 
There is no trouble with "mid-level," understood loosely in terms of 
a rough sense of degrees of generality: the difficulty is in explaining 
the "bridging" relation. A mid-level norm that specifies a general 
one and thereby helps mediate the latter to a concrete case serves 
as a bridge in a quite definite sense one across which, as I have just 
claimed, the discussant's or deliberator's commitment will likely 
travel. A series of progressively more specific norms would provide 
a bridge with multiple spans.621 
This thesis builds on and modifies Richardson’s conceptualisation of a ‘bridging 
principle’ by adding a contextual and thus practical exemplary element to the 
specification via best practice. The notion of a mid-level link between the abstract and 
the more prescriptive is retained, but in addition to mid-level principles, best 
practices as instantiations of principles (but not necessarily principles in themselves) 
should be conceptualised as a tool to bolster and guide the specification processes 
                                                      
620 Ibid., p. 301.  




where the provision of best practice is possible. In this light, best practice instances 
are seen as indicators of how to operationalise principles. 
Best practice examples offer the decision maker a concrete example of one way of 
specifying a norm which the decision maker can use as an analogy, in order to guide 
the way in which they specify the norm. This builds upon both the advantages of 
drawing upon experience, of taking real life examples (casuistry) and analogy whilst 
at the same time maintaining the commitment to the original norm but without 
removing from the decision maker the necessary flexibility (that typically comes with 
principles) to tailor the norm to the particulars of the case at hand. 
An additional benefit of instantiations of best practice is that they provide the decision 
maker with examples of how the principle can be interpreted. This is in contrast to 
reliance upon only principles on their own, which are criticised for their vulnerability 
in being open to too much interpretation. It is recalled, for example, that creative 
compliance can be a real challenge not only for principle-based but also for rule-based 
approaches to regulation. In a culture of creative compliance, decision makers 
purposefully interpret rules and principles in such a way that they do not breach a 
rule per se, but rather, interpretations, and the specifications to which they give rise, 
undermine or run contrary to the underlying objectives or ‘spirit’ of the rule or 
principle.622  Providing the decision maker with one or several instantiations of best 
practice, of how a principle ought to be enacted has the added benefit of guiding the 
decision maker away from creative compliance, or at the very least, it is posited, that 
this should make it more difficult for the decision maker to justify any creative 
compliance.  
All of the desirable attributes of principles are retained (flexibility, retention of the 
spirit/objective of the norm) whilst at the same time, the vulnerabilities of principles 
(abstractness, indeterminacy) are curtailed. Likewise, some of the attributes of rules 
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are manifested in best practice (prescription, specificity) but void of the negative 
aspects of rules (rigidity, over-prescriptiveness).  
Instances of best practice may represent a decision-making aid which is neither a 
principle nor a rule, but nonetheless which sits between principles and rules on the 
continuum, and which can assist decision makers. The value of best practice lies in 
the fact that such instantiations avoid the pitfalls of abstract principle-like norms and 
the dangers of prescriptive rule-like norms, which, ‘If they are too prescriptive they 
may proscribe solutions that can optimise ethical data use according to legitimate and 
possibly diverse values’.623   
Whilst the value of best practice has been laid out above (and the practical value will 
be demonstrated in more detail in the following chapter), an obvious challenge to 
such an approach demands immediate attention: conflicting specifications (and thus 
best practice instantiations) can arise through the application of principles and it is 
not clear which specification (which best practice) should be prioritised.  
For example, respect for the principle of autonomy may imply both: 
respect for autonomy through requiring consent; and 
respect for autonomy by providing an opt-out option. 
 
Indeed, this objection relates the application of principles more generally. Balancing 
is often invoked in order to resolve such conflict and the next section considers 
whether balancing should also be included as a necessary feature of decision-making 
with best practice or if specification, as Richardson suggests, is a superior method for 
resolving conflict. 
                                                      




5.5.2 Balancing  
How does the decision maker determine which principle (or in this case, which best 
practice) should prevail? In the context of Principlism, Beauchamp and Childress 
argue that balancing should be employed. First, an overview of the process of 
balancing is offered alongside key criticisms. Next and most importantly, the 
question of whether specification may be better suited to resolving conflict than 
balancing (or vice versa) is addressed. This leads on to the final section which 
considers whether a role remains for balancing nonetheless, and if so, what this role 
might be. 
5.5.2.1 What is balancing, how is it done and what are the problems associated with 
it? 
According to Beauchamp and Childress, ‘balancing is the process of finding reasons 
to support beliefs about which moral norms should prevail’.624 Unfortunately, the 
authors fail to do more than to merely allude to how this balancing exercise is 
achieved, as pointed out by Gillon, notwithstanding his enduring advocacy for 
Principlism.625 It is recalled from chapter two, that Alexy has described the balancing 
process as follows: 
The first stage is a matter of establishing the degree of non- 
satisfaction of, or detriment to, the first principle. This is followed 
by a second stage, in which the importance of satisfying the 
competing principle is established. Finally, the third stage answers 
the question of whether or not the importance of satisfying the 
competing principle justifies the detriment to, or non-satisfaction 
of, the first.626  
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An alternative more concise iteration, which Alexy refers to the ‘Law of Balancing’ is 
explained as ‘the greater the degree of non-satisfaction of, or detriment to, one right 
or principle, the greater must be the importance of satisfying the other’.627 
Beauchamp and Childress describe the process of balancing as follows: 
• It is ‘concerned with the relative weights and strengths of different moral 
norms’ 
• It ‘consists of deliberation and judgement about these weights and 
strengths’.628 
But, as considered in chapters two and three, balancing is notoriously criticised 
within the bioethics and legal theory literature due to the lack of satisfactory 
explanation on how it should be carried out.  It is also vulnerable to accusations of 
subjectivity, and being a value-laden process. It was considered in chapter two that 
this has resulted in a caricature of balancing as an irrational process629,630,631 and much 
of the criticism around balancing takes place in the context of Constitutional Law. 
What is of relevance to the bioethics context is that particular objections are made 
against the idea of assigning weights to principles632 which is equally relevant to 
discussions here on how to determine which best practice to prioritise.  
5.5.2.2 Assigning weights 
Building on Ross’s proposition for balancing principles,633 Beauchamp and Childress 
suggest that in order to determine which principle should be prioritised, each 
relevant principle must be assigned a weight.  It is acknowledged that the weight that 
any given principle will be attributed will vary, depending upon the particulars of 
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the context of making particular difficult decisions, in other words, weights are 
‘relative’.634  
Consider for example the difficult decisions which are raised in the context of data 
reuse for health research. As will be discussed further in chapter six, the paradigm 
balancing exercise sought in the context of SHIP (the Scottish Health Informatics 
Programme) concerns the tensions between respect for privacy and the interests (both 
public and private) in scientifically sound, ethically and legally robust health 
research. Put in the language of Principlism, the balance sought is one between 
respecting autonomy, nonmaleficence and beneficence.  
In the SHIP context, the weight assigned to the principle of autonomy will relate to 
issues around consent for reuse of data. Nonmaleficence is engaged due to the 
potential privacy risks involved with using the data for research purposes – risks of 
re-identification of the data subject for example. Related to the principle of 
beneficence, are questions around the potential benefits which such research might 
provide for health and wellbeing.  
A related question emerges around how and why these specific parameters are 
chosen and attached to each of the principles, for example, why is consent viewed as 
a mechanism for the respect for autonomy?635 An obvious answer is that consent 
represents a mechanism for expressing self-determination, it is ‘the basic paradigm 
of the exercise of autonomy in health care and in research’636 stemming from the 
Nuremberg Code in response to appalling experimental research. At the same time, 
it has been established that consent may be neither necessary nor sufficient within the 
research setting.637 Substantial discourse exists around the various arguments 
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associated with reliance upon consent and these are beyond the scope of the present 
discussion. The important point to note here is that in the research setting, a variety 
of factors may influence the different mechanisms which are associated with a 
particular principle, these factors will include legislative and procedural demands 
but may also reflect wider socio-cultural associations. Further exploration of this 
point is beyond the purview of this discussion. 
To return to the issue of assigning weights, the respective weights which may be 
assigned to these principles will also depend upon the particular facts of the research 
study and the data which the researcher wishes to access. Ascribing weights will also 
be contingent upon who is doing the balancing. Indeed, a key objection against 
balancing as a decision-making activity is that it ‘creates the space for judicial 
subjectivism and decisionism’638 which supposedly lacks rationality. Where 
decisionism is invoked, this may signal hostility to the exercise of discretion. 
Relatedly, Veatch has problematized balancing as giving rise to intuitionism:  
It can be argued that a balancing theory is nothing more than an 
elaborate rationale for letting pre- conceived prejudices rise to the 
surface. One can always argue that one principle or another is more 
weighty. There seems to be no definitive way to reach closure. 
Thus, the approach fails to resolve conflicts, and it can justify any 
conceivable view.639  
 
Similarly, Harris comments that balancing ‘is almost an invitation to cynically shift 
priorities’.640 These criticisms suggest that balancing may be a means to arrive at an 
outcome that is convenient for the decision maker so to speak, but, this assumes that 
the decision maker is intent upon ‘fiddling’ and seeking to manipulate the 
prioritisation of principles. This would be carried out in order to suit the decision 
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maker’s own preferences rather than employing the methodology in order to 
genuinely arrive at a determination of what to do which has not been pre-meditated.  
As will be further discussed in chapter six, there was a dislike for discretion and a 
desire for prescriptive rules amongst decision makers within the SHIP context. 
However, suspicions about the motives of some decision makers should not be 
misdirected to undermine the methodology of balancing itself. Perhaps such concerns 
could be allayed by elements of the SHIP Good Governance Framework which 
incorporate training and best practice instantiations in order to guide the decision 
maker.  
It is recalled that Alexy has defended balancing by arguing that where a relation of 
precedence can be justified, then balancing of principles is actually rational.641   But 
this threshold of justifiability resonates with one of the core features already offered 
by the process of specification as laid out earlier in this chapter. 
Further, Beauchamp and Childress recognise problems with the commonly invoked      
‘metaphor of larger and smaller weights moving a scale up and down’.642 They 
suggest that this metaphor has the effect of obscuring what is actually taking place in 
the process of balancing. Like Alexy, they argue that ‘justified acts of balancing are 
supported by good reasons. They need not rest merely on intuition or feeling, 
although intuitive balancing is one form of balancing’.643 
Beauchamp and Childress propose six conditions which should constrain balancing 
and thus help to mitigate some of the concerns associated with balancing: 
1. Good reasons can be offered to act on the overriding norm rather 
than on the infringed norm; 
2. The moral objective justifying the infringement has a realistic 
prospect of achievement 
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3. No morally preferable alternative actions are available 
4. The lowest level of infringement has a realistic prospect of 
achievement 
5. All negative effects of the infringement have been minimized and 
6. All affected parties have been treated impartially.644 
 
It is suggested here that these constraints on balancing could equally apply to the 
resolution of conflict arising between best practice instantiations. Justifiability 
continues to appear as a core feature of acceptable use of principles to a variety of 
authors (both within bioethics645 and legal theory646 literatures). It appears that 
justifiability may be a necessary component to, or telos of exercising discretion and a 
means of mitigating concerns around subjectivism. Just as the exercise of discretion 
is an inevitable feature of dealing with difficult decisions, so too is the necessity of 
justifying the final decision.  
Furthermore, an additional observation is that in contrast with a key function of 
principles identified previously in this thesis viz the justificatory function, a different 
type of justification is at play when using principles.  As well as using principles as a 
means of justifying decisions about which course of action to take, a preceding step 
lies in actually having to justify the attribution of relevant weights (determination of a 
particular condition of preference) of the different principles at play.  
Richardson suggests that balancing, when considered as ‘a feature or implication of 
the content of a theory’s principles is either: (a) ‘piecemeal or contextual’ (dictated by 
the content of a principle and relatively unproblematic) or (b) ‘global or overall’ (as a 
mode of conflict resolution).647 This latter characterisation of balancing, where it is 
employed in order to resolve conflict between principles is problematic to Richardson 
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because global balancing is reliant upon an overall theory, which, as considered 
above, is supposedly lacking in the Principlist approach.  
Furthermore, he asserts that balancing assumes two facts which are not always the 
case: (1) that there is a ’priority rule’ which will determine which principle should 
reign supreme in the case of conflict, and (2) that intuitive balancing will support the 
decision around which principle should be prioritised.648  
Within legal theory literatures, this balancing activity of assigning weights is also 
referred to as the ‘determination of a conditional relation of precedence’649. In other 
words, the principles are ranked or prioritised where different principles are granted 
precedence (assigned greater weights than others); any conflict between principles 
demands that the relevant principles be placed within a hierarchy.  
Strong has critiqued specified principlism because it fails to provide examples of the 
method which actually lead to resolution when conflicts arise between different 
specifications of principles.650 He suggests that the reliance on coherence (reflective 
equilibrium) is not achievable and that casuistry provides a more satisfactory 
approach to case resolution by identifying morally relevant features (‘casuistic 
factors’)651 which are similarities and differences between the paradigm case and the 
case at hand. 
The strength of the conclusions depends on the plausibility of the 
comparisons with the paradigm cases. In casuistic argumentation, 
there is room for disagreement concerning a number of matters, 
such as whether a case is more similar to one paradigm or another, 
and whether the morally relevant factors are present in a case to 
sufficient degree to warrant a given conclusion. Furthermore, 
casuistry does not claim to be able to resolve all cases (Strong, 1988). 
When disagreements of the kinds mentioned above cannot be 
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resolved, it might sometimes be appropriate to conclude that 
several alternative courses of action are permissible, or that 
casuistry simply does not provide an answer in that case.652 
 
Strong acknowledges the potential to characterise his approach as specified 
Principlism but rejects this on the grounds that specification uses principles to apply 
them to a case whereas casuistry when using principles, relies upon them for a 
paradigm case.653 This does not seem like a robust defence to me. In any case, even 
within discussions around methodology, it appears that authors are intent upon 
differentiating their approaches from others rather than focussing on the utility of 
their process or the end result.  
An element of Strong’s approach which is helpful, is the emphasis which it places on 
the value which casuistry can bring. As has been suggested here, I am proposing that 
best practice instantiations can make the most of both specification and casuistry in 
terms of supporting the decision maker. But, this still does not answer an important 
question around how we are to resolve conflict between different competing 
principles or best practice instantiations. This is considered in the following section.  
5.6 Specification, balancing and casuistry: displacement or 
complementarity?  
The previous section considered the role of balancing as a means of resolving conflict 
between principles (and specifications/best practice instantiations). The considerable 
challenges with balancing were also considered. This section moves on to explore 
whether specification can play a role in resolving conflict.  
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Richardson suggests that the process of specification should be a first step towards 
resolution. He describes balancing as a method which specification can both 
complement and surpass in terms of value to the decision maker:  
The model of specification concurs with the balancing approaches 
in seeing a need to qualify our commitments, but insists that this be 
done not by a quantitative weighting or discounting but instead by 
qualitatively tailoring our norms to cases. Thus, one is urged not 
merely to reflect and change one's mind in a way that resolves a 
conflict in an acceptable way, but to revise one's normative 
commitments so as to make at least one of them more specific.654 
 
Thus, the emphasis in the distinction between balancing and specification for 
Richardson lies in tailoring norms rather than merely balancing different weights. For 
Beauchamp and Childress, the distinction between the two methods lies in scope. 
Balancing relates to first assigning weights to principles, a method best suited ‘for 
reaching judgements in particular cases’. Specification, in contrast, is concerned with 
the scope of principles, more suited to ‘developing more specific policies from already 
accepted general norms’. 655  
This distinction which Beauchamp and Childress make between suitability for 
‘particular cases’ (via balancing) and ‘specific policies’ (via specification) is somewhat 
confusing as they go on to consider balancing as ‘merged’ with specification 
(considered further below). In any case, it should be borne in mind that this 
attribution of methodology is not categorical but rather, preferential.  
Let us return to the topic at hand viz the role of specification in resolving conflict 
between principles. Departing from Beauchamp and Childress, Richardson states 
that an overarching moral theory will be beneficial to decision makers when 
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addressing conflict through specification;656 alongside other authors, he refers to 
Principlism as a theory.  
Related to the idea that there is a need for an overarching moral theory, Veatch argues 
that specification only works when you have a rank-order. 657 Richardson rejects this 
because some specification can be very context-specific and will not be concerned 
with ranking. 658 Indeed, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics (‘the Council’) frequently 
employs principle-based recommendations on how to approach different bioethical 
issues arising from biomedical developments. It appears that the Council uses 
principles in order to remind readers and decision makers of the variety of pertinent 
issues which must be considered on a given topic.659  
For example, in its recent report on ethical issues around health data in research,660 
the Council explicitly lays out four guiding principles.661 These principles are offered 
as guides to the development of ethical approaches for the design and governance of 
data initiatives.662 
To sidestep the pitfalls of engaging with further discussion on ‘theory’ or the goals of 
bioethics, let us assume the non-necessity of an overarching/underpinning theory in 
order for principles to operate in a valuable action-orienting way.  Even beyond issues 
of theory, Richardson raises an important question when comparing balancing and 
specification: 
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Given that one has a reason for resolving a conflict one way rather 
than another, what compelling reason might one have for refusing 
to incorporate that reason into a further specification of one or the 
other of the competing principles?663 
 
In order to highlight the superiority of specification, Richardson offers a comparison 
between the two methodologies through the example of ‘how to treat research that is 
both carried out on and intended to benefit children’, given that children cannot 
meaningfully offer consent. In this predicament, he identifies conflict between the 
principles of autonomy and beneficence. He states that we must start out with a 
principle which unites the principles i.e. ‘[i]t is impermissible to engage in research 
on human subjects unless the principles of autonomy, beneficence, and justice are 
adequately satisfied.’664 He offers two specifications on ‘adequate satisfaction which 
‘recast’ the debate: 
The less restrictive specification is: “It is impermissible to engage in 
research on human subjects unless the principles of autonomy, 
beneficence, and justice are satisfied on balance.” The more restrictive 
specification is the following: “It is impermissible to engage in 
research on human subjects unless we do so in a way that respects 
their autonomy, proceeds justly, does no (intentional?) harm, and 
produces (significant) benefits.” Call this “the restrictive research-
limiting principle.” 665 
 
Even here, different interpretations can be taken and at this point Richardson refers 
to the National Commission approach which offered a tentative compromise between 
the competing principles:  ‘It is impermissible to engage in research posing more than 
a minor increase over minimal risks to human subjects who are children, unless...’666  
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Richardson acknowledges that indeterminacy and conflict may still remain, but 
‘being discursively explicit… specifications can be defended on the basis of reflective 
equilibrium: by making arguments that show how they may be supported by their fit 
with what we continue to believe on due reflection.’667  
Meslin et al.,668  have built upon Richardson’s emphasis on the discursive process 
whilst simultaneously arguing in favour of specified Principlism and sensitivity to 
context:  
principles may be seen to be internally consistent insofar as they 
facilitate this dialectical process and avoid the dead-end conflicts 
that can occur when principlism is understood simply as an 
inflexible deductive framework..669 
 
In contrast, whereas I had previously considered the role of context as one which is 
supplementary to the application of principles i.e. we should apply principles and 
have regard to the contextual dimensions, this latter suggestion implies that the 
application of principles can be a way of giving due regard to context. My thesis 
builds upon this approach even further by exploring the extent to which best-practice 
instantiations can play a similar role in decision-making. 
We can turn once more to SHIP in order to explore this question more fully. A 
paradigm ‘difficult decision’ in the context of data reuse for health research  arises as 
a result of tensions between respecting autonomy (normally, in the context of data 
reuse, this implies obtaining consent where possible or practical) and beneficence 
(which typically relates to arguments that research has the potential to improve 
health and wellbeing). If we are to specify each of these principles, in line with the 
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typical connotations that they have in the data reuse context, we are left with the 
following: 
Respect the autonomy of data subjects, by obtaining consent where 
possible and practicable prior to the use and sharing of personal 
data for research purposes (autonomy) 
and 
Respect the principle of beneficence by facilitating access to health 
data for research purposes (beneficence). 
 
At this juncture, specification does not adequately provide us with action-guiding 
content in order to balance the competing norms and thus resolve the dilemma; 
further specification is required. Beauchamp and Childress refer to this process of 
continuing specification as ‘progressive specification’ and maintain that it can 
continue ‘indefinitely’670. 
How does this apply to our example of data reuse? What would ‘progressive’ 
specification, alongside ‘qualitatively tailoring’ respect for and balancing of the 
principles of autonomy and beneficence look like in the particular case at hand? 
Respect the principles of autonomy and beneficence by obtaining 
consent where possible and practicable prior to the use and sharing 
of personal data for research purposes when such research is in the 
public interest. Where research is in the public interest and it is not 
practicable or possible to obtain consent, authorisation of use of 
personal data should be obtained from relevant authorisation 
bodies.  
 
This suggests a combination of both balancing and specification in order to resolve 
conflict. Beauchamp and Childress have acknowledged that the convergence of 
specification and balancing may be necessary in some (but not all) cases.  Although 
the example offered above may guide the decision maker, through specification, from 
                                                      




abstract principles to more prescriptive iterations of what to do, the risk still remains 
that the principles may be specified in alternative ways which do not provide 
satisfactory answers on what one ought to do. What one ‘ought’ to do, will be 
dependent upon the objectives or the values which underpin and are contained 
within a principle. For example, an alternative specification of the above principles 
could be: 
Respect the autonomy of data subjects, by providing an opt-out 
where possible and practicable when their data are used and shared 
for research purposes in the public interest. 
 
Something is missing in terms of guiding the decision maker towards understanding 
the kinds of manifestations or interpretations of the principle which their 
specification should work towards. To continue with the tree metaphor adopted in 
this thesis, something is needed in order to be able to identify the right kinds of leaves 
that one should be looking for. For the reasons which I have laid out earlier in this 
chapter, best practice instantiations can perform this important role. In order to do 
so, I have suggested that casuistry can play a helpful role in the identification of best 
practice instantiations which reflect paradigm cases where the principles at stake 
must be specified and conflict between them must be resolved.  
It is worth reiterating that it has not been suggested that such an approach will lead 
the decision maker all the way towards determining exactly what to do. Indeed, as 
reflected in Figure 1 offered above, in any given context more than one possible best 
practice instantiation may stem from each principle. What the approach does do, is 
to render the principle less indeterminate and narrower in scope. It goes one step 
further than specification by supplying the decision maker - through instantiations of 
best practice – with concrete examples of the principle ‘in application’. Thus, the 
decision maker is not left unsupported in spanning across the broad limbs of the tree, 




the decision maker with a sense of what the ‘leaf’ (determination of what to do) that 
they are seeking ‘looks like’.  
5.7 Additional challenges 
Despite the clear benefits of best practice instantiations as outlined above, some key 
challenges remain in the implementation of such an approach. These challenges are 
considered in turn below. 
5.7.1 The question of how we determine what best practice is? 
An important question which arises is ‘how to determine what constitutes best 
practice in any situation?’ Answering such a question meaningfully requires an 
extended exploration which is beyond the purview of this thesis. This thesis seeks to 
take a first step in highlighting the important role which best practice can play in 
supporting decision makers and proposing its conceptualisation as a form of 
specification which draws upon analogy. In depth analysis of best practice 
identification is perhaps a next step after the thesis.  
This being said, some helpful suggestions can still be made on this point. In the SHIP 
context, a dedicated working group was established in order to draft the guiding 
principles and best practice. Members included individuals experienced in dealing 
with difficult decisions in the practical context of data sharing. We developed best 
practice examples which reflected ‘common’ tensions between principles which arose 
in day to day data use. 
Looking to other approaches beyond SHIP, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics 
identified best practice models in their report on data sharing (including explicit 
praise of the SHIP approach).671 An important lesson from SHIP, which should be 
transplanted to any setting, is that best practice examples (and guiding principles) 
                                                      




should be drafted through an iterative and inclusive process which involves 
meaningful engagement with a variety of stakeholders. Often, guidance (including 
principles) will be open to consultation prior to finalisation and adoption. 
5.7.2 Where no established best practice exists 
Another potential challenge to best practice is that there may be situations where pre-
existing best practice examples do not exist. Indeed, the rapid pace at which 
technology develops renders bioethics particularly vulnerable to such instances and 
it is recalled from previous discussions that this is a particular challenge for legal 
rules.672,673 At the same time, it has been argued that principles may be better suited 
to dealing with situations where no clear rules are available which address a 
particular technology and associated dilemma.674 Schauer has acknowledged in the 
legal theory setting that analogy by legal reasoning is incremental in nature.675  
5.7.3 Resolution is not always provided 
It is important to appreciate that none of the methods considered above claim to offer 
resolution between conflicting principles, or prescriptions about what to do, in every 
difficult decision. Proponents of each of the methodologies openly acknowledge that 
indeterminacy may remain and conflict may endure. This is an important point. The 
emphasis is on justifiable decisions rather than unequivocal determinations on what 
to do. 
 I suggest that whilst we cannot completely ensure a homogenous, universally 
accepted in-depth conceptualisation of any one principle, through considering the 
process of specification, we can explore whether there is a way to further unpack what 
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we mean by referring to a certain principle not generally, but within a particular 
context i.e. when faced with a particular ethical dilemma. 
This is a necessary product of any norm that stops short of a rule, different options 
will emerge around what to do and discretion must be exercised in making the choice 
of which metaphorical leaf to pick. Just as principles are inappropriately critiqued for 
failing to tell decision makers exactly what to do, there is a risk that these misplaced 
expectations will also be imposed on best practice. The point of best-practice is to 
offer the decision maker examples. Even precise, specific rules give rise to varying 
interpretations (as demonstrated by the divergent interpretations of the European 
Data Protection Directive). Nonetheless, best practice still takes us closer towards 
determining what to do than a more abstract principle on its own. 
5.8 Summary and Implications for the conceptual tree metaphor 
This final section lays out the key findings which have emerged from this analysis 
and considers the implications which these findings have for the conceptual tree 
metaphor. 
5.8.1 What are the implications of specification for the conceptual tree 
metaphor? 
This chapter began with a background overview of Principlism. Consideration was 
provided on criticisms which could also be extended to principle-centric approaches 
more generally, leading to a focussed discussion on specification which has been 
advanced as a means to counter one of the biggest weakness of principle-based 
approaches i.e. lack of determinacy. 
Core features of specification were identified. The discussion built upon Richardson’s 
suggestion that specification creates a mid-level bridging norm. It was suggested that 




progressed in this thesis, the new norms generated through the process of 
specification are less abstract than initial principle-like norms and less prescriptive 
than rigid rule-like norms.  
It was argued that whilst principles, when bolstered by specification, can provide 
help to decision makers, these on their own may still not offer adequate support for 
decision makers during their exercise of discretion in determining what to do. This 
resonates with the findings in the following chapter, where a rule-centric decision-
making approach was also unsatisfactory on its own.  
5.8.2 What are the implications of best practice instantiations for the conceptual 
tree metaphor? 
Next, it was suggested that the inclusion of best practice instantiations (also 
conceptualised as mid-level norms) alongside principles could help to support 
decision makers in determining what to do. Best practice instantiations were 
considered as a tool which can draw upon the strengths of both specification and 
casuistry. The latter approach relies upon paradigm cases and analogy.  
Best practice instantiations represent more substantive examples of how principles 
are specified in particular contexts without the need to render them so specific that 
they lose their ‘principle-likeness’ and become rules. Within this chapter, the 
examination of best practice has been explored with concentrated reference to 
specification and to casuistry. The practical value of instances of best practice will be 
demonstrated next in chapter six, in the context of the SHIP case study.  
When drafting best practice guidance to support guiding principles, it is suggested 
that elements of casuistry (in offering real paradigm examples) can assist decision 
makers in the application of principles to similar but not identical contexts.  
It was acknowledged that this reliance upon best practice is not unproblematic. 
Challenges arise out of determining what constitutes best practice and there may be 




challenges, it is maintained that regulatory spaces which are already occupied with 
rules and principles could be greatly bolstered by the provision of co-produced best 
practice guidance. Such a process should include stakeholders including regulators, 
decision makers and publics and SHIP, explored in the next chapter took precisely 
this inclusive and iterative approach.   
5.8.3 What are the implications of conflict for the conceptual tree metaphor? 
A further contribution of this chapter lies in marking out the parameters beyond 
which the abilities of specification, instantiations of best practice, rules and principles 
to help the decision maker are limited. Just as the limbs of a tree fork into branches, 
which in turn fork into numerous twigs, principles and rules are open to 
interpretation (and can be enacted in different ways), so too, the methodology of 
specification, and the use of best practice examples, offer but one example of an 
enactment of a principle.  
Balancing has often been invoked in order to counter the conflicts that can arise 
between different principles and the methodology was considered as a potential 
means to address conflicts which might arise between different best practices. 
Unfortunately, many difficulties lie with balancing and ultimately, in keeping with 
Richardson’s argument (made with reference to principles), specification may be a 
better device through which to attempt to reconcile conflict between best practice 
instantiations. 
At the same time, it was acknowledged that no methodology can completely 
eradicate conflict or indeed render either principles or best practice so determinate as 
to give us specific answers about what to do. In continuing with the tree metaphor, 
best practice instantiations are akin to bunches of leaves. They remain useful guides 
to the decision maker for moving from the broad limbs to the specific branches and 




quite take the decision maker to the precise leaf, but they can furnish us with a sense 
of what the leaves might look like or resemble. 
5.8.4 What are the implications of the limitations of specification, balancing, 
casuistry and best practice for the conceptual tree metaphor? 
Earlier in the thesis, it was posited that something ‘beyond’ rules and principles was 
necessary in order to aid decision makers in resolving difficult decisions. The 
literature findings suggest that specification, balancing, casuistry and best practice 
may provide this additional support when applied to principles. This chapter has 
demonstrated in theoretical terms that best practice instantiations (via specification 
and the use of casuistry) can offer real value beyond rules and principles. 
At the same time, it has been suggested that these additional guides can only take the 
decision maker so far.  
It has been openly acknowledged that limitations of best practice instantiations exist. 
In particular, challenges arise where no pre-existing best practice has been established 
or where resolution in determining what to do is not achieved despite the provision 
of best practice instantiations. Once more, precise determination is not the telos of the 
application of best practice instantiations. They are designed to guide decision 
makers towards the type of leaf (determination) that they should work towards. Such 
an approach does not, cannot and should not obviate the exercise of discretion.  
To conclude, this chapter has used the dominant model of Principlism as an analytical 
platform through which to examine principle-centric approaches to decision-making. 
A particular  focus was placed on the use of best practice instantiations for extracting 
action-guiding content from principles.  
The next chapter shifts the focus towards a more practical exploration of the 
implications which a rule-centric approach to decision-making can have.  Relatedly, 




decision-making in addition to the real world practical value of including best 





Chapter Six: Practical Case Study - the Scottish Health 
Informatics Programme (SHIP) 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter is centred around a case study on the Scottish Health Informatics 
Programme (SHIP). It begins with a brief explanation of the rationale behind 
adopting SHIP as a case study. The methodology is laid out and anticipated 
challenges of the approach are also considered.  The second section offers background 
information on the Scottish Health Informatics Programme, outlining the context 
within which the project took place and the goals to which actors involved in the 
collaboration aspired. Finally, the discussion considers each element of the tree 
metaphor in turn, as it relates to findings from the SHIP experience. The Good 
Governance Framework which was developed in response to identified challenges to 
data reuse in health research is laid out. It is considered in the context of the tree 
metaphor with a view to testing the current claims made within the metaphor as well 
as further refining and developing the metaphor by incorporating the insights gained 
from the case study.  
As a reminder to the reader, the current conceptualisation of the tree metaphor (which 
stands to be further developed in this chapter) is briefly summarised below.  
6.1.1 From trunk to branch to twig: from the broad to the specific 
The trunk of a tree forks into branches which, in turn, fork into twigs and these in 
turn nourish leaves that represent new life. With each fork, the branches and twigs 
become progressively narrower. An analogy can be drawn with this progressive 
narrowing characteristic and the principle-rule continuum which is being developed 
here. On one end, we have the trunk (broad, abstract principle- like norm) which 
progressively narrows (becoming more specific and prescriptive – more rule-like) 




the broad to the specific also accounts for the forks, i.e. different interpretations which 
can be taken from each rule and principle.  
6.1.2 The space that runs across the entirety of the tree 
The space spanning the trunk, branches, twigs and leaves is also analogous to the 
interrelationships that might exist between rules and principles. It represents the 
space where the shared ‘family resemblances’ between both norms appear and a mid-
level bridging-norm such as best practice sits. Best practice instantiations represent 
more substantive examples of how principles are specified in particular contexts 
without the need to render them so specific that they lose their ‘principle-likeness’ 
and become rules. 
On another level, this space running across the tree also represents the discretionary 
space which decision makers must self-navigate in order to determine what to do, in 
order to first locate a bunch of leaves and then decide which particular leaf (action) 
to pick.  
Specification has been advanced as a methodology which can help the decision maker 
to garner action-guiding content from a principle. Through the process of 
specification and casuistry, best practice instantiations are generated and these are 
akin to bunches of leaves in the tree metaphor. They remain useful guides to the 
decision maker for moving from the broad limbs to the specific branches and closer 
to the individual leaf (or ‘determination of what to do’). Best practices do not quite 
take the decision maker to the precise leaf, but they can furnish us with a sense of 
what the leaves might look like or resemble. 
6.1.3 The tree as a living organism 
A tree in its entirety can be conceptualised as the decision-making process as well as 
the environment within which a decision must be taken. The tree is a living organism 




and leaves (decisions on what to do). Nevertheless, the tree also comprises of roots, it 
is unable to survive without nutrients and a healthy root structure to deliver these 
nutrients to the rest of the tree. Repeatedly, throughout the discussions thus far, 
reference has been made to the possibility that neither rules nor principles, neither 
alone nor when used together, suffice for decision makers and something additional 
may be needed to ensure that the tree can remain healthy and ‘flourish’.  
6.1.4 The tree is comprised of different parts 
The anatomy and surroundings of a tree is comprised of different components for 
example, leaves, roots, soil, and bark. These all serve different functions within the 
tree. 
6.1.5 Further development of the tree metaphor 
It will become apparent that the tree metaphor has much to offer at a practical level. 
It enriches our understandings of the various functions of rules and principles in 
decision-making, akin to the varying features which a tree possesses. This chapter 
further explores the distinct yet connected functions which best practice 
instantiations can play in the decision-making endeavour.  It also highlights and 
fleshes out the interrelationship between and complementarity of rules and 
principles, akin to the connected but distinct space spanning across the length of a 
tree. Further, the metaphor simultaneously acknowledges the significance of 
additional decision-making tools and considerations, which speaks to the 
surrounding environment of the tree and the importance of healthy root structures. 
We will see in the context of SHIP, that the prevailing culture around data-sharing 
played a significant role in influencing practice, as well as the benefits of additional 
tools like appropriate training and proportionate risk assessments. The discussion 
will also offer a platform for comparison with the theoretical analysis on principle-




Finally, it should be noted that this case study is not only a case study on law, but 
rather, it is an inclusive case study that amply demonstrates how rules and principles 
play out. Further, it demonstrates how approaches to decision-making can be skewed 
toward one approach or the other i.e. principle-centric or rule-centric approaches.  
6.2 Methodology: choice of case study and approach 
This first section lays out the rationale behind choosing SHIP as a case study. Next, 
the methodology and its suitability to this thesis are considered. Finally, potential 
challenges associated with the elected methodology, and the ways in which these 
challenges will be addressed are considered. 
6.2.1 Why use SHIP as a case study? 
The SHIP case study has been purposefully or ‘analytically’ selected. This implies that 
it is ‘information-rich, critical, revelatory, unique’.676 In contrast with intrinsic case 
studies,677 purposefully selected case studies imply that there is an intention to 
generalise the findings, this corresponds to the objective here.678  
SHIP represents a useful case study for several reasons. First and foremost, it offers a 
real-life example of a health research setting where difficult decisions had to be taken 
around ‘what to do’. Second, the regulatory landscape was predominantly rule-
centric; this offers the opportunity to gain insights into the implications of relying 
upon rule-based approaches to decision-making. Third, as it transpires, principle-
based approaches were incorporated in the project and thus the case study also offers 
the opportunity to consider the complementarity of rules and principles whilst 
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Accessed 8 Oct 2014: http://www.psyking.net/htmlobj-3839/case_study_methodology-
_rolf_johansson_ver_2.pdf.  
677 ‘In such a case the researcher has no interest in generalising his or her findings. The 





simultaneously highlighting the need for additional decision-making 
tools/considerations.  
Further, my experience as a researcher embedded within the project provides me 
with a unique and information-rich insight into the project background, 
methodologies, processes, developments and findings. My role as a core member of 
the SHIP Information Governance Workstream enables me to offer a regulatory 
analysis of the project. This is of primary relevance to the discussion taking place 
within this thesis in terms of health research regulation. Given this unique position 
of involvement and perspective of analysis, SHIP provides a very appropriate case 
study. In the next section we will consider why my elected approach is particularly 
befitting of this exercise. 
6.2.2 Methodology and challenges 
It should be noted from the outset that the approach employed here is inspired by the 
methodology of analytic autoethnography but I am not claiming that the approach 
constitutes a robust analytic autoethnography per se, A robust analytic 
autoethnography would require a substantial amount of expanded, reflexive text on 
my personal experience, which is not necessary for the purposes of this thesis. Thus, 
whilst I do draw upon my personal experiences in the context of SHIP, I am doing so 
only as far as is necessary and pertinent to the discussion and work that this thesis is 
doing.  I have nonetheless chosen to conduct the case study in a similar fashion to 
how autoethnographies are carried out. This is because such an approach offers a 
helpful way of carrying out the case study and of framing of the discussion. Thus, it 




Autoethnography is a methodological approach which ‘involves self-observation and 
reflexive investigation in the context of ethnographic field work and writing’.679,680 A 
variety of different autoethnographical approaches exist including indigenous/native 
ethnographies, layered accounts, narrative and reflexive autoethnographies.681,682  
For the purposes of this case study, I will be employing an approach inspired by 
analytic autoethnography which is often differentiated from evocative 
autoethnography thusly:683  
Analytic autoethnographers focus on developing theoretical 
explanations of broader social phenomena, whereas evocative 
autoethnographers focus on narrative presentations that open up 
conversations and evoke emotional responses.684 
 
Examples of evocative autoethnographies include reflections on: growing up with a 
disabled mother,685 the experience of ill mental health686 and poor physical health687 
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685 Ronai, C., “My Mother is Mentally Retarded”, Ellis, C., and Bochner, A., (eds.), Composing 
Ethnography: Alternative Forms of Writing, (California: Altamira Press, 1996), pp. 109-131. 
686 Grant, A., “Testimony: God and Aeroplanes: My Experience of Breakdown and Recovery”, 
13 Journal of Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing (2006), pp. 456-457. 
687 Sparkes, A., “’The Fatal Flaw’: A Narrative of the Fragile Body-Self”, 2 Qualitative Inquiry 




and having an abortion.688 Examples of analytic autoethnographies also include 
health related challenges. For example, The Body Silent689 recounts the experiences of 
a professor with a spinal condition which eventually leads to paraplegia. Another 
example centres on the use of reflective analysis in mental health nursing.690 
It is acknowledged that the lines between both types of autoethnography may become 
blurred. For example, the SHIP case study and the thesis as a whole should ‘open up 
conversations’. But, it is not the aim of this chapter, or thesis, to evoke emotion in the 
ways that evocative autoethnographical methods endeavour to do. Rather, the goal 
here is to provide a scholarly discussion which has real practical insight and value 
within and beyond the context of data reuse in health research, and which moves 
current discussions forward.  
Autoethnographies are reflexive and analytic autoethnographies imply that: 
a researcher is personally engaged in a social group, setting or 
culture as a full member and active participant but retains a distinct 
and highly visible identity as a self-aware scholar and social actor 
within the ethnographic text.691 
 
More specifically, Anderson identifies the following five elements of analytic 
autoethnography: 
(1) complete member researcher (CMR) status; 
(2) analytic reflexivity; 
(3) narrative visibility of the researcher’s self; 
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(4) dialogue with informants beyond the self; and 
(5) commitment to theoretical analysis.692 
 
These five elements correspond succinctly with both (1) the role which I played 
within SHIP and (2) the goals of this thesis. The ways in which this case study 
corresponds to each of the five elements is briefly demonstrated below. 
6.2.2.1 Complete member researcher status 
Complete member research status implies that ‘the researcher is a complete member 
in the social world under study’.693 My position within SHIP, discussed in more detail 
in the following section, was that of a researcher charged with exploring and 
developing best practice in information governance relating to the reuse of health 
data for research purposes. As such, I was a key actor within the project. 
6.2.2.2 Analytic reflexivity 
According to Davies, analytic reflexivity implies researchers’ awareness of their 
necessary connection to the research situation and hence their effects upon it.’694 This 
awareness in the context of SHIP can be demonstrated by the fact that I was jointly 
responsible for identifying pre-existing challenges to data linkage and co-
constructing governance approaches which would modify and improve the status 
quo. At the same time, I co-authored academic papers which have reflectively 
recounted the process and theoretical reasoning behind the governance solutions 
developed.  
                                                      
692Anderson, L., “Analytic Autoethnography”, 35 Journal of Contemporary Ethnography (2006), 
pp. 373-395. Hereafter, ‘Anderson, (2006)’.   
693 Ibid., p. 379.  
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6.2.2.3 Narrative visibility of the researcher’s self  
Anderson explains: 
A central feature of autoethnography is that the researcher is a 
highly visible social actor within the written text. The researcher’s 
own feelings and experiences are incorporated into the story and 
considered as vital data for understanding the social world being 
observed.695 
 
Once more, it is noted that in addition to being embedded as a member of SHIP, my 
role was distinct and visible within the project. My contributions to the project came 
from the perspective of an academic lawyer. This is demonstrated by virtue of the 
academic papers which I generated, and the workshops, meetings and academic 
conferences which I attended, facilitated and participated in.  
6.2.2.4 Dialogue with informants beyond the self 
One of the pitfalls associated with autoethnography is that autoethnographers might 
‘lose sight of the ethnographic imperative that we are seeking to understand’.696 Thus, 
there is a need for the individual to engage in dialogue with “data” or “others”.697 As 
stated above, I attended numerous (operational and strategic) meetings and co-
convened workshops which sought to gather data, most often around attitudes 
towards data sharing and key challenges associated with conducting research. These 
activities will be considered in more detail later in the chapter where it is 
demonstrated that the development of governance solutions in SHIP was a very 
iterative process. This was reliant upon continual engagement with other project 
members and wider stakeholders. 
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6.2.2.5 Commitment to theoretical analysis 
At the core of the analytic approach, is the use of empirical data ‘to gain insight into 
some broader set of social phenomena than those provided by the data themselves’.698 
The analytic approach being employed here provides a platform from which 
theoretical explanations of the nature, utility and interrelationships of rules and 
principles are deduced. This is a much broader phenomenon than the development 
of information governance approaches solely within the SHIP experience.  
This section has identified the core elements of analytic autoethnography, and has 
demonstrated how my involvement within SHIP satisfies these criteria to a standard 
which justifies shaping the case study approach around the methodology, albeit with 
the caveat mentioned from the outset that I am not claiming to carry out an analytic 
autoethnography per se. Before commencing with the case study, it is necessary to 
consider the methodology and associated challenges that come with adopting such 
an approach. 
6.2.3 Conducting the analytic autoethnography and anticipating key challenges 
associated with the case study 
It has been claimed that when conducting autoethnography, there is no need for 
methodological rigidity699 because ‘one of the values of this (autoethnography) 
approach is its flexibility, you must be aware of possible dynamics and open to 
improvisation and changing strategies along the way to better match constraints and 
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needs of the project’.700 Thus, a variety of approaches to conducting 
autoethnography701,702 are evident as are the ‘product results’.703 
As such, electing for, let alone articulating any one ‘method’ with which to conduct 
the autoethnography is challenging and perhaps not necessary. Rather, it can be 
argued that adopting Anderson’s five elements of analytic autoethnography does in 
fact represent the methodological approach in itself. As such, I avail of the ‘creative 
latitude’ often associated with ethnography, and will consider how I have 
demonstrated each of the five elements of analytic autoethnography (with the caveat 
mentioned from the outset) at the end of this chapter. Next, I consider the challenges 
associated with analytic autoethnography and suggest how these will be addressed.  
6.2.4 Anticipated challenges 
Again, as I have stated from the outset, this case study is not an analytical 
autoethnography in the strict sense. Rather, I am adopting an approach inspired by 
analytic autoethnography as set out above. As such, it remains valuable and 
necessary to consider the challenges that are associated with the approach taken here. 
An obvious criticism of authoethnographical approaches is that such methodologies 
can lack objectivity, given the fact that the researcher is both embedded within the 
particular object group of inquiry and, at the same time, commentator on the 
group/organisation and practices arising therein. Whilst this somewhat paradoxical 
criticism may remain valid, this, by its very nature, is what conducting an 
autoethnography necessitates and is an unavoidable vulnerability of the 
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methodology. Nonetheless the approach will lead to a unique and valuable 
perspective.   
Another criticism is that the autoethnographer is able to capture ‘only a partial 
vantage point for observation of the social world under study’.704 Hence, there is a 
risk that not all of the concerns raised will be reflected within the study. Two counter-
arguments are offered here. First, it is questionable whether any method can fully 
capture all vantage points. Second, the reflective exercise conducted here is based on 
dialogue with other members of the project (at meetings and workshops) as well as 
publics (who attended workshops and were interviewed), which could be considered 
a superior alternative to methods solely reliant upon academic literatures.  
I posit that the value that can be gleaned from such an approach outweighs the 
associated vulnerabilities. Claims of complete objectivity are not being made here. 
Rather, the unique position which I had as both co-producer of information 
governance approaches and actor within the SHIP project is being used to its 
advantage in order to offer a unique, information-rich, embedded and informed 
account of the discussions and actions which occurred during the project. My role as 
a scholar enables me to offer a reflexive account of the events that occurred under 
SHIP, and to consider the implications that changes which were implemented during 
the project might have for the wider discussion within this thesis around rules and 
principles. This ability to offer a reflexive account is further bolstered by the temporal 
distance and hindsight which I presently possess. 
Thus, the remaining discussion is structured as follows. First, I offer background to 
the SHIP project. Next, I lay out the core elements of the Good Governance 
Framework (GGF), which I co-developed under the auspices of SHIP. This includes 
analytical reflection upon how the GGF was developed. Finally, I consider the 
broader implications which these developments have for the line of inquiry being 
                                                      




pursued in this thesis. In particular, I highlight the relevance of the findings as they 
relate to the conceptual decision-making tree being developed in this thesis. 
6.3 Background: The Scottish Health Informatics Programme (SHIP) 
6.3.1 Data linkage and the impetus for SHIP 
The Scottish Health Informatics Programme (SHIP)705 was a Scotland-wide, funded,706 
collaborative initiative involving four Scottish universities707 and the Information 
Services Division (ISD) of National Health Services Scotland. The latter organisation 
acts as custodian for the vast majority of Scotland’s NHS health datasets, which 
include data on Scottish birth, morbidity, acute cancer and mental health.708 The 
universities are involved in conducting research on, and developing methodology 
around, the use of those (and other) datasets. The project ran from 2009-2013 and it 
strove to establish a ‘research platform for the collation, management, dissemination 
and analysis of Electronic Patient Records’.709 The overarching aim of the initiative 
was to better facilitate the reuse of health data for a wide variety of research purposes. 
This included generating research in areas such as pharmacovigilance, diabetes and 
epidemiology. 
Electronic Patient Records (EPRs), also commonly referred to as ‘Electronic Health 
Records’ or ‘Electronic Medical Records’, contain ‘the results of clinical and 
administrative encounters between a provider (physician, nurse, telephone triage 
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nurse, and others) and a patient that occur during episodes of patient care’.710 Many 
health systems have made, or are in the process of making, a transition from paper-
based filing systems towards digitised files in the form of EPRs.711 This is in large part 
due to the fact that EPRs represent a cost-effective and accurate method of collecting 
and recording individual health information, which can be updated more easily than 
paper files and made readily accessible to healthcare professionals across healthcare 
systems. 
The impetus for launching SHIP lay in widespread acknowledgement of the clear 
health and non-health research value that can be generated from harnessing 
information contained within EPRs. Often, such information is referred to as 
‘secondary data’ i.e. data which are collected for one purpose (for inclusion in EPRs) 
and subsequently used for another purpose (research).712 Equally, such uses of data 
are commonly referred to within the literature as ‘secondary uses’. As I have argued 
elsewhere, ‘secondary data’ implies an inferior use of data and ignores the fact that 
such uses of data can significantly contribute to important health and non-health 
research benefits.713 Thus, reference is made here to ‘data reuse’, which does not hold 
the same inferior connotations as ‘secondary uses’.  
Data reuse has taken place within the health research context for many years and 
Scotland is a notable pioneer in this area.714 The strong Scottish track-record can be 
partly attributed to the fact that every individual using the National Health Service 
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in Scotland is allocated a Community Health Index (CHI) Number. The CHI number 
is included in every patient document and record in Scotland which enables a high 
level of integration for care and/or research purposes. In the research setting, this 
integration is achieved through the use of data linkage methodologies. 
Data linkage715 is the process whereby one or more datasets are joined together and 
subsequently analysed to glean new information. This information can contribute to 
health and non-health population improvements.  Having a CHI number attributed 
to almost every individual in Scotland716 facilitates a high level of opportunity for data 
linkage-based research. The types of data most often reused for data linkage purposes 
include health data which are routinely collected for administrative purposes. One 
area which relies heavily on data linkage is pharmacoepidemiology, ‘the study of the 
use, and effects, of drugs and other medical devices in large numbers of people.’717 
This includes research on adverse or unintended effects, which may also result from 
interactions of different medicines.718 For example, by linking together clinical 
diabetes data with cancer registries, SHIP researchers were able to investigate 
whether insulin glargine was related to increased cancer risk.719 In turn, this has led 
to a Europe-wide study in order to investigate this further. 
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More broadly, epidemiology, which strives to understand population level health, is 
extremely reliant on the availability of vast amounts of health data in order to 
establish reliable findings. This is also true for the majority of data linkage studies, 
rendering access to vast amounts of data crucial. Further, data linkage is not restricted 
to the health research setting. Many cross-sectoral linkage studies have taken place, 
which link health and non-health data. A Scottish example is the Scottish 
Longitudinal Study (SLS) which links together a variety of data including health, 
education, ecological, housing and social data. Over the years the SLS has facilitated 
an array of important projects including research on health inequalities, educational 
and social patterns in teenage births and the impact of mobility on mortality in 
Scotland.720 
Reusing data is an economical and efficient way of conducting health research 
because the required data have already been collected. Further, large amounts of data 
can be analysed quickly thanks to developed methodology and computing power. 
Thus, researchers are able to wield results that may not be economically viable in 
other settings such as clinical trials.721   Many initiatives relating to data reuse for 
research exist internationally722,723,724,725 and both Scottish726,727 and wider UK 
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Government have made e-health research (involving EPRs and data linkage) a 
strategic priority.728 
Despite the clear benefits of data reuse, in addition to its proliferation within and 
beyond health research and the strong policy push towards maximising such 
activities, many impediments currently exist around conducting such research. These 
impediments are often attributed to a regulatory landscape that is typically 
characterised as complex, disproportionate and over burdensome.729,730,731,732,733  
From the UK perspective, several influential reports have been issued on this topic, 
notably those by Thomas and Walport,734 the Academy of Medical Sciences,735 Dame 
Caldicott,736 the UK Department of Health737 and most recently, the Nuffield Council 
on Bioethics.738 All of these reports have lamented the existing disproportionate 
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regulatory landscape, concluding that important research in the public and private 
interests is being hindered.  
These regulatory impediments will be considered in more detail below as they relate 
to rules and principles. Of relevance here is the fact that SHIP was initiated and 
developed at a time of, and in response to, regulatory discontent around the reuse of 
data for health research purposes.  Thus, the SHIP initiative was not only borne out 
of recognition of the benefits of such research, but also with the goal of improving the 
ability to conduct such research. A collaborative tender was submitted to the 
Wellcome Trust, Medical Research Council (MRC) and Economic and Social Research 
Council (ESCRC) in order to obtain funding to establish SHIP, which was awarded 
£3.5million. The following section considers the project in more detail. 
6.3.2 SHIP: the project and tasks involved 
As mentioned above, SHIP was a collaborative endeavour involving Scottish 
universities and ISD. The project consisted of four core workstreams: public 
engagement, research, pharmacovigilance, and information governance.  
Due to the wide implications that the initiative had for the health research landscape 
across Scotland, the project involved a wide range of stakeholders including:  
• patients and other members of publics; 
• researchers (within and beyond SHIP); 
• IT experts; 
• GPs; 
• data custodians and data processors (within and beyond SHIP); 
• Caldicott Guardians (responsible for protecting patient confidentiality in NHS 
Organisations);739 
                                                      





• the Privacy Advisory Committee for Scotland (which advised ISD and 
National Records for Scotland on approvals for research applications 
requesting data access);740 and  
• Scottish Government. 
The different stakeholders were all subject to, and part of, the wider complex and 
inconsistent regulatory landscape741 governing data reuse for health research in 
Scotland. Such a diverse spectrum of stakeholders with their own, often differing 
priorities, provided a range of considerations and viewpoints demanding 
consideration within the governance regime.  My role as a Research Fellow on the 
Information Governance Workstream of SHIP provided me with unique insight into 
the ethical and legal issues and interests at stake.   
Alongside a colleague,742 I was charged with delivery of the following core tasks: 
• to analyse the ethico-legal and cultural challenges associated with the reuse of 
electronic patient records in Scotland, the wider UK and internationally, with 
a view to mapping the elements necessary to contribute to an optimal 
governance regime;  
• to assess the governance issues that arise from the fully integrated approach 
represented by SHIP through an examination of the legal, ethical cultural and 
governance arrangements that operate within Scotland; and 
• to take an interdisciplinary approach to governance so that it accommodates 
public attitudes. 
In order to deliver these outputs, I embarked upon an initial scoping exercise with a 
view to surveying the pre-existing regulatory landscape and its associated challenges. 
                                                      
740 NHS National Services Scotland, ‘Privacy Advisory Committee’. Accessed 11 Mar 2015:   
http://www.nhsnss.org/pages/corporate/privacy_advisory_committee.php.   
741 For an overview of the regulatory landscape governing secondary use of data for health 
research in Scotland, see: Laurie, G., and Sethi, N., “Information Governance of Use of Health-
Related Data in Medical Research in Scotland: Current Practices and Future Scenarios”, 
Edinburgh Law School Working Paper Series, 2011/26 (SSRN, 2011). Hereafter, ‘Laurie and 
Sethi, (2011)’.  
742 In the interests of full disclosure, it is acknowledged here that this colleague was the 




The exercise also sought to identify what a model of optimal governance743 might look 
like. This initial scoping exercise involved: 
• consultation of primary and secondary legislation and case law; 
• documentation of the various roles of key actors involved in the governance 
of data reuse for health research (including data custodians such as ISD NHS 
Scotland and those in regulatory roles including the Information 
Commissioner and Caldicott Guardians); 
• consultation of good practice guidelines from professional organisations such 
as the General Medical Council; 
• surveying consultation reports on the topic of health research and data reuse; 
and 
• engaging with researchers (including informal interviews and 
questionnaires) in order to understand the effect of the governance landscape 
on their studies.744 
The outcome of the scoping exercise revealed a rule-centric landscape governing 
approaches to data reuse in health research. A detailed description of the regulatory 
environment and associated challenges is provided elsewhere745 and is unnecessary 
for the purposes of this discussion. Rather, the next section provides a novel analysis 
of the findings of the scoping exercise as they relate to the lines of inquiry being 
pursued here. This particular perspective has not yet appeared in the public domain 
in the form presented herein.  
                                                      
743 For an interesting commentary on different approaches to governance and Responsible Research 
Innovation, see Landeweerd, L., Townend, D., Mesman, J., and Hoyweghen, I., “Reflections on 
Different Governance Styles in Regulating Science: A Contribution to ‘Responsible Research 
Innovation’”, 11 Life Sciences, Society and Policy (2015), pp. 1-22.  
744 The primary methodologies involved in this scoping exercise included desk-based 
literature reviews and interviews. The scoping exercise was written up as a working paper. 
See Laurie and Sethi, (2011).  




6.4 The regulatory environment at the time of SHIP 
6.4.1 A rule-centric landscape 
A dominant message emerging from the scoping exercise was that a rule-centric 
approach towards data reuse was prevalent. The term ‘rule-centric’ is being used here 
to describe a tendency both within the regulatory framework and within behavioural 
practices of predominantly deferring to rule-like norms. It is recalled that the starting 
definitions adopted in this thesis characterise rules as either applicable or not, in 
contrast with principles which are optimisation requirements which carry a 
dimension of weight. 
Thus, rule-like norms are generally more specific and prescriptive than principle-like 
norms. The term ‘rule-centric’ also refers to an observed tendency to seek out specific 
and prescriptive iterations of what to do in certain contexts. When asked what 
optimal governance might look like and/or what was required to address enduring 
regulatory challenges, the research revealed an appetite among key stakeholders and 
decision makers for a normative framework that embodied yet more rules prescribing 
conduct with respect to whether and how access to data should be allowed.   
There was, however, an irony in all of this. This was because, in keeping with 
assertions from key influential reports mentioned above, the existing relevant ‘rules’ 
considered in the scoping exercise were also being characterised by the same 
stakeholders and decision makers as complex, unclear, confusing, over burdensome, 
disproportionate and at times, conflicting. For example, at the time of SHIP, the 
processing of personal data746 implicated the following legislative provisions: 
                                                      
746 The Data Protection Act 1998, c.29 part 1 states: 
‘”personal data” means data which relate to a living individual who can be identified— 
(a)from those data, or 
(b)from those data and other information which is in the possession of, or is likely to come 




• The UK Data Protection Act 1998747 (DPA 1998), as the UK enactment of the 
European Directive 95/46/EC,748 is a body of rules which lays out the 
conditions under which personal data may or may not be processed; 
• the European Convention on Human Rights (notably Article 8 which relates 
to an individual’s right to respect for private life);749  
• the NHS Act (2006) which allows the common law duty of confidentiality to 
be set aside in England and Wales750; and 
• the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002. 
In addition to these provisions, professional and organisation codes of conduct were 
also relevant, including: 
• the General Medical Council’s Confidentiality Code of Practice751; 
• NHS Caldicott Guardian Principles752; and 
                                                      
individual and any indication of the intentions of the data controller or any other person in 
respect of the individual’. 
747 Note that some legislative developments and changes have occurred since SHIP, however, 
due to the retrospective nature of the discussion, legislative and organisational provisions are 
described as they existed during the SHIP project and scoping exercise. 
748 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on 
the protection of individuals with regards to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data.  
749 The European Convention on Human Rights, Article 8, Right to respect for private and 
family life: 
‘1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. 
2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except 
such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests 
of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention 
of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others’. 
750 Section 251, NHS Act 2006 allows the common law duty of confidentiality to be set aside 
by the Secretary of State of Health in those instances where patient identifiable information is 
required for medical purposes (including medical research). 
751 The Caldicott Principles, including the recently added 7th Caldicott Principle are included 
in Department of Health, Information: To Share or Not to Share, Government Response to the 
Caldicott Review, (2013). 




• the Information Commissioner’s Office Guide to Data Protection.753,754 
In Thomas and Walport’s influential Data Sharing Review, the authors describe a lack 
of legislative clarity as follows: 
[T]he Data Protection Act fails to provide clarity over whether 
personal information may or may not be shared. The Act is often 
misunderstood and considerable confusion surrounds the wider 
legal framework – in particular, the interplay between the DPA and 
other domestic and international strands of law relating to personal 
information. Misunderstandings and confusion persist even among 
people who regularly process personal information; and the 
specific legal provisions that allow data to be shared are similarly 
unclear.755 
 
In previous chapters, it was noted that one of the limitations of rules is that they can 
be open to varying interpretation. Indeed, the European Data Protection Directive 
(the Directive), from which Member States’ data protection legislation derives across 
the EU, including the UK’s DPA 1998, is a prime example.756 The body of rules 
contained within the Directive have resulted in diverse interpretations by different 
Member States. This has led to divergent approaches towards data sharing for reuse 
in the health research context.757,758,759 Even within one single Member State - the UK - 
the DPA 1998, due to its lack of clarity, is vulnerable to varying (mis)interpretations.  
                                                      
753 Information Commissioner’s Office, ‘A Guide to Data Protection’, (2009). 
754 Case law in this area is relatively sparse but one notable case had emerged around the time 
of SHIP: Common Services Agency v Scottish Information Commissioner [2008] UKHL 47.  
755 Thomas and Walport, (2008), para 8.21.   
756 For more on this, see Beyleveld, D., Townend, D., Rouillé-Mirza, S., and Wright, J., 
Implementation of the Data Protection Directive in Relation to Medical Research in Europe, 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004).  
757 European Commission, “Commission Staff Working Paper Impact Assessment”, (2012), 
(SEC2012) 72 final, p. 13. 
758 Robinson, N., et al., ‘Review of the European Data Protection Directive’, Technical Report 
Sponsored by the Information Commissioner’s Office, RAND Europe, (2009).  





An obvious objection to the characterisation of the DPA 1998 as rule-based would be 
to point out that it includes within it eight data protection ‘principles’. First, the very 
reference to ‘principles’ might imply that these are in fact principles, but as already 
been demonstrated in previous chapters, conflation of the terms ‘rule’ and ‘principle’ 
is not infrequent. Further, given the general and broad language used to convey the 
data protection ‘principles’ within the DPA 1998 (a feature typically associated with 
principle-like norms), they might at first glance, appear to be principles. But, again, 
as previously considered (with particular reference to Schauer’s contributions 
discussed in chapter two) distinctions must be made between the general and the 
vague and reliance upon language alone is not a reliable means of differentiating 
between principle and rule-like norms. 
Thus, upon closer consideration, and if we refer back to the initial definitions of rules 
(applicable or not) and principles (optimisation requirements with a dimension of 
weight), it can be argued that these principles are actually closer to rule-like norms 
on the principle-rule continuum being developed in this thesis.  The eight principles 
must be adhered to,760 they are either applicable or not761 and they are not designed to 
be balanced against each other (as with typical principle-like norms).  
We can move on to now consider that the Directive has two overarching goals: 1) to 
protect personal privacy; and 2) to facilitate data sharing across the EU.762 These are 
the principles upon which the legislation is based and yet, they are constantly in 
tension with each other. In the following section, this tension is laid out in the form 
of the balance to be sought between protecting both public and private interests in 
privacy whilst at the same time respecting the public interest in facilitating research.  
                                                      
760 If a data controller is found to be in serious contravention of any of the eight data protection 
principles, they are liable to be sanctioned and fined up to £500,000 by the Information 
Commissioner. Data Protection Act 1998, s 55(a). 
761 Applicable if personal data are being processed. 
762 ‘The centrepiece of existing EU legislation on personal data protection, Directive 95/46/EC3, 
was adopted in 1995 with two objectives in mind: to protect the fundamental right to data 




From the literature and stakeholder engagement undertaken during the scoping 
exercise, it became clear that reliance upon the relevant legislative rules was 
impeding important research.  And yet, in meetings with different stakeholders 
which were held in order to understand how the regulatory landscape might be 
improved, a constant theme which emerged was that data controllers in particular 
wanted to know exactly what they had to do to in order to discharge their 
responsibilities. As mentioned previously, there was in fact, support for more rules.  
Many individuals expressed an aversion to exercising discretion (typically associated 
with principle-like norms), reinforcing allegations of a ‘tick-box’ mentality.763 A fear 
of monetary and legal sanctions for inappropriate use, in addition to reputational 
damage, were concerns for decision makers and the tendency to err on the side of 
caution (“better not to risk sharing”) were also evident. 
It became clear during the course of SHIP that something more was needed in order 
to support the interpretation of these rules in a way that better accommodated both 
the public and private interests in privacy protection and facilitation of research. 
Equally, a clearer iteration of ‘what to do’ was needed for the day-to-day decision 
makers. This echoes the discussion in previous chapters where the literature revealed 
the need for ‘something extra’. 
Later in this chapter, it is demonstrated that these ‘requirements for improvement’ 
were met in large part by the Good Governance Framework which I co-developed 
with a colleague in the Information Governance Workstream (laid out further below). 
For immediate consideration though, is the fact that one of the reasons that data 
controllers were so keen to have prescriptive rules which set out exactly ‘what to do’ 
was because the regulatory landscape they had to self-navigate was one burgeoning 
with difficult decisions. A point to which I now turn. 
                                                      
763 Sethi, N., and Laurie, G., “Delivering Proportionate Governance in the era of eHealth”, 13 




6.4.2 A landscape demanding difficult decisions  
A clear theme which emerged from the scoping exercise was that the decision makers 
in this context were faced with difficult decisions. In-depth consideration of the 
various legal issues and ethical values764 at stake with regards to data reuse for 
research is offered elsewhere.765 But, for the purpose of the present discussion, a brief 
overview of key ethical considerations implicated in the SHIP context is helpful in 
order to demonstrate the nature of the decisions to be taken in this area, and just why 
they are considered to be ‘difficult’ decisions.  
6.4.2.1 Privacy 
Health data is considered to be personal and private in nature and thus it is defined 
within data protection legislation as ‘sensitive’.766 Furthermore, individuals have the 
broader right to respect for private and family life under the European Convention 
on Human Rights. With regards to data sharing, this concept ‘relates to the idea that 
there is a realm of private information (and conduct), often sensitive in nature, and 
that it is for the individual to determine whether or not to disclose this data, to whom, 
and on what basis’.767 This right to privacy is not, however, absolute; encroachments 
upon privacy may be justified where it is in the public interest to do so.768,769,770 
                                                      
764 For discussion on some of the ethical issues at stake in individual-level data sharing in the context 
of low/middle-income countries, see Bull et al., “Best Practices for Ethical Sharing of Individual-
Level Health Research Data from Low- and Middle- Income Countries”, 10 Journal of Empirical 
Research on Human Research Ethics (2015), pp. 302-313.  
765 See for example Laurie and Sethi, (2011) and Sethi and Laurie, (2013).   
766 Data Protection Act 1998, s 2(e). 
767 Laurie and Sethi, (2011), p.10. 
768 For general discussion on the nature of privacy, see for example: Benn, S., and Gaus, G., 
(eds), Public and Private in Social Life, (London: Crook Helm and St. Martin's Press, 1983).  
769 Dworkin, G.; “Privacy and the Law”, Young, J., (ed), Privacy, (Chichester: Wiley & Sons, 
1979). 
770 Laurie, G., Genetic Privacy: A Challenge to Medico-Legal Norms, (Cambridge: Cambridge 




6.4.2.2 Public interest 
‘Public interest’ remains a somewhat precarious term,771,772,773,774,775 and akin to privacy, 
one which is invoked across a range of different forums,776 including, for example, 
questions around media reporting on celebrities.777,778 The notion stems from the idea 
of collective or common goods.779 Within the context of health research, it has been 
established that: 
the claim that an interest in health is itself an interest held in 
common is not a particularly contentious claim. If there are any 
common interests held (nearly) universally within a human society, 
then health is surely one of them.780 
 
                                                      
771 Taylor, M., Genetic Data and the Law, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 29. 
772 Economic and Social Research Council, Public Interest in UK Courts. Accessed 3 Jan 2016: 
http://publicinterest.info. 
773 Sorauf, F., “The Public Interest Reconsidered”, 19 Journal of Political Economy (1957), pp. 616–
39, p. 618. 
774 Feintuck, M., ‘The Public Interest’ In Regulation, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).  
775 Black, G., and Stevens, L., “Enhancing Data Protection and Data Processing in the Public 
Sector: The Critical Role of Proportionality and the Public Interest”, 10 SCRIPTed (2013), pp.  
93-122. 
776 For discussion on public interest in the context of freedom of information requests, see ICO, 
“The public interest test – Freedom of Information Act”, (2013). Accessed 10 Sept 2015: 
https://ico.org.uk/media/fororganisations/documents/1183/the_public_interest_test.pdf.  
777 Campbell v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd [2004] UKHL 22.   
778 Theakston v MGN Ltd [2002] EWHC 137(QB).  
779 ‘There are certain “public goods” which “benefit us all (in one way or another) as members 
of a territorially circumscribed society. Such public goods may equate to what Alan Gewirth 
referred to as basic wellbeing, which comprises the natural rights to essential conditions such 
as life, physical integrity and mental equilibrium, without which it would be difficult or 
impossible to achieve, or have a reasonable chance of achieving, any purposes; and basic 
freedoms, such as distributive and aggregative levels of “justice”, “equality”, “crime control” 
and programmes of health care. This may include tangible goods like food and housing; 
intangible goods, such as political security; and goods on demand, such as health care and 
legal representation.’ Capps, B., Campbell, A., and Meulen, R., ‘Report for UK Biobank’, 
(2008). Accessed 11 Jan 2011: http://www.egcukbiobank.org.uk/meetingsandreports/ 
index.html. 
780 Taylor M, “Health Research, Data Protection and the Public Interest in Notification”, 19 




Thus, the public interest has commonly been evoked within discussions around 
health research.781 As considered directly below, this interest is often framed as one 
to be balanced against interests in privacy protection. Arguments made in the context 
of justifying encroachments of privacy typically characterise public interest in the 
context of data reuse as where there is ‘a pressing social need or such reasonable 
likelihood that it will result in tangible benefits for society’.782  
6.4.2.3 Balancing privacy and public interest 
The Privacy Advisory Committee for Scotland was charged with advising the 
Information Statistics Division of NHS Scotland (host to a vast amount of Scotland’s 
NHS datasets) and NRS (National Records of Scotland, again, another key data 
custodian in Scotland) on data access applications.783 PAC suggested that public 
interest must be interpreted as encouraging good medical research as well as 784 
protecting patient privacy.785 Laurie and Stevens note:  
It is often overlooked that safeguarding privacy and other personal 
rights and interests of citizens in society is also in the public interest. 
Too often there is a tendency to polarise debate of private rights v 
public interests, when in fact they two are sides of the same public 
interest coin.786 
 
                                                      
781 See also Townend, D., ‘Overriding Data Subject’s Rights in the Public Interest’, Beyleveld, 
D., Townend, D., Rouillé-Mirza, S., and Wright, J., (eds) Implementation of the Data Protection 
Directive in Relation to Medical Research in Europe, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004). 
782 NHS NSS Privacy Advisory Committee for Scotland, ‘Guiding Principles and Policy for 
Decision-Making and Advice’. Accessed 16 Mar 2015: 
http://www.nhsnss.org/uploads/pac/090806_updated%20policy%20and%20principles.pdf.  
783 The Privacy Advisory Committee for Scotland has now merged into the Public Benefit and 
Privacy Panel in Scotland which strives to streamline applications for research on NHS held 
data.  
784 Emphasis added.  
785 NHS NSS Privacy Advisory Committee for Scotland, Guiding Principles, (2011).  
786 Stevens, L., and Laurie, G., “The Administrative Data Research Centre Scotland: A Scoping 
Report on the Legal & Ethical Issues Arising from Access & Linkage of Administrative Data”, 




One of the most challenging decisions in the data sharing context then, revolves 
around precisely how to maintain respect for (public and private interests in) privacy 
whilst enabling important research in the public (and private) interests.787,788 
Researchers must demonstrate in their data access applications how their proposed 
study is in the public interest. Equally, those advising on or granting data access (such 
as the former Privacy Advisory Committee in Scotland or the Confidentiality 
Advisory Group in England and Wales)789 must also consider whether the proposed 
research is in the public interest.  
6.4.2.4 Consent 
In the context of data reuse for research, consent implies that individuals have the 
right to determine how information pertaining to them is used. Consent ‘remains the 
primary policy device in legitimating medical research’.790 As such, relatively high 
importance is placed on obtaining patient consent before sharing information. At the 
same time, the dangers of over-reliance of consent791,792 and the resulting impediments 
to research793,794 have been considered. There are several practical difficulties around 
obtaining consent in the context of data reuse. The first such difficulty lies in 
determining how much information is necessary in order to ensure that the 
                                                      
787 As noted elsewhere, there are both wider public and individual private interests in sharing 
data for research purposes. It is not helpful to set up the discussions as public v private. For 
more on this, see for example Stevens and Laurie (ibid.).  
788 Taylor, for example, suggests that a necessary component of public interest decision-
making involves taking public preferences into account, Taylor, (2011).  
789 The Confidentiality Advisory Group is an advisory body which functions under the 
auspices of the Health Research Authority and which deals specifically with requests to access 
patient information for research purposes without consent.  
790 Mason K., and Laurie, G., Law and Medical Ethics, 9th Edition, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), p. 679. Hereafter, ‘Mason and Laurie, (2013)’.   
791 Laurie, (2008). 
792 Laurie and Postan, (2013). 
793Andersen, M., and Storm, H., “Cancer Registration, Public Health and the Reform of the 
European Data Protection Framework: Abandoning or Improving European Public Health 
Research?”, 51 European Journal of Cancer (2015), pp. 1028-1038.  
794 Parker, M., “When is Research on Patient Records without Consent Ethical?”, 10 Journal of 




individual fully understands what they are consenting to (i.e. informed consent).  As 
this author has noted elsewhere, the notion of informed consent (and the various 
other types of consent) is particularly complex and problematic.795 This has been 
covered extensively within the literature.796,797,798 The very nature of data reuse implies 
that data are used for a purpose other than the purpose for which they are originally 
collected. It is often difficult, if not impossible, to foresee every single future use to 
which the data will be put. Even where future uses may be discernible, the practical 
challenges around obtaining consent are significant. 799,800 We can recall that data 
linkage relies on vast amounts of data pertaining to many individuals. As such, 
contacting and obtaining consent from every single effected individual can be 
extremely costly in terms of time and money, if not impossible.801,802 Similar challenges 
are acknowledged in the context of biobanking.803,804 
In recognition of these challenges, there are provisions within the regulatory 
framework for setting aside requirements for consent but these come with their own 
costs. Anonymisation is a popular alternative which we will now consider. 
                                                      
795 Sethi and Laurie, (2013), p. 178.  
796 Otlowski, M., “Tackling Legal Challenges Posed by Population Biobanks: 
Reconceptualising Consent Requirements”, 20 Medical Law Review (2012), pp. 191–226. 
797 MacLean A., “From Sidaway to Pearce and Beyond: Is the Legal Regulation of Consent Any 
Better Following a Quarter of a Century of Judicial Scrutiny?”, 20 Medical Law Review 
(2012), pp. 108–129. 
798 Caulfield, T., and Kaye, J., “Broad Consent in Biobanking: Reflections on Seemingly 
Insurmountable Dilemmas”, 10 Medical Law International (2009), pp. 85-100. 
799 Regidor, E., “The use of personal data from medical records and biological materials: ethical 
perspectives and the basis for legal restrictions in health research”, 54 Social Science and 
Medicine (2004), pp. 1975-1894, p. 1976. 
800 Furness, P., and Nicholson, L., “Obtaining Explicit Consent for the Use of Archival Tissue 
Samples: Practical Issues”, 20 Journal of Medical Ethics (2004), pp. 561-564, p. 561. 
801El Emam, K., and Arbuckle, L., Anonymizing Health Data, (USA: O’Reilly Media, 2013), p. 2.  
802 UK Information Commissioner’s Office, “Anonymisation: Managing Data Protection Risk: 
Code of Practice”, (2012), p. 29. 
803 Widdows, H., and Cordell, S., “The Ethics of Biobanking: Key Issues and Controversies”, 
19 Health Care Analysis (2011), pp. 207-219. 
804 See also tensions around data protection, medical research and insurance in Townend, D., 
“Privacy, Health Insurance, and Medical Research: Tensions Raised by European Data Protection 





Anonymisation of data involves employing techniques in order to render 
identification of an individual highly unlikely, but not impossible.805 For example,  
key identifiers which render individuals identifiable, such as names, date of birth or 
postcodes are removed from records. However, where datasets are joined together, 
the likelihood of re-identification may also increase, depending on what other 
information an individual has access to.806  Identifiability is a significant concept in 
legal terms because identifiable information (or “personal data”) is subject to the DPA 
1998. Anonymisation is often perceived as negating the need to obtain patient consent 
in order to use information (and thus of taking secondary uses/data reuse outside the 
remit of the DPA 1998). But, whilst this may be the case in some circumstances, 
matters are more complicated than this.  
As Dove and Laurie have recently highlighted, ‘anonymisation is a process and not a 
status’807 and there is a need to differentiate between (a) access to and the use of data 
which are anonymised, and (b) data which will undergo the process of 
anonymisation.808,809 Detailed discussions on anonymisation are available 
elsewhere810,811,812 and are unnecessary for present discussion. The point here is to 
highlight the complex landscape with which decision makers must grapple.  
Beyond consideration of the legal and ethical complexities around anonymisation, 
are the practical consequences of the process. It can have a detrimental effect on the 
                                                      
805 Ohm, P., “Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of 
Anonymization”, 57 UCLA Law Review (2010), pp. 1701-1777.  
806 ICO, (2012), p. 16.   
807 Dove, T., and Laurie, G., “Consent and Anonymisation: Beware Binary Constructions”, 350 
British Medical Journal (2015).  
808 Ibid.  
809 See also Beyleveld D., and Townend D., “When is Personal Data Rendered Anonymous? 
Interpreting Recital 26 of Directive 95/46/EC”. 6 Medical Law International (2004), pp. 73-86. 
810 Ibid. 
811 Emam et al., (2015). 





value of data; the process of anonymisation can render data less useful or ‘rich’ for 
research purposes.813,814 Further, rendering re-identification highly unlikely may not 
always be desirable for data linkage purposes where traceability is important. As I 
have outlined elsewhere,815 traceability of data can facilitate longitudinal studies 
(which track patients over long periods of time) and enables feedback and 
intervention with patients where clinically relevant information may arise.816 
6.4.2.6 Pseudonymisation 
Pseudonymisation is a method which does enable traceability whilst mitigating some 
of the concerns around identifiability. It is ‘the process of distinguishing individuals 
in a dataset by using a unique identifier which does not reveal their “real world” 
identity’.817 Although pseudonymisation can offer a means of linking data and of re-
identification (if necessary), the extent to which it is effective is dependent upon the 
context in which data are being used.818,819 It may be inadequate ‘for many research 
purposes’.820 Researchers wishing to access data must consider whether or not 
pseudonymisation techniques might suit their particular study. Similarly, those 
advising on access or granting access to data must consider the particular 
pseudonymisation techniques which a researcher proposes to employ and whether 
or not these are sufficiently robust in terms of privacy preservation. The situation is 
                                                      
813 ‘Absolute 100% anonymity is almost impossible to achieve without the data set being 
reduced to one data item, rendering it of little use for most research purposes’, Confidentiality 
Security Advisory Group for Scotland, ‘Protecting Patient Confidentiality: A Consultation 
Paper’, (2002) para 8.2. 
814 ICO, (2012), p. 13. 
815 Sethi, (2014), p. 282.  
816 For more on this topic, see Lo Iacono, L., “Multi-Centric Universal Pseudonymisation for 
Secondary Use of the HER”, 126 Studies in Health Technology and Informatics (2007) pp. 239-247, 
p. 239. 
817 See for example ICO, (2012), p. 49.  
818 House of Commons Health Committee, ‘The Electronic Patient Record Sixth Report of 
Session 2006–07 HC 422-I (2007), p. 91.  
819 Bourne, I., Information Commissioner’s Office, ‘The Complexities of Privacy and 
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further complicated by the fact that the current European Data Protection Directive 
is unclear around the levels of pseudonymisation necessary to render data sufficiently 
de-identified to the point where they are considered anonymous and therefore 
outwith the scope of the legislation. 
6.4.2.7 ‘Consent or anonymise’ 
The phrase ‘consent or anonymise’821 has come to typify the predominant approach 
to data reuse in health research. It implies that where consent to use patient records 
is lacking (i.e. where this is not practical, possible or desirable), then the default 
position is to make data access conditional upon anonymisation, obviating the legal 
requirement to obtain consent for all future uses. We have considered above why this 
approach is problematic in terms of the anonymisation process, diminishing data 
utility for research purposes. 
One of the key explanations for the prevalence of ‘consent or anonymise’ is that the 
law is confusing around whether or not consent is needed and under which 
circumstances. This has led to what has been referred to within the literature as a 
culture of ‘caution’.822 The term implies that rather than risk sanctions for 
inappropriate data sharing, data controllers/advisory bodies have tended to ‘play it 
safe’ and impose conditions of anonymisation if consent is not obtained. This has 
resulted in claims about considerable impediments to research.823 In turn, there is a 
concern that it has resulted in researchers having limited and unhelpful options on 
how to proceed, viz, either needing to obtain consent or to no longer use identifiable 
information and instead, use anonymised or pseudonymised data.  
What is often underappreciated is that the law does not demand the ‘consent or 
anonymise approach’. Indeed, consent is but one means of legitimising the use of data 
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under Schedule 2 of the DPA 1998.824  Personal data may still be used lawfully, 
without consent, subject to certain conditions being met, including authorisation from 
the relevant approval body. For example, in England and Wales, The Confidentiality 
Advisory Group of the Health Research Authority has the power to authorise such 
uses.825 In Scotland, the newly-established Public Benefit and Privacy Panel for Health 
and Social Care (PBPP) offers a streamlined approvals process for applications 
wishing to access NHS Scotland-originating data.826 
In these instances, it must be demonstrated that obtaining consent is either 
impractical or impossible, that the use of data without consent is necessary, that 
appropriate security mechanisms are in place and that the proposed research can be 
justified in the public interest.  
6.4.2.8 Public attitudes and trust 
Public confidence also plays a significant role in the decisions taken on data reuse. 
Public confidence in the use of patient information is fundamental: ‘a loss of public 
confidence in healthcare systems could result in patients withholding information, 
which could have a serious impact upon their care’.827 Indeed, the negative impacts 
of failing to address social and ethical concerns within regulatory approaches has 
been acknowledged.828,829 Assurances are sought that data will be used ‘in a manner 
which can be justified by arguments such as the public interest and which are 
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acceptable to them or at least to a substantial body of reasonable persons’.830 At the 
time that SHIP was launched, there was a dearth of information around public 
attitudes towards (or knowledge of) reuse of data for research purposes.831 Equally, 
the project was initiated in the wake of several mishaps regarding the poor handling 
of patient identifiable information that were extensively covered in the 
media.832,833,834,835  
From the outset, those involved in SHIP were therefore acutely aware of the potential 
damage to public confidence towards data uses. This was one of the key drivers for 
my close collaboration with colleagues involved in the Public Engagement (PE) 
Workstream of SHIP.  From a reputational standpoint, in meetings with key 
stakeholders, data custodians (who are responsible for ensuring the safety and ethical 
and responsible uses of data) made it clear that they were particularly concerned with 
the reputational impacts that misuses (or perceived misuses) of data might have.  
Misuses could include providing access to data for studies which are deemed 
inappropriate i.e. not in the public interest. Misuses might also include illegal uses of 
data, which could lead to damages to or loss of trust and, as indicated above, patients 
withholding information and impeding research. Additionally, there was the 
looming prospect of financial repercussion in terms of monetary penalties levied by 
the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO). One year into SHIP, the ICO was 
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granted powers to fine data controllers for ‘serious contraventions’ of the DPA 1998, 
for up to £500,000.836 Thus, the reluctance to share data was grounded on these wider 
concerns.  
This section has highlighted some of the key ethical values at stake when considering 
the reuse of data for health research purposes. Key stakeholders, namely: researchers, 
data controllers/custodians (responsible for granting access to data), and 
advisory/authorising bodies (responsible for advising on/authorising the use 
of/withholding of data) were obliged to consider all of these values when taking any 
decisions around data reuse. 
The difficult nature of these decisions not only lies in the multiplicity of 
considerations in play, but also by virtue of the absence of an obvious, viable, 
workable, or coherent means to tackle the decision-making process in a way that is 
ethically robust and which would satisfy the range of stakeholders. 
The next section considers the important role which discretion played within SHIP 
and the wider regulatory framework. This is significant because it reveals the rule-
centric landscape and associated problems which were impeding important health 
research.  
6.4.3 An environment where discretion was unwelcome 
The scoping exercise involved engagement with data controllers/data custodians and 
researchers who were typically faced with difficult decisions around whether or not 
to grant access to data and if so, under which conditions. An emerging theme from 
these engagement activities was that the exercise of discretion was perceived as an 
inconvenient and yet necessary feature of the regulatory environment. This could be 
explained by several factors.  
                                                      




First, the law i.e. (the relevant set of rules) was complex and unclear and this meant 
that data controllers were often left wanting in terms of knowing ‘what to do’ about 
certain data access applications. As we have considered in previous chapters, 
discretion is especially prevalent where rules are ambiguous and the result of unclear 
and complex rules meant that a culture of caution ensued (where data access 
applications were either rejected or data custodians/advisory bodies demanded that 
consent be obtained or that the data undergo anonymisation prior to access). This was 
because the law was in many respects passively facilitative of what could be done 
with respect to data but did not require action on the part of responsible actors. Thus, 
while it was very clear what ought not to be done with data, there was a wide margin 
of manoeuvre within the realm of the lawful, or perhaps better put: the not unlawful. 
But, in no circumstances did the law obligate data use, access or sharing.  The net 
effect was that existence of such discretion, when it was exercised, resulted very often 
in conservative practices around data sharing. It is worth reiterating the point that 
the DPA 1998 did not demand consent and yet, this was the predominant default 
interpretation of the legislation.837,838  
As highlighted earlier, a constant theme that emerged during engagement with data 
controllers was that they wanted to know exactly what they had to do to in order to 
discharge their responsibilities. This was compounded by broader concerns around 
precisely when data controller status was reached,839 and what this meant in terms of 
responsibilities.  As mentioned earlier, individuals expressed an aversion to 
exercising discretion, reinforcing allegations of a ‘tick-box’ mentality whereby 
individuals want to be clearly told what to do, rather than be forced to exercise 
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discretion. It appeared that fear of sanctions for inappropriate use was also a driving 
factor. While it was neither the objective nor within the skill set of the Information 
Governance Workstream to gather robust evidence of these sentiments, the strength 
of feeling that emerged from these meetings nonetheless had a powerful effect on the 
crafting of the downstream governance model.  
Notwithstanding, given the nature of the problematic regulatory landscape and the 
difficult decisions which had to be taken, discretion played an important role in 
shaping the outcome of research applications and thus, in shaping research more 
generally. It was a necessary and inevitable component of the decision-making 
process. In legislative and organisational terms, the data controller was identified as 
the individual ultimately responsible (and liable) for inappropriate data sharing. The 
final decision about whether to share data and if so, under which circumstances, 
ultimately lies with the data controller.  
6.4.4 Interim summary 
This chapter began by considering the rationale behind adopting SHIP as a case 
study. The approach inspired heavily by the methodology of analytic 
autoethnography was also considered. Next, my role within the project and the tasks 
which I was charged with, as a core member of the Information Governance 
Workstream were laid out. Contextual information around the reuse of Electronic 
Patient Records for research purposes was also provided. This included consideration 
of the fact that such reuses of data can offer considerable benefit in terms of health 
and well-being. The significant regulatory hurdles impeding data reuse were also 
outlined.  
In particular, the regulatory landscape governing data reuse was characterised as 
‘rule-centric’. This was both in terms of the prevalence of an array of legislative 




burdensome. A cultural tendency towards (and appetite for even more) prescriptive 
iterations of ‘what to do’ became apparent through engagement with data custodians.  
Next, the key ethical and social factors implicated in decisions around data reuse for 
research were set out. These demonstrated the difficult nature of the decisions which 
must be taken around data reuse. Finally, the important role which the exercise of 
discretion plays in achieving this balance has been highlighted. Yet, there was a 
reluctance to exercise this discretion (and especially in a way that facilitated data 
sharing where appropriate). 
The next section considers the development and content of the Good Governance 
Framework (GGF), which was introduced in response to all of the considerations 
which have been laid out in the discussions thus far. Once the GGF and its constituent 
parts have been mapped out, reflective analysis is offered on the case study and 
discussion is provided on how this relates to the broader line of enquiry being 
pursued here viz the conceptual tree metaphor.  
6.5 Good Governance Framework (GGF) 
Under the auspices of SHIP, charged with the task of improving the governance 
landscape and in response to the revelations of the scoping exercise, my colleague 
and I developed a Good Governance Framework (GGF). This comprises four key 
elements:  
1. clarification of roles and responsibilities of data controllers; 
2. guiding principles and best practice; 
3. researcher training; and 
4. proportionate risk-based categorisation of data access applications. 
 
Each component of the GGF was developed in response to an identified gap or 
weakness in the status quo. It is recalled from the previous section that three 
predominant weaknesses of the state of play identified at the beginning of SHIP were: 




As mentioned above, we worked closely with SHIP Public Engagement (PE) 
colleagues throughout the course of the project. We attended numerous stakeholder 
workshops attended by members of the public, patients and researchers. PE 
colleagues sought to gather information on stakeholder attitudes towards data reuse 
in the context of health (and other) research. This included generating input on some 
of the governance approaches which we subsequently implemented within the GGF. 
A detailed account of all of the PE findings is unnecessary for this discussion. Rather, 
the important point is that addressing ethical and social concerns was considered 
paramount to generating the GGF and this relates more generally to the importance 
of well-constructed regulatory approaches for decision-making. 840,841,842 The section 
below lays out the core features of the GGF with a more detailed version of the GGF 
accessible elsewhere.843  
6.5.1 Clarification of roles and responsibilities of data custodians and data 
processors  
One of the components of the GGF takes the form of a publicly accessible document 
which lays out the roles and responsibilities of data custodians and data processors 
in the context of SHIP.  This element of the GGF was developed in response to a key 
theme which emerged from the scoping exercise:  that confusion arose around what 
these responsibilities were, particularly when data are shared in different contexts at 
different times. Further support for such a document stemmed from a meeting of the 
SHIP Information Governance Working Group. 
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Although rules (most notably those contained within the DPA 1998) were provided 
on how personal data should be processed and shared, the perception was that these 
rules were not clear enough.  The Article 29 Data Protection Party is charged with 
providing guidance on the implementation of data protection law throughout the EU, 
including on issues of data reuse for research; in this regard they have provided an 
opinion seeking to clarify the roles and responsibilities of data controllers and data 
processors.844 In turn, the guidance within the Opinion was incorporated into a SHIP 
document outlining these roles in more detail.845 The document was developed by 
myself, Graeme Laurie and the NHS Scotland ISD. The significance of this document 
is considered in more detail below.  
6.5.2 Guiding principles and best practice 
The regulatory considerations around data reuse for health research implicate both 
principles and rules. As considered earlier in this chapter, the landscape governing 
data reuse was rule-centric and dominated by complex and unclear rules. Difficult 
decisions had to be taken on how to implement these rules whilst also paying due 
regard to relevant principles.  
At the time of SHIP, there was a move within the financial sector away from rules-
based regulation (RBR) towards principle-based regulation (PBR). Different forms of 
PBR exist, including formal, substantive846, full and polycentric.847 Essentially, the 
overarching difference between the two approaches is described as follows: 
Principle-based regulation (PBR) can be contrasted with rules-
based regulation (RBR) where the former relies upon broad and 
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looser principles to guide action and the latter upon stricter pre- 
and proscriptive rules for framing approaches to governance and 
decision making.848 
It became apparent during the course of the project that the broad overarching 
principles underpinning the legislative framework were compromised or under-
appreciated due to a culture of compliance which centred on observation of rules, 
often leading to a ‘tick-box’ mentality. It appeared that the original principles which 
were underpinning many of the rules were ‘lost’ as a result of the complicated 
landscape and resultant culture. Additional concerns were raised in a meeting in July 
2010 of the Information Governance Working Group (IGWG), which consisted of: 
• my colleague Graeme Laurie and I (representing the Information Governance 
Workstream in SHIP); 
• colleagues in charge of Public Engagement in SHIP; 
• a Caldicott Guardian based at ISD; 
• the SHIP Principal Investigator; 
• the Head of Programmes for ISD; 
• the Programme Principal for Scottish Health Information Services Research; 
• the SHIP Project Manager; and 
• the Head of NHS Central Register (National Records for Scotland).  
 
Although SHIP was still in its early stages, clear governance challenges were already 
emerging. During the meeting, particular concerns were raised around: 
• the need to streamline data access requests given the bottleneck which was 
occurring in managing such applications; and 
• the various governance issues which were beginning to emerge, particularly 
around the question of when obtaining consent was necessary. 
 
                                                      




The group agreed that there was no ‘one size fits all’ approach to governance and that 
there was a clear need for both clarity and flexibility. Graeme Laurie suggested that 
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Guidelines on 
Human Biobanks and Genetic Research Databases849 offered a helpful approach. Such 
a principle-based approach accommodated the need for a flexible and overarching 
governance mechanism. The Guidelines contained different principles which might 
be engaged across various scenarios in addition to containing best practice examples 
with respect to each of the principles. It was proposed that this could form the basis 
of a high-level guidance document on information governance for SHIP. The 
principles would not only offer flexibility, but could be addressed to the various 
stakeholders involved in SHIP and affected by SHIP-related activities. 
The group supported this suggestion and as a result, a dedicated Short Life Working 
Group (SLWG) was established and charged with the task of formulating and refining 
a set of principles. The group members were carefully selected in order to facilitate 
coproduction of principles which reflected input from a variety of stakeholders.  
The SLWG850 consisted of a variety of stakeholders (10 individuals in total) including: 
• an NHS Caldicott Guardian; 
• an NHS Data Protection Officer; 
• a representative from the Chief Scientist’s Office; 
• a representative from the NHS Central Register; 
• the SHIP project manager; 
• a researcher in ISD; 
• the Head of IT infrastructure at ISD; and 
• legal academics.  
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Prior to our first meeting, Graeme Laurie and I constructed a first draft of guiding 
principles designed to provide a starting basis for discussion by the group. The draft 
principles were based on: 
• the OECD Guidelines on Human Biobanks and Genetic Research Databases851 
(which adopts a principles and best practice approach);  
• a notable report on good governance standards in the public sector;852 
• various existing Memoranda of Understanding on data sharing and linkage 
(MoUs) which embody instances of best practice; and 
• research conducted as part of the scoping exercise discussed above. 
 
From the outset, and included within the very first draft of the guiding principles, 
alongside each principle, a best practice example of the principle was offered. The 
examples were identified from exemplars of practice already observed from the 
information governance landscape. For example, some of these practices took place 
within the Information Services Division of NHS Scotland (as explained above, ISD 
was responsible for hosting the majority of datasets which would be accessed via 
SHIP). An extract from the principles reads: 
• Every effort should be made to consider and minimise risks of identification 
(or re-identification) to data subjects and their families arising from all aspects 
of data handling.  
• Best practice example - It is acknowledged that at times data controllers may 
not be able to fully assess privacy risks, especially prior to linkages, however 
they should still carry out an assessment that identifies potential risks based 
on the information they do have.  
Hence, in addition to proposing principles, possible examples of best practice were 
suggested within drafts of the document so that the SLWG could consider the 
principles as well as offer comments on or alternative suggestions for best practice 
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examples. The best practice example above anticipates a practical challenge which 
many data controllers face with regards to identifying all risks of re-identification. 
The SLWG subsequently met in September 2010, where the draft of what were 
referred to as the Guiding Principles and Best Practice (GPBP) were further 
considered. The group agreed that the document would be valuable to SHIP. Two 
subsequent meetings took place during which the document continued to undergo 
refinement. It was suggested that there was a need to include a section defining key 
terms, including to distinguish between ‘principles’ and ‘best practice’. The key terms 
were defined as follows: 
‘Principles’ are fundamental starting-points to guide deliberation 
and action. They reflect the values that underpin the SHIP project 
and its commitment both to promote the public interest and to 
protect individual interests. Principles are not rules. Principles 
sometimes conflict. This is why they are starting points for 
deliberation or action. Because of their fundamental importance, 
however, it is expected that they are followed where they are 
relevant to a given data use, storage, sharing or linkage practice. 
Any departure must be fully and appropriately justified. 
‘Best Practices’ are examples of principles in action. These are 
instances of optimal governance and in that sense they are 
aspirational. As with principles, where instances of best practice are 
not or cannot be followed, clear justification should be offered. 
Together, these principles and best practices are an indication of the 
standards expected within and upheld by SHIP. 
 
The updated GBPB document was circulated amongst members of the SLWG and 
amongst two other groups in SHIP – the SHIP Management Group and the 
Operationalisation Group (responsible for the technical considerations of integrating 
and maintaining SHIP-related data). We also ran multiple drafts of the Principles 
document past the researcher and IG community which led to its further refinement. 
All groups communicated their comments to me, and I incorporated these into the 




than originally proposed. This was discussed by the group and it was agreed that 
rather than arbitrarily reducing the number of principles for the sake of a shorter 
document, the majority of the principles should remain. This was because the high-
level document was directed towards the entire SHIP project (as well as being 
publicly available), thus it was relevant to a wide variety of decisions and 
stakeholders. 
Further, Public Engagement workshop findings indicated that obtaining consent 
represented an important aspect of data reuse and it was agreed that this should be 
reflected within the GPBP. Thus, one of the principles states: 
Personal data must not be used without consent unless absolutely 
necessary... [w]here obtaining consent is not possible/practicable, 
then (a) anonymisation of data should occur as soon as is 
reasonably practicable and/or (b) authorisation from an 
appropriate oversight body/research ethics committee should be 
obtained.  
The above principle offers support for decision makers regarding how the relevant 
legislation should be interpreted (consent should be obtained), whilst at the same 
time making clear that flexibilities exist within the law (anonymisation or 
authorisation can be employed where consent is not practical or possible). 
Emphasising the fact that decision makers can justify data reuse without consent 
serves to guide decision makers away from the conservative culture of refusing data 
access applications based on the fact that consent was not obtained, even when the 
other conditions of anonymisation and/or authorisation are satisfied.  
The principles also remind decision makers that flexibilities exist within the legal 
rules governing data use for research purposes, and that unconsented use is 
permissible subject to the necessary conditions. Thus, this represents an example of 
how principles can be employed in order to reflect and support rules. 
The SHIP GPBP lay out the core considerations which decision makers should take 




and the circumstances under which these uses can take place. It was hoped that 
behaviour and decisions taken around data sharing would be standardised across 
SHIP. As this author has noted elsewhere: 
[f]rom the outset, good governance demands an accessible 
articulation  of the different values and standards against which 
individual and organisational activity will be assessed.853 
Principles, by their very nature, offer the ideal medium for relaying 
these standards854 due to their flexibility; they can be adapted and 
implemented in a manner which best suits the level of decision 
making taking place.855 
Discussion in chapter four considered whether principles and rules could encourage 
standardisation of practice. Of note here, is that the approach taken in SHIP 
appreciates that different decision makers may reach different decisions.  It was 
suggested that regulators/the relevant organisation had to first determine which 
practices should be prioritised. In the context of SHIP and GPBP, it was clear that the 
facilitation of scientifically sound, legally and ethically robust data sharing was the 
practice that needed to be encouraged. A more specific activity which SHIP sought to 
encourage was cross-sectoral data sharing (sharing between health and non-health 
sectors), and thus, this has been articulated specifically within the following SHIP 
GPBP principle:  
Where ethical and legal standards are met, data should be made 
accessible to trusted researchers across disciplines. The value of 
such cross-sector sharing should be recognised...[a]long with the 
potential benefits, risks should also be identified and appropriately 
addressed. In particular, assurance of reciprocal privacy standards 
across sectors is necessary...[t]he unnecessary duplication of 
approval procedure(s) and governance mechanisms should be 
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avoided. Mutual recognition of equivalent standards and 
procedures should be sought.856 
This principle clarifies the standards which should be met and the key considerations 
to take into account when considering cross-sector data sharing applications. All 
actors accessing or providing access to data under SHIP are expected to adhere to the 
SHIP GPBP and this is made explicit in any data sharing agreements between 
researchers and data custodians. 
The GPBP are a prime example of the on-going engagement that further refined the 
entire Good Governance Framework which likely contributed to the facilitation of 
uptake across the SHIP community; it was to a large extent co-produced with those 
who would have to use it. 
The GPBP subsequently formed the basis of the Scottish Government Data Linkage 
Framework Principles and were endorsed by the Information Commissioner. The 
uptake by these stakeholders will be considered in more detail later in the chapter.  
In addition to prioritising/defining the desired behaviour to be encouraged in SHIP, 
additional decision-making tools have been incorporated into the Good Governance 
Framework. This was in response to the potential limitations which rules and 
principles might have in standardising behaviour and in recognition of the fact that 
‘something extra’ might be needed (we will consider these additional elements 
further below). 
6.5.2.1 Instances of Best Practice 
Before moving on to consider the additional elements of the GGF, the best practice 
examples included within the Guiding Principles and Best Practice (GPBP) should be 
described in more detail here. In fact, as has been discussed in chapter five, best 
practice instantiations are particularly helpful for decision makers and occupy an 
                                                      





important space on the principle-rule continuum being fleshed out in this thesis. 
Further, the analysis provided in this thesis of best practice as manifestations of 
specification and casuistry represent an important theoretical and practical 
conceptualisation.  
To return to this practical and real-world consideration of best practice, it is recalled 
that instances of best practice were included explicitly within the GPBP in order to 
tend to criticisms that principles can be abstract and vague. These were also included 
in light of the aversion away from discretion and the desire for clear prescriptions of 
‘what to do’ which emerged from stakeholder engagement during the scoping 
exercise. Offering decision makers more (context) specific, concrete examples of how 
the principles could be enacted was one way of anticipating and addressing this 
aversion. Decision makers are instructed at the beginning of the GPBP document, 
that: 
‘Best Practices’ are examples of principles in action. These are 
instances of optimal governance and in that sense they are 
aspirational. As with principles, where instances of best practice are 
not or cannot be followed, clear justification should be offered. 
 
An example from the GPBP in relation to privacy is offered below: 
Principles 
1) Data controllers should demonstrate their commitment to 
privacy protection through the development and implementation 
of appropriate and transparent policies. 
2) Every effort should be made to consider and minimise risks of 
identification (or re- identification) to data subjects and their 
families arising from all aspects of data handling. 
Best Practice 
A) Organisations involved in data sharing and use should have a 
designated officer responsible for addressing privacy matters. This 
might be the Data Controller or Caldicott Guardian or someone 




B) Assessing privacy risks is an integral component of a data 
controller’s responsibilities and should form a central part of their 
privacy policy. This process should include the identification of 
confidentiality, security and privacy risks of any data handling 
including linkages, storage and access considerations.  
C) It is acknowledged that at times data controllers may not be able 
to fully assess privacy risks, especially prior to linkages, however 
they should still carry out an assessment that identifies potential 
risks based on the information they do have. 
D) Potential data recipients should also assess the impact on 
privacy prior to submitting data access requests and they should 
highlight any identified risks in order to discuss these with the data 
controller. 
E) Appropriate disclosure control should be applied to all outputs; 
this should be carried out under the authority and oversight of the 
designated privacy officer. 
 
The above excerpt demonstrates that the best practice instances offer specific practical 
examples of how the principles could be applied or enacted. Some of the best practice 
examples also pre-emptively acknowledge difficulties which might be encountered 
by decision makers when trying to observe the principles. See for example, best 
practice example C above, which addresses the fact that not all privacy risks can be 
assessed prior to data linkage but nonetheless, observance of the privacy principles 
necessitates attempts to be made to identify potential risks. Several instances of best 
practice are offered alongside each principle, in order to maximise the level of 
guidance and support offered.  
6.5.2.2 Interim summary 
Thus far, two of the core elements of the SHIP GGF have been described. This has 
included details on the reasoning behind and processes involved in their 
development. First, a document clarifying the roles and responsibilities of data 
controllers and data processors in the context of data reuse in SHIP was discussed. 




elements involved iterative processes of co-production by various SHIP project 
members and were developed in response to identified gaps within the regulatory 
landscape and associated challenges for decision makers. The remainder of this 
section lays out the content of the final two elements of the GGF and describes how 
these were developed.  
6.5.3 Researcher training 
In recognition of the complexities around decision-making in the data sharing 
context, the SHIP management group suggested that an educational training model 
should be developed. This was in order to clarify to SHIP researchers and data 
custodians the legal and ethical considerations which they should be aware of when 
making decisions around data sharing and use. 
A researcher training programme was developed under the auspices of SHIP and in 
partnership with the Distance Learning Office at the School of Law, University of 
Edinburgh. Two research associates were employed in order to develop the module 
over three months. Prior to agreement on the core content of the module, the 
researchers conducted a scoping exercise in order to review pre-existing information 
governance training modules.857  
Throughout the development of the training programme, numerous meetings took 
place in order to agree upon its content. Several colleagues from the SHIP research 
community (including a Caldicott Guardian, a Data Protection Officer, members of 
Scotland’s Privacy Advisory Committee and several researchers) helped to further 
refine the content by completing a pilot version of the module and offering feedback 
on the content. The feedback was incorporated into the module and the course 
content was finalised. 
                                                      
857 These included obligatory NHS training courses in addition to the Medical Research 
Council Data and Tissues Toolkit (2011); Clinical Trials Toolkit; GMC Confidentiality 




The programme consisted of an online course which any researcher wishing to access 
SHIP-related data was required to complete prior to gaining data access.  Equally, the 
course was made available to data custodians, responsible for taking decisions about 
whether to grant access to data and if so, under which circumstances. After 
completion of the course, the researcher was granted ‘SHIP accredited researcher 
status’. The course consisted of following modules: 
• Legal Concepts: outlining the key ethical and legal concepts relating to data 
reuse in the health research context such as privacy, consent and public 
interest; 
• Legal Frameworks: including an overview of relevant legislation such as the 
Data Protection Act 1998, Human Rights Act 1998 and the Common Law Duty 
of Confidentiality;  
• Safe Projects: outlining the importance of good information governance and 
gaining and maintaining public confidence and trust in research; 
• Safe Data: offering a more detailed account of how personal data can be 
obtained and processed in the research context; 
• Safe Settings: highlighting the different legal requirements and practical 
steps which can be taken in order to ensure data security; and 
• Safe Outputs: discussing how the outputs of research involving data reuse 
can be kept safe and secure. 
The researcher training component of the GGF implies that all individuals dealing 
with SHIP-related data should be fully aware of their legal and ethical 
responsibilities. This enables them to be better equipped to deal with the difficult 
decisions which they may come across when considering data reuses and supports 
them in drawing upon discretion in taking these decisions. A clear concern that 
emerged from PE work was that only trusted individuals should be able to access 
data, particularly where data have not been anonymised.858 Ensuring that anyone 
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who accesses SHIP-held data undergoes the course and successfully completes an 
assessment at the end of the module is one way of addressing this concern.  
6.5.4 Proportionate, risk-based categorisation of applications 
In order to support the rules and principles underpinning SHIP practices, a 
proportionate, risk-based categorisation of data access applications was also 
introduced by virtue of the Good Governance Framework. The categorisation 
approach is depicted in the image below:  
 
Figure 2: SHIP Application Categorisation Process 
 
 
Stages 1 and 2 are laid out in more detail elsewhere.859 For present purposes, a brief 
summary of the process is offered. When a data access application is submitted to 
SHIP, certain key benchmarks must be met before the application can move on to 
Stage 2.  Thus, Stage 1 corresponds to ‘threshold considerations’ for using SHIP-held 
data. If an application fails on any one of these considerations, then the application 
must immediately by triaged and categorised as ‘high impact’ thus exposing it to the 
                                                      




maximum level of scrutiny by PAC (now the PPBP). These benchmarks include 
seeking an assurance of the following: 
• safe data (ensuring that data will be adequately protected and useful for 
research purposes); 
• safe people (ensuring that people accessing data have undergone adequate 
training e.g. the SHIP training course); and 
• safe environment (ensuring that appropriate data security mechanisms are in 
place). 
Once these benchmarks have been met, a holistic ‘Privacy Risk Assessment’ is 
undertaken. This involves assessing the overall risk of the proposed research project 
and data use. This includes, for example, consideration of the content and sensitivity 
of requested data, motive and public benefit of the project and the likelihood and 
possible impact of a privacy breach. Whilst privacy is a central consideration, Stage 2 
also involves consideration of all of the GPBP elements in order to help the triage 
application in its own context.  
Once the requirements of Stages 1 and 2 of the approach have been satisfied, the 
application must be assigned a risk category. The risk category allocated to a given 
application will determine the terms and conditions under which data access may be 
granted to the researcher applicant. Details of the specific categories is not important 
for present purposes. What remains noteworthy is that this approach offers decision 
makers more detailed iterations of the level of scrutiny which data access applications 
should be subject to according to pre-determined rules and principles.  
Furthermore, an over-arching principled approach shapes the categorisation model: 
the principle of proportionality. Proportionality has been discussed at length 
elsewhere.860 Within the context of the Good Governance Framework, the principle of 
proportionality implies that the level of scrutiny against which a data access 
                                                      




application is subjected, should correspond to the level of perceived risk associated 
with the proposed data use.861 
6.5.5 Summary of GGF  
Figure 3 below summarises the methodology employed in developing the GGF and 
each of its constituent elements. This depiction reflects the fact that each of the 
elements was developed in response to an identified challenge or gap within the 
regulatory landscape. Additionally, the image serves to highlight the fact that the 
development of the GGF involved an iterative process which constantly necessitated 
engagement with stakeholders and refinement towards the final framework.
                                                      











6.5.5.1 Subsequent uptake of SHIP and GGF 
In 2013 when SHIP was already reaching its end, a 7th Caldicott Principle was 
introduced to the pre-existing Caldicott Principles which consider the use of NHS 
patient information and confidentiality. The 7th principle explicitly reminds decision 
makers that ‘the duty to share information can be as important as the duty to protect 
patient confidentiality’.862 At the same time as this new principle was introduced, the 
same message was conveyed within a rule. A duty to promote ethical research has 
been laid out explicitly within the Care Act 2014. Section 111(2) of the Act introduces 
a legal obligation to actively encourage and facilitate safe and ethical research: 
In performing the duty under subsection (1), a person must have regard to the need: 
(a) to protect participants and potential participants in health or social care 
research and the general public by encouraging research that is safe and 
ethical, and 
(b) to promote the interests of those participants and potential participants 
and the general public by facilitating the conduct of such research.863 
 
Both the 7th Caldicott Principle and Section 111(2) have been introduced in response 
to increasing concerns that research was being stifled due to the conservative data 
sharing practices which were outlined at the beginning of this chapter. The Scottish 
Government has explicitly endorsed the GGF in its Data Linkage Framework in 2015. 
The original research generated within SHIP and the best practices approach now 
forms a central tenet of the Scottish Government Open Data Strategy Action Plan 
(2015).864   
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Most recently, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics (the nearest the UK has to a standing 
[government] Commission on Bioethics)865 released its influential report The 
Collection, Linking and Use of Data in Biomedical Research and Health Care: Ethical Issues.866 
The report explicitly recommends a principle-based approach towards providing a 
‘morally reasonable set of expectations’ around ‘the use of data in biomedical and 
health research’.867 Further, the report refers to key elements of the GGF in SHIP as ‘a 
demonstration of a number of elements of good practice’.868 Such explicit support 
suggests that the elements incorporated into the GGF are perceived as beneficial in 
practical terms on how to approach governance. Another indication of the real 
practical value and influence which SHIP has achieved is demonstrated through its 
recognition as an international example of best practice in good governance of data 
linkage by the Council of Canadian Academies.869  
Thus far, this chapter has offered background information on the Scottish Health 
Informatics Programme. This has included discussion on the reuse of health data for 
research purposes and the ethical and legal issues implicated by data reuse. The 
development of the GGF has been recounted in addition to the provision of 
descriptions of each element. The next step in this case study is to offer an analysis of 
SHIP and test the conceptual tree metaphor which was proposed as a result of the 
findings from Part One of this thesis. 
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(http://www.scienceadvice.ca/uploads/eng/assessments%20and%20publications%20and%20








It is recalled that Anderson’s five elements of analytic autoethnography were laid out 
at the beginning of this chapter:  
(1) complete Member Researcher (CMR) status; 
(2) analytic reflexivity; 
(3) narrative visibility of the researcher’s self; 
(4) dialogue with informants beyond the self; and 
(5) commitment to theoretical analysis.870 
 
The forgoing discussion has demonstrated my status as a complete member 
researcher as part of the Information Governance Workstream. Throughout the 
discussion I have made reference to dialogue with others (fellow members of the 
Information Governance Working Group, the Guiding Principles Short Life Working 
Group, Public Engagement colleagues, SHIP researchers, data custodians and publics 
through workshops). 
This section of the chapter emphasises my commitment to theoretical analysis. It is 
recalled that chapter four concluded with a hypothetical conceptual tree model 
around the roles and interrelationships of rules and principles for decision-making. 
Here, I offer a reflexive analytical discussion on the experiences in SHIP and consider 
the insights which can be gained from the case study for the questions being pursued 
in this thesis.  
6.6 Analysis and discussion 
Each of the components of the Good Governance Framework (GGF) will now be 
considered in turn and analysis will be offered here about the broader assumptions 
                                                      








which can be garnered about rules and principles in decision-making. Specific 
reference will be made to each of the features of the conceptual tree metaphor. 
Following on from this discussion, the conceptual tree model will be further refined 
in order to incorporate any modifications/additions which are required as a result of 
the analysis.   
It should be noted from the outset that the SHIP case study may not necessarily reveal 
insights into every single proposed feature of the conceptual tree metaphor but given 
the discussions thus far, it is anticipated that the reflections will still significantly 
contribute towards refinement of the metaphor.  
6.6.1 What does the clarification of roles and responsibilities of data controllers 
mean for the conceptual tree metaphor? 
Although not original in content per se, the document which was developed in order 
to clarify the roles and responsibilities of data controllers and data processors 
represents an acknowledgement of the need to ensure that decision makers are kept 
abreast of relevant guidance and obligations with which they are expected to comply. 
In the context of SHIP, it was unclear how many researchers or data controllers would 
have been aware of the existence of the Article 29 Working Party, let alone any 
opinions which it released.871  
This suggests that an important element of the effectiveness of rules and principles 
can be related to transparency and accessibility in terms of how accessible rules, 
principles and related guidance are to decision makers. Even clearly drafted rules and 
principles will fail to guide decision makers unless those same individuals are made 
fully aware of their existence.  
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A failure to clearly articulate and highlight the existence of applicable rules and 
principles jeopardises implementation or uptake872 which, ironically, may be 
intended to aid precisely those decision makers the guidance may be targeted at in 
order to deal with difficult decisions. In short, this is a clear example of where more 
prescription was helpful in SHIP, making more transparent the Article 29 Data 
Protection Working Party Opinion. In terms of the conceptual tree, although 
apparently very self-evident, it is important that decision makers and other 
stakeholders are aware of the very existence of the tree and of each of its components 
as well as the implications which each of the components (rules and principles) will 
have.  
6.6.2 What do the Guiding Principles and Best Practices tell us about the 
conceptual tree metaphor? 
In the previous chapters, the various functions which rules and principles can 
perform in the decision-making context were considered. Significant insights have 
been provided into the relationships between rules and principles and their co-
existence upon a continuum. Further, the discussion in chapter five has revealed the 
valuable work which best practice instantiations can do in supporting decision 
makers when they must exercise discretion. The SHIP GPBP support those 
observations and this section considers how so. The ways in which a principled-
approach helps to support the application of rules (and offers decision makers 
support beyond the guidance which rules offer) is also highlighted. This is with a 
view to reinforcing one of the central arguments made within this thesis; that 
principles and rules each have weaknesses which the respective other can 
compensate for (to an extent) and they are thus better conceptualised as co-existing 
                                                      








upon a continuum. Further, the practical value of the best practice instantiations is 
also considered after the discussion on the guiding principles. 
6.6.2.1 Guiding Principles 
As stated previously, engagement with data custodians revealed an appetite for more 
rules in an already rule-centric regulatory landscape. But, we knew that despite 
individual and institutional reluctance against the exercise of discretion, adding more 
rules would not erase the inevitable discretionary space which decision makers had 
to traverse, nor would it meet the needs of a (necessary) flexible approach.  
This was evident from the fact that the pre-existing regulatory landscape was already 
one laden with rules which complicated matters rather than clarifying what to do for 
decision makers. It was clear that something other than rules was needed in order to 
support decision makers. And yet, whichever approach we opted for in order to 
support decision makers, it was also clear that it needed to be reflective of the pre-
existing rules which governed the ways in which data could be reused.  
It was at this stage that we considered the introduction of high-level principles. This 
was based on the OECD guiding principles instrument which had already been used 
in the biobanking context. Its value seemed to lie in: (a) providing a common 
framework and language for establishing what was at stake without necessarily 
dictating outcome (specific prescriptions), and (b) overtly embracing the need to 
engage on what was at stake and reflect relative to the value-objectives being sought.  
How does the experience of the SHIP Guiding Principles relate to the claims within 
the conceptual tree? First, something can be said about the relationship between 
principles and rules. Principles were employed as a means to communicate pre-
existing yet complex (legal) rules. Rather than generating even more prescriptive 
rules, the approach taken was to extract from the relevant legal rules the core values 








of a tree progressively narrow into forks and branches (transition from broad and 
abstract towards narrow and specific whilst still interconnected). Thus, with regards 
to the principle-rule continuum, this highlights the relationship between rules and 
principles; rules are conceptualised as manifestations of underlying ethical principles. 
Further, the continuum represents a move away from the specific and prescriptive 
towards the broad and abstract. This resonates with earlier discussions in chapter two 
which considered the distinction which Schauer stressed between the general and the 
vague.873  
Even where rules are provided, poor drafting may generate conflict between different 
rules, rendering uncertainty about which rule should apply in a given situation. 
Again, by virtue of their flexibility and their adaptivity, principles can be called upon 
in situations where discretion must be drawn upon.  This was certainly the case 
within the context of SHIP and data reuse more generally, where some data uses must 
be restricted and others promoted, and the distinction between the two is not always 
clear in practice, especially when the decision maker is faced with a difficult decision. 
The literature reviews in chapters two and three have already indicated that it is 
impossible to legislate for or to foresee every single possible eventuality. There will 
be many situations for which a rule is not provided; “no system of rules is capable of 
covering all new cases that might eventually arise”.874 In the absence of applicable 
rules, decision makers must exercise discretion in order to determine which other 
factors they will take into account. Where rules are lacking, principles, by virtue of 
their broad scope, may be applied to a variety of situations. 
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The protective function that principles can provide against abuse from decision 
makers was also previously considered.875 A further aspect of this protective function 
emerges upon reflection of SHIP. That is, principles can safeguard against the 
over/under-inclusiveness of activities that rules can perpetuate. Principles can play a 
protective role against this challenge, particularly where manifestly clear values are 
underlying. As I have argued elsewhere: 
The nature of principles is such that they provide us with a 
reminder of the different underlying values which must be 
factored-in to the decision making process around “what to do” 
rather than telling us explicitly. As alluded to above, linking data 
from health and non-health sources has great potential to expand 
our understanding of health and wellbeing. Yet, there has been a 
focus within regulatory terms on prioritising health uses (and even 
here, regulatory impediments are rife)…[P]rinciples can be of real 
value in helping to avoid the over/under-inclusiveness of activities 
that can result from relying upon rules alone. In particular, 
principles as a pre-determined, clear set of values can compensate 
for the gaps in the law where a clear course of action for the 
situation at hand is not offered….principles offer flexibility and 
guidance where provisions are not provided within the law.876  
 
Further, within the legal theory literature, Raz suggested that one of the core 
functions of principles is to support the interpretation of rules. I also considered that 
one of the results of a complex regulatory landscape is that it can generate varying 
interpretations of legislation and thus varying outcomes for decisions around 
whether to share data or not. The legislative provisions governing data reuse are a 
clear example of a complex landscape. Indeed, the European Data Protection 
Directive has given rise to a variety of interpretations by Member States. The SHIP 
Guiding Principles offer decision makers assistance by outlining the interpretative 
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slant which should be taken when observing the relevant legislation and when 
attempting to comply with the core objectives of SHIP, viz, responsible sharing of 
data for sound scientific research.  
The generic but nonetheless value-based set of principles allow the GGF to operate in 
increasingly complex contexts, such as cross-sectoral linkages, even those not yet 
envisaged. This resonates with Braithwaite’s assertions (considered in chapter two) 
that principles are particularly suited to regulating complex landscapes. The reader 
is reminded that the SHIP principles (which were developed for use in the health 
sector) subsequently formed the basis of the entire Scottish Government data 
initiative to prompt responsible data linkage across all sectors.877   
The principles included within the GGF offer longevity and increased reach, as 
demonstrated by the fact that the principles were also endorsed by the ICO. The 
principles have also heavily influenced arguments for principle-based approaches to 
the use of administrative data for research.878,879   
Another function of principles identified through the literature reviews in Part One 
was the standardising/unifying effect which principles can have across different 
healthcare professions. Part of the reasoning behind introducing the SHIP principles 
lay in offering stakeholders a set of shared overarching principles which all actors 
involved in SHIP would be aware of and expected to observe.  
This function should not be confused with the effect of homogenising decisions. Even 
with the same rule or principle, as noted above, different interpretations will arise. It 
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was acknowledged from the outset that the Guiding Principles were intended as a 
type of benchmark against which conduct and decisions would be assessed. 
Relatedly, it was made clear to SHIP stakeholders that in justifying any decisions 
related to the use (or denied use) of SHIP data, clear reference needs to be made to 
the Guiding Principles. Thus, the principles provide a basis on which to articulate the 
reasoning behind any decisions about whether data could or could not be accessed. 
This also relates to another function of principles which emerged from the literature 
review in Part One, i.e. the accountability function which principles can perform. It 
was noted that the notion of accountability can correspond to both ‘being called to 
account for one’s actions’880 and ‘the management of expectations’.881  The SHIP GPBP 
were designed to be an open, publicly accessible representation of the values and 
practices that SHIP (and all who were affiliated to it) subscribed to.  
SHIP actors were expected to adhere to the principles and their conduct would be 
assessed according to their compliance with/derivation from the principles. Any 
behaviour had to be justified with reference to the principles. This was particularly 
important in terms of openness and transparency not only for those using SHIP-
facilitated services, but equally for members of the public about whom information 
was being used for research purposes. Thus, the principle-based approach taken in 
SHIP implies that principles offer a benchmark for judging conduct of SHIP members 
and stakeholders more generally, according to the principles articulated in the GGF.  
It was previously considered that principles offer ‘an effective form of communication 
which facilitates ongoing moral debate and ongoing reflection’.882 Indeed, the SHIP 
GPBP offer a clear example of this dialogical function of principles. Further, they were 
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developed by virtue of an iterative process which included continual refinement and 
revision of the principles in response to stakeholder engagement on their content.  
Shortly after SHIP came to an end, an initiative called care.data sparked considerable 
controversy not only within but beyond the health research community.883,884,885 
Care.data is an NHS England and government proposal which seeks to extract data 
from patient records for retention and use in a centralised database, with possible 
access from commercial entities. One of the core criticisms of the initiative lay in the 
lack of meaningful engagement with the public before its launch.886 This has led to 
considerable delay in the establishment of the initiative. A public consultation was 
launched only after significant media reporting on the matter and the project has only 
recently been (partially) recommenced through four pathfinder projects.887 This also 
demonstrates the fact that rules alone may not be enough; care.data had a legal basis 
for its establishment by virtue of the Care Act 2014 and the rules included therein.  
Principles provide a means of engaging meaningfully with stakeholders. As I have 
argued elsewhere, principles provide a common framework through which:888  
stakeholders can agree upon the values and considerations to be 
included within regulatory approaches. Principles can also be used 
as a way of communicating the different interests which are at 
stake…Principles are more conducive to supporting genuine 
                                                      
883 PwC, ‘Data Release Review’, Health and Social Care Information Centre, (2014). Accessed 
11 July 2014: http://www.hscic.gov.uk/media/14246/HSCIC-Data-Release-Review-PwC-Final-
Report/pdf/HSCIC_Data_Release_Review_PwC_Final_Report.pdf. 
884  ‘Careless.data’, (editorial), 507 Nature, (2014), doi:10.1038/507007a.  
885 Goldacre, B., ‘Care.data is in Chaos, it Breaks my Heart’, Comment in The Guardian, (2014).  
Accessed 24 April 2014: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/feb/28/care-data-
is-in-chaos.   
886 Ramesh, R., ‘NHS medical records to be stored in regional data centres’, The Guardian 
(2014). Accessed 8 Oct 2014:  http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/oct/07/care-data-
patient-information-accredited-safe-havens. 
887  Digital Health.Net, ‘Care.data re-launched this month’, (2015). Accessed 2 Aug 2015: 
http://www.digitalhealth.net/news/29947/.   








dialogue with stakeholders and publics, since they do not prescribe 
(in the way that rules can) what specifically ought to be done. They 
promote reflection precisely on this point, through engaging in 
dialogue and, in particular, they offer us the opportunity to layout 
the core values which matter to us in the specific context.  Rules, in 
contrast, can do the opposite, they can either prohibit something 
that might not be problematic or, as in the case of care.data grant 
licence889 where there is little. 890 
 
This section has considered the varying functions which the SHIP guiding principles 
perform, highlighting the value which principles can add in supporting the 
interpretation and deployment of (complex) rules. And yet, despite these important 
and valuable functions which principles can offer, we felt that the guiding principles 
needed to be supported by instantiations of best practice, considered next. 
6.6.2.2 What do best practice instantiations mean for the conceptual tree metaphor? 
As laid out above, each of the SHIP guiding principles was underpinned by best 
practice examples as manifestations of each of the principles in practice. Again, this 
was in keeping with the OECD guidelines which also included best practice 
examples. But, SHIP was not obliged to also include best practice examples in its own 
approach. There must have been some implicit appreciation amongst the members of 
the SLWG of the fact that practical examples are valuable in supporting decision 
makers in understanding how to apply principles.  
It is recalled that this lack of specific guidance on how to apply principles has been 
much lamented within the bioethics literature. Chapter five has offered a theoretical 
exploration of best practice instantiations alongside specification, balancing and 
casuistry.  
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The best practice instantiations included within the SHIP GPBP appear to perform 
two important tasks. First, they offer an example of a principle in practice; and at the 
same time, they reflect the normative dimensions of the values at stake. 
This means that best practice examples could help us to address the challenges that 
principles are too vague but without the need to resort to hard and fast, specific rules. 
Best practice examples seen in this light are beacons for the operationalisation of 
principles; they are not wholly prescriptive in that they do not determine what needs 
to be done; rather they are strongly illustrative of what ought to be done in terms of 
providing examples of how the principle can be interpreted and its objectives met.   
This raises an interesting point for the conceptual tree being developed here and 
relatedly for the principle-rule continuum and the role of specification. It appears that 
the best practice instances are simultaneously rule-like and principle-like; they are 
more prescriptive than principles and more abstract than rules. With broad principles 
as starting points, through the process of specification, they become more prescriptive 
and rule-like. On a practical level, best practice instantiations stop short of telling the 
decision maker exactly what to do in the context of their difficult decision, but they 
still offer her more guidance than abstract principles alone. Equally, they offer more 
flexibility than rigid prescriptive determinations of what to do (rules). In relation to 
the tree metaphor, best practice instantiations are akin to the features of the leaves 
(i.e. the determinations of what to do). Whilst they stop short of guiding the decision 
maker towards a particular leaf, they nonetheless play a valuable role in 
demonstrating the types of features which the leaves might possess. Another 
important point is that there are many different ways in which the principles can be 
‘observed’. For example, the following principle can be interpreted and thus 
implemented in numerous ways: 
Data controllers should demonstrate their commitment to privacy 
protection through the development and implementation of 








Observation of this principle might include demanding anonymisation, 
pseudonymisation, disclosure control or obtaining consent. Thus, best practice 
examples do not necessarily point the decision maker towards a definitive answer. 
Rather, by offering practical examples of manifestations of underlying rules and 
principles, they guide the decision makers towards the ‘types’ of application which 
should be made. To relate back to the conceptual tree metaphor, this implies that best 
practice instantiations are akin to different bunches of leaves on a tree. The decision 
maker is offered an idea of what the leaf (specific decision about what to do) should 
look like. She is not necessarily provided with the specific leaf (the decision) but is 
better equipped to identify the specific leaf by virtue of her awareness of which 
‘features’ of the leaf to look for.  
6.6.3 What does Researcher Training and Vetting tell us about the conceptual 
tree? 
A vital component of exercising the necessary discretionary space in decision-making 
lies beyond the question of whether we are employing rules and principles, and falls 
on the question of who is making decisions (and exercising discretion), how, and 
based on what. This has led to the need for additional elements included in the GGF 
which deal specifically with these latter issues. 
The development and necessary completion of the researcher training programme by 
any individual wishing to access SHIP data represents an acknowledgement of the 
fact that the utility and value of rules and principles is dependent upon more than the 
mere existence of rules and principles. 
It implies that the benefits of rules and principles can only be fully realised when 
individuals who are drawing upon them are appropriately skilled and informed in 
how to use them. Decision makers must be supported in exercising discretion around 








support. This idea of placing importance in the person making decisions in the 
context of difficult decisions was also raised in both literature reviews. In other words, 
an important determining factor within the decision-making context is not only the 
how but also the who.  
Within the bioethics sphere, this has resonance with the popular ethical theory Virtue 
Ethics.  This normative ethical theory stresses the importance of the moral character 
of individuals. A detailed discussion of Virtue Ethics is not necessary for the present 
discussion.891 The important point is that the mere existence of principles or rules 
cannot ensure that individuals will always act ‘virtuously’ nor in a way that is 
consistent with the relevant ethical principles and legal rules.  
No governance framework can ensure compliance amongst all individuals. For 
example, creative compliance can occur whereby individuals purposefully 
misinterpret principles and rules in order to exploit loopholes. At the same time, it is 
suggested that principles might be better placed than rules to avoid creative 
compliance because they are broad in scope (and flaunting principles may be more 
difficult than rigid ‘all or nothing’ rules).  
Rules, principles, specification and instances of best practice do not supplant the need 
for adequate training for decision makers, for example. Nor, it is argued, can they 
compensate for cultural challenges to regulation. In relation to the tree metaphor, all 
of this relates to the surrounding environment within which the tree exists. A tree is 
only as healthy as the surrounding soil which nourishes it, and the roots which 
provide this nourishment from the soil to the trunk, branches, twigs and leaves. The 
branches of the tree (rules and principles) and the leaves at the end of these branches 
(options of what to do) are dependent upon the roots 
(organisational/cultural/educational environment) upon which the tree is grounded. 
                                                      
891 For such an account, see: Hursthouse, R., On Virtue Ethics, (New York: Oxford University 








Support for decision makers such as appropriate and effective training and vetting 
procedures, and ‘virtuous’ decision makers can significantly contribute towards a 
healthy tree. These additional components beyond rules and principles are essential 
for the longevity of the tree. It is submitted that in order to make the most out of all 
of the tools which decision makers have at their disposal, it is equally important to 
understand the different limitations of these tools, just as much as to understand their 
capabilities. 
6.6.4 What does proportionate risk-based categorisation mean for the 
conceptual tree metaphor? 
The categorisation of data access applications based on the perceived relative risks 
they carry, may on its face appear to be nothing more than a mere process for 
streamlining data access applications. Whilst this was one of the primary goals behind 
its formulation, upon closer analysis, the approach can offer us insights which are 
relevant to the conceptual tree.  
The risk-based categorisation approach offers more detailed procedural guidance for 
data custodians around ‘what to do’ when assessing a data access application. 
Similarly, it offers researchers who will be submitting these access applications an 
idea of ‘what to expect’ in terms of the level of scrutiny that their application may be 
subject to, thus providing some level of certainty and predictability. It is recalled from 
chapter two that certainty and predictability were heralded as functions which rules 
could perform. It is interesting to note here then that such a function can be performed 
through procedure rather than rules.   
Although it is acknowledged that each stage of the categorisation process is shaped 
around the rules and principles governing the reuse of data in health research, it is 
also notable that even with this more detailed approach, the role of discretion cannot 








must be made by one individual or group of individuals but the exercise of discretion 
is inevitable. In the language of the conceptual tree, risk-based categorisations offer 
support for the decision maker in understanding the direction which they should take 
when traversing the journey from trunk, to limb, to branches, twigs and ultimately 
leaves.  
6.7 Conclusion 
Through conducting a case study on the Scottish Health Informatics Programme, this 
chapter has considered a rule-based approach to decision-making. This consideration 
has involved an exploration of the rationale behind the launch of the SHIP project, an 
overview of the key legal and ethical issues inherent in data reuse for research 
purposes and consideration of the developments which took place under its auspices. 
In turn, all of these findings were reflected back into the conceptual tree metaphor 
which was advanced in the previous chapters.  
Of particular note for this thesis is that upon inception of SHIP, the governance 
landscape was characterised as rule-centric. This posed significant challenges for 
decision makers and generated impediments to important research in the public 
interest. Through the introduction of the Good Governance Framework - within 
which principles and best practice instantiations featured centrally – the governance 
environment was transformed. The reflections have revealed that rather than hard 
rules-based systems which can point to clear yes/no answers on data sharing, this 
principle-based approach recognises that such a binary outcome is usually 
inappropriate when balancing the complex range of considerations. A principle-
based approach assists decision makers in taking into account a relevant range of 
values when balancing the considerations. It provides a mechanism for reflection on 
their relative importance and it provides a means to justifying particular outcomes, 








Upon considerations revealed through the autoethnography, the end result for SHIP 
was a more facilitative decision-making environment in which decision makers were 
supported in the exercise of discretion. The reflections on the project and the GGF 
which we developed has highlighted that both rules and principles were necessary 
and that additional elements i.e. ‘something extra’ beyond rules and principles also 
played an important role. In particular, best practice instantiations may be one of the 
key additional elements necessary for decision-making in the context of difficult 
decisions in health research.  
Despite some limitations, it is submitted that real value can be gleaned from the 
deeper understanding of rules and principles offered within this thesis, as 
conceptualised through the various elements of the conceptual tree metaphor 
presented herein. In the conclusion to this thesis, a commentary is provided on the 






Chapter Seven: Conclusions 
7.1 Introduction 
This thesis has provided insight into important tools of decision-making: principles, 
rules and laterally, best practice instantiations. It has done so through an exploration 
of the distinct yet interrelated functions which they perform, it has shed light on the 
interrelationship that exists between them. Further, it has positioned best-practice 
instantiations in the middle of the principle-rule continuum. A conceptual tree 
metaphor has been introduced and developed in order to test and advance key 
findings from this body of work. This represents a helpful conceptual device which 
articulates the various elements of the contributions made by virtue of this thesis.  
The research set out to unpack the nature and various functions which principles and 
rules perform in helping the decision maker to determine what to do. A further goal 
was to deepen our understanding of the interrelationships between principles and 
rules as interconnected, interdependent and yet distinct decision-making tools. This 
topic has received little attention within the literature despite its significance. A 
specific focus was placed on decision-making in the context of data reuse for health 
research purposes. 
This final chapter draws together the findings from this body of work and lays out 
the original contribution to which claim is made in this thesis. First, I will reiterate the 
synthesis findings from Part One of this thesis. Next, the contributions from Part Two 
are considered. The culmination of the findings will then be framed around the 
conceptual tree metaphor which was proposed, developed and refined throughout 
the course of this research. Each component of the tree is considered in turn. 
Discussion is offered on the practical and theoretical implications of the findings 
throughout. The limitations of the findings will also be addressed. Finally, possible 





7.2 Part One – Remaining Rooted: Template construction and literature 
reviews 
Part One began by laying out the rationale for an exploration of principles and rules 
within the context of difficult decisions. The health research setting perpetually 
confronts the decision maker with difficult decisions and principles and rules are 
regularly invoked in order to determine ‘what to do’. Despite this central reliance on 
principles and rules, reflection is lacking on the different ways in which these norms 
are conceptualised and relied upon for decision-making respective to each other. This 
body of work has provided a valuable exploration of the different functions which 
principles and rules can perform, and has shed light on the nature of the relationships 
existing between them. Through the construction and deployment of a bespoke 
analytical template, two important literature bases were consulted in order to gather 
insight into pre-existing conceptualisations of principles and rules. In turn, the 
literatures were compared and contrasted and the findings culminated in the 
development of a conceptual tree metaphor through which to communicate and 
further explore key lines of investigation which resulted from the literature reviews. 
7.2.1 Chapter Two: Legal theory literature review 
The first literature review explored discussions on rules and principles within 
jurisprudential literatures. This was chosen because of the enduring space which 
principles and rules have occupied within that sphere. Typical characterisations 
emerged of rules as prescriptive, specific and rigid norms. In contrast, principles were 
described as vague and abstract. The open texture which both norms (but more so 
principles) are vulnerable to was problematised and the scope for discretion on the 
part of the decision maker was also considered. Alexy’s and Dworkin’s definitions of 
the two norms were adopted. In short, rules are either applicable or not whereas 
principles are optimization maxims, applicable to varying degrees and which carry a 
dimension of weight. Despite this distinction and a tendency to consider principle- 





that distinguishing between principles and rules is challenging. It was suggested that 
rather than further seeking to dichotomise rules and principles, a more helpful 
framing lies in conceptualising both as co-existing upon a continuum. 
Whilst the notion of a continuum has already been invoked within the literature, the 
further conceptual contribution made here builds upon the continuum and explores 
it in more depth, in particular by fleshing out the middle-ground on the continuum 
via an exploration of specification, casuistry and best practice. Further, fleshing out 
the continuum and the different functions played by rules and principles 
acknowledges the shared ‘family resemblances’ between the norms whilst also 
appreciating that clearer distinctions between the norms may become apparent at 
extreme ends of the continuum.  An additional insight which this thesis provides and 
which goes beyond the pre-existing notion of the continuum, is that it accounts for 
the fact that different principles and rules will give rise to different interpretations 
which in turn will generate different determinations of what to do.  
Likewise, different functions which rules and principles can be called upon to 
perform were also identified, this is also an under-developed point of discussion 
within the literature, yet one which is particularly important in terms of 
understanding the nature of principles and rules. The fact that decision makers place 
varying expectations upon rules and principles is also under-appreciated within the 
literature. This ‘mapping’ of functions has real practical significance in regulatory 
terms, a necessary first step when considering how to approach regulation will lie in 
determining the purpose of the regulation (and will influence whether we employ 
rule-base, principle-based, a combined or a modified approach). 
7.2.2 Chapter Three: Bioethics literature review 
The second literature review centred on bioethical literatures because this is the 
primary discipline to which this research is directed. In contrast with the legal theory 
literature, bioethical discussions centred heavily on ethical principles and discussion 





the terms ‘rule’ and ‘principle’ were used almost interchangeably. This highlighted 
the lack of reflection within the bioethical literature, and subsequently sheds light on 
new insights on the significance of differentiating between, and understanding the 
nature of, principles and rules.  
In building on the principle-rule continuum, the bioethics literature suggested that 
principles underpin rules and in turn, rules were conceptualised as more specific or 
formalised manifestations of principles. This bolstered the need for further 
exploration of the interrelationship between rules and principles. Principles were 
problematised for the challenges associated with their application to difficult 
decisions both in terms of (1) extracting action-guiding content and (2) balancing 
conflicting principles. Similarly, the question of the necessity of over-arching moral 
theory was considered. The importance of contextual factors in decision-making also 
emerged as an important theme yet one which could not be explored in-depth. 
Alternative approaches to decision-making were also explored, including casuistry. 
Varying functions which principles can perform were also considered. The core 
findings of chapter three suggested that principlism, specification, balancing and 
casuistry all necessitated further investigation.  
7.2.3 Chapter Four: Comparative analysis  
Chapter four offered a comparative analysis of both literatures and it is argued that 
this is a novel and valuable undertaking in and of itself.  Several notable observations 
which overlapped across both literatures emerged and this culminated in a 
‘portraiture’ of key ‘family resemblances’ which are shared between the two norms. 
For example, both literatures problematise the interpretative challenges associated 
with the application of principles as well as the issue of how to address conflict 
between different principles. In particular, three overlapping characteristics with 
regards to the application of principles and rules were identified which would in turn 
inform further investigations in the remainder of the thesis, these are                          





what to do. Further, both literatures hinted towards the need for ‘something extra’ 
beyond principles and rules for decision-making purposes. The notion of the 
potential interrelationship between principles and rules also features across the 
literatures, and bolsters the further development of the principle-rule continuum 
which is offered in this thesis.  
7.2.4 Conceptual tree 
Whilst conducting the comparative analysis, the metaphor of a tree emerged as an 
accurate and helpful conceptual device with which to articulate the observations that 
were beginning to emerge. The value and limitations associated with the use of 
metaphor were considered and it was concluded that despite the risk of over-
extension of a metaphor, it remains a meaningful conceptual device nonetheless. The 
tree metaphor was subsequently tested, refined and further developed throughout 
the course of Part Two and it is laid out in more detail later in this chapter. 
7.3 Part Two – Branching Out: Refining and developing the tree metaphor 
Part Two of the thesis ‘branched out’ by testing and developing the conceptual tree 
and the propositions included within it. Two topics of analysis were carefully selected 
in order to explore the key themes which had emerged as a result of the literature 
reviews.  
7.3.1 Chapter Five: Principlism and specification  
Building on the preceding literature reviews and the tree metaphor, chapter five 
sought to explore the implications of adopting a principle-centric approach to 
decision-making and to further explore the potential decision-making support of 
specification, casuistry and best practice. The dominant bioethical approach of 
Principlism provided the perfect backdrop through which to conduct the exercise. 





difficulties in applying principles, a particular analytical focus was placed on the 
process of specification.  Although this methodology for extracting action-guiding 
content from principles has been incorporated into the Principlist approach, the 
literature reveals that the methodology remains somewhat elusive. Clear and 
satisfactory examples and explanations of how to specify is lacking but value of the 
approach is evident in respect of the creation of a ‘mid-level norm’.  
I have suggested that such mid-level norms can be centrally located on the principle-
rule continuum. The decision maker starts out with a broad, abstract principle-like 
norm, and through progressive specification, a rule-like norm is created. Whilst such 
rule-like norms do not necessarily provide the decision maker with a specific 
determination of what to do, they support the decision maker considerably 
nonetheless in:  (1) reducing the indeterminacy of the starting principle, (2) narrowing 
the scope of the starting principle and (3) providing justifications on a chosen course 
of action.  
I have built upon the above three goals of specification by advocating the introduction 
of best practice instantiations as a supplement to guiding principles. I have suggested 
that the casuistic approach of drawing analogies from paradigm cases provides a 
helpful approach to identifying best practice instantiations. These are important 
conceptual contributions which can be implemented in practically valuable ways. 
7.3.2 Chapter Six: SHIP case study 
The case study in chapter six charted the progress and developments of the Scottish 
Health Informatics Programme (SHIP).  This served as a fruitful, practical, real-life 
exploratory backdrop against which to investigate the implications of a rule-centric 
approach to decision-making. It also considered the effects of the introduction of 
principles to the decision-making environment. The unique perspective which I 
brought as both an independent academic observer and an embedded researcher 





particular, the Good Governance Framework which was developed within it, have 
generated several important considerations regarding decision making. 
First, the limitations associated with over-reliance on rules can be damaging; it can 
lead to over-burdensome and confusing regulation which paradoxically stifles the 
very practice (ethical, legal and scientifically sound research) which it is designed to 
facilitate. This is because rules can perpetuate a tick-box mentality and an appetite for 
even more rules (and more confusion) when the rigid pre-existing rules are 
unsatisfactory in terms of helping decision makers determine ‘what to do’.  
It has been argued that principles can support decision makers in confronting difficult 
decisions. Due to their flexibility, they can be adapted and applied to a variety of 
different dilemmas. Principles can compensate for the short-comings which rules can 
generate given the specific and limited reach of the latter norms. A further benefit is 
that principles can also serve as justifications for a particular course of action. Despite 
the multiple benefits of a principle-based approach, it was acknowledged that 
principles do not supplant the need for rules but rather, can be complementary 
towards pre-existing rules in a given setting.  
The added value of best practice instantiations as supports for decision makers in 
understanding how to apply different principles was considered in real practical 
terms, building upon the findings of the previous chapter which explored the 
function of best-practice from a theoretical level.  
The SHIP case study also highlighted the important influential factors which can 
impact upon decision-making and which extend beyond mere reliance upon rules 
and principles. For example, additional elements of the Good Governance 
Framework focus on training and proportionate approvals processes. Likewise, the 
process involved in drafting the principles and best practice instantiations was an 





7.4 Conceptual tree  
The findings of the thesis have culminated in a final version of the conceptual tree 
metaphor which is represented in the Figure 4 below. Each element will be discussed 












7.4.1 From root to trunk to branch to twig - the principle-rule continuum. 
The trunk of a tree forks into branches which, in turn, fork into twigs. With each fork, 
the branches and twigs become narrower. An analogy can be drawn with this 
progressive narrowing and the principle-rule continuum which has been developed 
here. On one end, the trunk (broad abstract principle-like norm) progressively 
narrows (becoming more specific, prescriptive and rule-like). This eventually leads to 
leaves (different options of what to do).  
The implications of these findings for this thesis are that an optimum approach to 
decision-making is one which embraces both rules and principles, as complementary 
and co-existing decision-making aids; the narrower twigs of the tree are reliant upon 
the broader limbs. In turn, the limbs must narrow in order to generate leaves.  This 
symbiotic relationship suggests that it is not necessarily helpful to seek out only 
principle-centric or rule-centric approaches. 
Further, it reflects that fact that principle-like norms can develop into rule-like norms 
and vice versa, depending upon how these norms are interpreted and deployed. As I 
have suggested above, the progressive narrowing (via specification) can help to 
transform broad abstract principle-like norms into more prescriptive best practice 
instantiations which are not quite so prescriptive as typically rule-like norms, but 
which nonetheless transport the decision maker closer towards determining what to 
do.  
In contrast, where a narrow and prescriptive rule-like norm may not provide a 
suitable determination of what do, the decision maker can progress away from the 
narrow and towards the broad, i.e. principles can function as reminders to the 
decision maker of the ethical values which are designed to underpin the rule. This 
two-way travel represents the non-linear and fluid nature of the conceptual tree, 
which accommodates travel both away from the abstract towards the prescriptive and 
vice versa.  Equally, best practice instantiations can represent a middle-ground on the 





may be that the decision maker, in spanning away from twigs towards broad limbs, 
determines that they should explore a different ‘fork’.  
Furthermore, the forking feature of the tree metaphor offers a more helpful 
conceptualisation of the relationship between principles and rules than the 
continuum metaphor on its own. This is because in acknowledging the continuum 
and the move from broad to specific (and vice versa), the fork and different resultant 
branches also account for the different interpretations which a solitary principle or 
rule can generate.  
This is healthy and useful, rather than problematic.  The principle-rule continuum is 
not only a valuable way in which to conceptualise these norms, but it is also a fluid 
and valuable tool of insight and exchange on the complementary nature and value of 
principles, rules and best practice.   
7.4.2 The discretionary space between the trunk, branches, twigs and leaves 
The space which spans across the entirety of a tree is analogous to the discretionary 
space which decision makers must self-navigate through in order to determine what 
to do.  Each fork is analogous to the different options or interpretations which the 
decision maker is presented with in terms of the potential principles/rules which she 
elects to apply in a given situation as well as the diverse interpretations (and best 
practice instantiations) which can stem from each rule/principle. 
It is argued that through the introduction of guiding principles and best practice 
instantiations, decision makers are better equipped to make difficult decisions by 
virtue of supported discretion. This is in part due to the nature of principles; they are 
flexible overarching guides which remind decision makers of the different ethical 
considerations which must be factored-in. In acknowledgement of the fact that it may 
be challenging to apply over-arching principles, best practice instantiations can offer 
significant support in this regard. Carefully constructed best practice which offer 





to the decision maker how the principles are applied in practical terms, based on 
paradigm difficult decisions which stem from the decision-making context which the 
principles are directed towards. 
It is noted that numerous best practice instantiations may be generated from the same 
principle and the decision maker must still exercise discretion in order to elect which 
best practice instantiation they will use to draw an analogy with the difficult decision 
they are facing. The exercise of discretion is an inevitable, necessary and desirable 
aspect of decision-making. It has been openly acknowledged that we are unable to 
anticipate every possible difficult decision.  
Best practice instantiations retain an appropriate level of the flexibility of principle-
like norms, however the narrowed scope and grounded exemplars contained within 
them better serve individuals in this space than a rule/principle/rule and principle-
centric approach.   Furthermore, through the conceptualisation of specification as a 
means to provide justification (via reflective equilibrium), decision makers are 
equipped with justifications for a particular course of action.  
7.4.3 Different features of trees- leaves, roots, bark all serve different distinct 
yet co-dependent functions- i.e. rules and principles perform distinct yet 
interrelated functions  
Whilst consideration of the various functions which rules and principles can perform 
was somewhat restricted to Part One of this thesis, identification of these functions 
still has real practical significance in regulatory terms. It is argued that a necessary 
first step when considering how to approach regulation will lie in determining the 
purpose of the regulation i.e. regulators must ask themselves ‘what are we asking of 
these rules/principles?’ In turn, this should inform the adoption and implementation 
of whether we employ a predominantly rule- or principle-based approach. I have 
suggested that the most appropriate regulatory approach is one which employs both 
rules and principles in a mutually supportive way and which should be bolstered by 





7.4.4 The tree as a holistic organism which relies on rules and principles as 
integral features but which also acknowledges that decisions are rooted in and 
contingent upon wider considerations such as roots beneath the soil viz 
training, culture and coherence. If the roots are unhealthy, the tree will not 
flourish and the leaves will not grow  
A tree is a living organism which is primarily comprised of a trunk, branches and 
twigs, these are integral features. Nevertheless, the tree is unable to survive without 
nutrients and a healthy root structure to deliver these nutrients throughout the 
organism. These nutrients and this root structure are analogous to the ‘something 
extra’ theme which has continually featured in discussions viz the need for something 
in addition to rules and principles (and best practice). This research has identified 
several additional features necessary for the existence and flourishing of the decision-
making environment. 
One ‘healthy root’ theme corresponds with adequate training of decision makers. This 
includes the necessity for decision makers to be aware of and understand the various 
rules and principles which they must incorporate into their decision-making. This 
may seem axiomatic, but the SHIP experience demonstrated that decision makers 
may not necessarily be aware of the existence of, let alone understand, the various 
rules and principles in play. This thesis stresses the added value of principles, 
appropriately deployed, as decision-making aids to the responsibilities of decision 
makers.  
A related healthy root type corresponds with the type of person which the decision 
maker is. Whilst carefully drafted rules and principles (supported by best practice) 
can support decision makers and help to curb creative compliance (purposeful 
interpretation contrary to the spirit of specific regulations), they cannot guarantee 
virtuous intentions. This is not to suggest that the majority of decision makers in the 
health research context willfully abuse regulation, but rather, it stresses the 
importance of appreciating the limitations around rules and principles and the fact 





practices and behavior. Consider, for example, the Information Commissioner’s Code 
of Practice which acknowledges that ‘motivated intruders’ may wish to access data 
for unethical/illegal purposes. Whilst the scope of this thesis has not facilitated 
consideration of Virtue Ethics, perhaps that approach can help in this regard. 
7.4.5 The life-cycle of the tree - leaves fall and are absorbed back into the soil- 
principles and rules must be tailored to the new challenges which are presented 
to the law especially where technology develops (this also resonates with 
Rawlsian reflective equilibrium which is a secondary feature of specified 
principlism) 
The life cycle of the tree as a constantly evolving, living organism corresponds with 
reflective equilibrium. Although space has precluded meaningful engagement with 
this concept, it must be acknowledged that coherence is paramount. A necessary 
consideration which takes place prior to the application of rules and principles, is the 
content of the rules or principles. As stated in the introduction to this research, the 
majority of jurisprudential and bioethical literatures on rules and principles focus 
precisely on debating the content or substance of rules and principles. My focus on 
the nature of rules and principles as decision-making norms makes a helpful 
contribution to a lesser-explored aspect of health research regulation but in no way 
seeks to denigrate the fundamental importance of having coherent rules and 
principles in the first place.  
7.5 Benefits and limitations of the metaphor 
Whilst the value of the metaphor and the insights which it brings to the decision-
making context are clear, as laid out above, it is also worthwhile briefly considering 
the relationship between the metaphor and the continuum as well as the limits of the 
metaphor. Regarding the continuum and the metaphor, it is recalled that the 
principle-rule continuum has already been advanced within the literature as a means 





fleshed out the continuum by introducing best practice instantiations as mid-level 
bridging norms which occupy a middle space on the continuum. Whilst the tree 
metaphor captures the continuum, it is much more valuable and insightful than the 
continuum alone. The tree metaphor not only accounts for the ontological fuzziness 
between rules and principles, but it goes several steps further by also accounting for 
the different interpretations which any given principle or rule can give rise to, in the 
language of the tree metaphor, this relates to the forking feature i.e. the different limbs 
which progressively lead to different branches and in turn different twigs. The 
decision-maker must constantly exercise discretion when picking which 
interpretation of a rule or principle to adopt. Further, the tree metaphor captures the 
various functions which rules and principles can perform, and accounts for the 
significance of wider decision-making factors such as training, culture and reflective 
equilibrium. The continuum alone does not account for these important 
considerations or features.  
Despite the clear value of the metaphor, as laid out above, it is acknowledged that the 
conceptual tree also has its limitations. For example, as mentioned in chapter four, 
there is a risk that metaphors can be stretched too far, that unintended meaning can 
be read into or attached to a metaphor. Each of the specific parts of the tree metaphor 
should not be taken to be too literally related to principles, rules and best practice. It 
is inevitable that some confusion may arise between the numerous different features 
of trees and the numerous different functions, tools and features of decision-making 
which I have shed light on in this body of work.  This is partly because of the 
complexity associated with communicating the multiple dynamics and functions 
which have been revealed throughout this research.  Nonetheless, it is argued that 
despite these limitations, the conceptual tree metaphor provides an original, 
theoretically and practically valuable contribution towards navigating the path of the 
difficult decision. Finally, the tree is a living metaphor and there remains space for 
further clarification, refinement and development following on from this thesis. Other 





7.6 Next steps 
Having considered the core contribution which this body of work makes, a final task 
lies in considering how this work can be further developed. Space constraints have 
curtailed the pursuit of important additional lines of investigation. One obvious 
future exercise is to investigate the use of best practice instantiations in more detail 
and across wider regulatory settings. Further, reference is also made in the literature 
to ‘standards’, and whilst I have purposively excluded consideration of standards for 
the purposes of this research, a helpful next-step in further unpacking the principle-
rule continuum lies in exploring the role of standards in decision-making. 
Context has continually featured within the discussions. Numerous authors have 
sought to emphasise the significance of the context in which a decision is taking place.  
The flexibility of the conceptual tree means that it could be applied in different 
jurisdictional contexts for example in common law or civil law systems in order to 
explore different normative functions. Within the bioethics setting, as considered, 
Meslin et al advocate a Principlist approach which includes sensitivity to context.  On 
a similar note, Callahan has identified different ‘strands’ of bioethics and questions 
arise around how we can facilitate sensitivity to context in practical and meaningful 
ways and whether the different functions of rules and principles in decision-making 
may vary according to the context in which a decision is being made. In turn, decision 
makers may need extra/alternative decision-making aids when presented with 
different ‘types’ of decisions.  
This also relates to the broader theme of regulatory culture. It is recalled that at the 
inception of SHIP, the term ‘culture of caution’ was invoked in order to describe the 
pre-existing regulatory environment. Indeed, I have discussed the ways in which 
principles and best practice in particular can help to improve and transform a culture 





At the same time, as I have stressed repeatedly throughout this work, understanding 
the limitations of rules and principles is also paramount. I have very recently been 
involved in research which seeks to understand how to achieve interoperability 
across different data sectors (for example, sharing data between health, education and 
crime sectors). In the context of data sharing, interoperability implies being able to 
share data across different sectors without extra effort (or more realistically, with 
minimal extra effort).  
When asked to identify core barriers which impede sharing across different data 
sectors at a workshop, my colleagues Graeme Laurie892, Leslie Stevens893 and I had 
assumed that participants would first and foremost identify legal or technical 
barriers. In fact, they stressed that whilst regulatory and information system-based 
concerns were important factors, the most pressing concerns centre on different data 
sharing cultures which exist within each of the sectors. Further, numerous 
participants stressed the integral roles which partnerships and trust played in terms 
of willingness to work and share across sectors. These wider factors stress the need 
for holistic approaches to governance and future work could explore whether 
principles and rules might have a role to play in fostering interoperability. 
The numerous further lines of inquiry considered above demonstrate the wide scope 
of the findings and the potential applicability of this research to a diverse array of 
settings. Whilst considerable exploratory space around decision-making remains to 
be investigated, this body of work has contributed at both a theoretical and practical 
level towards deepening our understanding of how we can guide the decision maker 
through the path of the difficult decision.  
  
                                                      
892 It is recalled that Graeme Laurie led the Information Governance worksteam of SHIP. 
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